

Counterplans

General Stuff

Competition

The core controversy of icebreakers is who should fund the plan- proves the counterplan is legitimate

O'Rourke 14 (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 6/5/14, "Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf>, JHR)

Another **potential issue for Congress**, if it is determined that one or more new icebreakers should be procured by the government through a traditional acquisition, is whether the acquisition cost of those ships should be funded entirely through Coast Guard's Acquisition, Construction, and Improvements (AC&I) account, or partly or entirely through **other parts of the federal budget**, such as the Department of Defense (DOD) budget, the NSF budget, or both.⁵⁴ Within the DOD budget, possibilities include the Navy's shipbuilding account, called the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account, and the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF), which is an account where DOD sealift ships and Navy auxiliary ships are funded.

Alaska CP

1nc

Text: Alaska should fund _____

CP Solves – Alaska would willingly invest

DeMarban 12 (Alex – staff writer for the Alaska Dispatch, Parnell: AIDEA could help finance icebreaker if Feds drop ball, Alaska Dispatch, p.<http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/parnell-aidea-could-help-finance-icebreaker-if-feds-drop-ball>) //Laura D

Earlier this week, Alaska Dispatch published a story shining light on an exchange of letters between Gov. Sean Parnell and Rep. Don Young about how the state can help the US government beef up its Arctic icebreaking capacity. **Icebreaker fans know the federal government is hobbled in the Arctic as other countries boost their presence in the resource rich -- and increasingly accessible -- Far North. But the nation's two heavy-duty icebreakers are out of commission,** leaving just the medium-duty ship, Healy. Parnell's March 15 reply to Young, who had tossed out ideas on how the state could help, was succinct. **Parnell lamented the federal government's shirking of its ice-breaking role in the Arctic,** and said the state should not subsidize that US duty. However, **he said Alaska could consider helping, including financing. He didn't provide more detail on the financing idea, and the Dispatch did not receive an immediate reply to a request seeking more detail.** However Sharon Leighow, the governor's spokeswoman, emailed a response the day after the story published on Thursday. "Before looking to the state of Alaska to fund federal infrastructure, we would suggest the president revisit his FY 12 proposed budget for the US Coast Guard, which contains \$8.68 billion of discretionary funding. **We think protecting the nation's interests and the state's interests in the Alaska offshore area is critical.** The president proposes funding six fast-response cutters, 40 response boat medium-endurance cutters, and other vessels and air assets. **While those are important, and we support the USCG, we think a new icebreaker is critical and should be funded by the administration. It is clearly the administration's job to make sure the Coast Guard has the assets it needs, and an important asset is a new heavy icebreaker.** "If the federal government fails to provide for this need, there may be options for a state agency like Alaska Industrial Development and Export Authority to participate in some sort of arrangement, but that will be up to the AIDEA board, and the Coast Guard would have to come to AIDEA with a project proposal that met all due-diligence requirements. What exactly such an arrangement could look like would be up to the AIDEA board." **The president's budget did provide about \$8 million to plan and design a new icebreaker. The cost of a new icebreaker has been estimated to cost \$900 million, though an official with Louisiana-shipbuilder Edison Chouest Offshore said it could be done more cheaply.**

Solvency

Alaska could fund the plan

DeMarban 12 (Alex, Should Alaska take the lead in financing new icebreakers? April 11, 2012, <http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/should-alaska-take-lead-financing-new-icebreakers>, JZG)

Gov. Sean Parnell says the state might be interested in helping finance a new icebreaker so the U.S. can make up lost ground in the race for Arctic dominance. That's **the gist of the governor's response** to a lengthy letter from Rep. Don Young **offering ideas on how Alaska can help the cash-strapped federal government put costly new icebreakers off Alaska's** increasingly busy northern **coasts**. With the nation's icebreaking fleet reduced to a single working ship -- its two large icebreakers are undergoing repairs or being decommissioned -- the state and U.S. government should consider sharing costs to make new icebreakers a reality, Young suggested in a Feb. 7 letter to Parnell. New or refurbished icebreakers will cost hundreds of millions of dollars. More ships are plowing through the Bering Strait as sailing seasons lengthen in the warming but often ice-choked Arctic. The U.S. Coast Guard predicts traffic will continue growing as shipping, resource development and tourism expands. But the Healy, a "medium duty" icebreaker that escorted a Russian fuel tanker to Nome this winter, is the Coast Guard's lone functioning icebreaker. 'Creative financing' **"Without access to heavy icebreakers, we will be unable to adapt to historic changes in the Arctic,"** Young wrote. "Icebreakers are critical for ensuring safe shipping and resource operations and providing for field research opportunities." He continues: "Given the current fiscal climate in D.C., funding the acquisition of new vessels presents a significant challenge. It is clear that we must consider creative financing and ownership options to move forward." **In addition to helping bankroll the project, the state should also think about owning an icebreaker with private firms. The state could refurbish the Polar Sea or the Polar Star. It could then lease its icebreakers to the Coast Guard** and National Science Foundation, wrote Young. Last fall, Young introduced legislation calling on the federal government to lease two large icebreakers for at least 10 years from private entities that own and operate the ships. The ships must be built on American soil, according to the bill, which remains in the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. Parnell wrote Young back in a March 15 letter: "You must be as dismayed as I am to see the federal mission in the Arctic to assist marine trade, provide search and rescue, and provide law enforcement through ice-breaking services diminish so significantly." Parnell said the state won't subsidize US responsibilities such as icebreaking. But it is willing to help the federal government improve its ice-breaking capability. "We can look at all the ways the state can be supportive and helpful, such as financing," Parnell wrote. Parnell's letter didn't address the kinds of "financing" the state could provide. A request to his office seeking clarification wasn't returned Wednesday evening.

Reserve funds ensure stable funding

Epler 6/21/11 (Patti, "Should Alaska build its own Arctic icebreaker?") Alaska Dispatch. <http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/should-alaska-build-its-own-arctic-icebreaker> //Laura T

GIRDWOOD -- **Anchorage Sen. Lesil McGuire thinks the state should build its own Polar-class icebreaker, much like the U.S. Coast Guard uses for Arctic patrols. The Coast Guard's two "heavy" icebreakers are out of commission right now, and the service is relying on one "medium" icebreaker -- primarily a scientific research vessel -- for anything that's needed in the Arctic. The problem? Repairing or retrofitting an icebreaker costs hundreds of millions of dollars. Building a new one? Even more. Congress has been reluctant to commission a new ship due to the high cost. An April report by the Congressional Research Service put the pricetag of a new icebreaker at about \$1 billion, \$500 million to fix up one of the existing ships enough to last another 25 years. The heavy icebreakers have been in service more than 30 years. McGuire, addressing the Arctic Imperative Conference that ended Tuesday night, called the icebreaker a "key part of the Arctic," saying the Alaska Legislature should pay for one itself, using some of the billions of dollars the state has socked away in various budget**

reserve accounts. The ship could be used for search and rescue operations and help in oil spill response, among other things.

Alaska has back up funding

Harris 2/29/12 – Investigative reporter and editor with specialties in consumer protection and finance for Money Magazine and Consumer Reports (Marlys, “Outlook for state budgets getting brighter, but far from rosy”) <http://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2012/02/outlook-state-budgets-getting-brighter-far-rosy> //Laura T

For starters, some states' success derives less from fiscal discipline than dumb luck. The soaring price of oil has conferred on Alaska a \$3.4 billion surplus, which it can add to the \$11 billion the state has already stashed in a rainy day fund. Oil also bears much of the credit for putting Texas in the black by \$1.6 billion -- after a \$27 billion budget shortfall last year. South Dakota, home to several large credit card companies since the 1980s when it removed caps on interest rates, is enjoying a small surplus from its bank franchise tax, as the card business gradually improves. What's more, state revenues have not risen to anything near their pre-recession levels; in 2011 they were about \$39 billion (or 7 percent) below their 2008 peak. State government watchers predict that in 2012 revenues will drag \$20 billion behind -- better, but still awful.

Solvency – Cooperation

Global warming has increased geopolitical and economic competition in the Arctic—a strong Arctic Council can provide the leadership needed to facilitate peaceful and sustainable development

Patrick 14 – senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (Stewart, “The Unruled World,” Council on Foreign Relations Foreign Affairs Article, [http://www.cfr.org/global-governance/unruled-world/p32502\)BC](http://www.cfr.org/global-governance/unruled-world/p32502)BC)

Geopolitical and economic competition has also heated up in the warming Arctic, as nations wrangle over rights to extended continental shelves, new sea routes over Asia and North America, and the exploitation of fossil fuel and mineral deposits. To date, cooler heads have prevailed. In 2008, the five Arctic nations -- Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States -- signed the Ilulissat Declaration, affirming their commitment to address any overlapping claims in a peaceful and orderly manner. Some **experts contend that the Arctic needs a comprehensive multilateral treaty to reconcile competing sovereignty claims, handle navigational issues, facilitate collective energy development, manage fisheries, and address environmental concerns. A more productive strategy would be to bolster the role of the Arctic Council, composed of the five Arctic nations plus Finland, Iceland, Sweden, and several indigenous peoples' organizations. Although this forum has historically avoided contentious boundary and legal disputes, it could help codify guidelines on oil and gas development, sponsor collaborative mapping of the continental shelf, create a regional monitoring network, and modernize systems for navigation, traffic management, and environmental protection.**

Arctic Nuclear-Free Zone CP

FYI

here's what the cp would do

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The Framework for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in the Arctic

1. The Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone should cover all adjacent seas, sea beds, continental shelves, disputed territories, international waters and airspace of Canada, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Northern Russia and Alaska (USA) should also be covered by the Treaty.
2. Along the edges of the zone, there should be a gradual “thinning out” of nuclear weapons.
3. All zonal states and NATO should subscribe to a policy of non-First Use of nuclear weapons both during peacetime and wartime in the Arctic.
4. Non-nuclear weapon states in the region should renounce the nuclear umbrella.
5. “Nuclear Weapon Free” should mean all nuclear weapons and armaments, as well as the targeting of nuclear facilities and nuclear testing.
6. The peaceful use of nuclear technology for civilian purposes should continue.
7. Verification procedures need to ensure that civilian nuclear technology is not being deferred towards weapon building capabilities.
8. All nuclear weapons must be removed from the zone.
9. There should be no new deployment of weapons.
10. Transiting the zone with nuclear weapons should not be permitted.
11. A permanent organization should be established to ensure verification of the rules and this organization should have the resources that it needs to operate fully.
12. Joint aerial patrols of the region should be carried out.
13. States should prioritize aerial reconnaissance of the proposed ANWFZ with their OST quota of flights.
14. The ANWFZ should incorporate the PSI into its framework.
15. An advanced underwater listening system built by and accessed to by all zonal states should be created.
16. Information-sharing of relevant information should be commonplace.
17. The place of nuclear weapons within the military strategy of the zonal states should not be replaced with another equally (or more) destructive Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD).

Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)

18. Measures that do not build confidence (i.e. flag planting, whiskey burying and fly-bys) should be avoided.
19. Arctic Council member states should resource their Arctic SAR capabilities to honour their SAR Treaty commitments. This process should be monitored by the Arctic Council's new Secretariat.
20. INCSEA should be 'multilateralized' to include all of the Arctic States.
21. Both the United States and Russia should take their nuclear arsenals off high alert status.
22. Nuclear Weapon States should unfix the guidance systems of their weapons from targets within the zone immediately.
23. An Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs from each state should be appointed to handle negotiations.
24. Consular services and support should be increased within the region and researchers and Indigenous Peoples should have simplified access to visas.
25. The United States should ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the existing sovereignty disputes in the region.
26. A common code for ship design should be agreed upon in order to mitigate the chances of environmental damage.
27. Financial and technical support for programs such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program that aims to safely dispose of nuclear waste in the Russian North should be forthcoming from all zonal states.
28. The security of nuclear fuel storage facilities should be bolstered.
29. Common training programs for nuclear officials should be initiated in order to create the people with the required expertise to carry out the other recommendations.
30. Economic integration should be encouraged. One possible method would be for an Arctic Chamber of Commerce to be established or through the Barents Euro-Arctic Council Secretariat.

Getting to "Yes"

31. The rules of the Arctic Council should be amended to allow for debates concerning peace and security issues such as arms control.
32. If the Arctic Council is unable to address these peace and security concerns, then another forum must be created which can discuss peace and security issues such as Arctic arms control.
33. If it is not possible to get all Arctic states to ratify the NWFZ Treaty then those states which support the initiative should sign on to the treaty and continue to lobby non-signatories to sign on.

1nc

Text: the United States federal government should propose an Arctic Nuclear-Free Zone treaty to the Arctic Council

This is feasible and solves the link to politics

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The task of “getting to ‘yes’”[193] is by no means an easy one. Hamel-Green, however, gives hope that this **can be achieved** when he writes that, **“in all the existing zones, a number of factors, including skilful diplomats and visionary leaders, and, in some instances, vigorous grassroots campaigns from non-governmental academics, peace movements and indigenous communities, have, successfully won out against traditional arms race advocates of nuclear-based deterrence and ‘security’”**[194]. While there are opponents to the idea of a NWFZ in the Arctic, on balance the support is with the idea. **The major players, Indigenous communities and civil society are all on board. For this reason, a NWFZ in the Arctic is possible.**

5.1 What Are States Looking For?

States are looking for security[195]. **Many states still ascribe to the Cold War way of thinking that says that they are more secure when they live under a nuclear umbrella.** For example, Norway’s opposition to a Nordic NWFZ was stated as such: “with justification it can be argued that the prospects of the Nordic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone stand or fall to the degree that Norwegian security requirements can be satisfied”[196]. Therefore, **an important part of “getting to yes” is convincing states that the arguments made in the first section of this paper – that nuclear weapons are more of a security threat than a protection against security threats – are valid. If states believe that their security interests are better served by living within a zone without nuclear weapons, then they will sign on to the treaty with all of its incumbent rights and obligations.**

5.2 Achieving Government Buy-In

Integral to “getting to yes” is achieving buy-in from the highest echelons of the leadership in all Arctic regional states. **While opponents do exist, there is a coalition of supports in the Canada, the Nordic countries, and yes, even in the United States and Russia.**

One minute before midnight of the day of Barack Obama’s inauguration, the **Bush Administration issued a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD 66), which outlined a United States Arctic Region Policy.** NSPD 66 stated that the United States should develop “greater capabilities and capacity” in the Arctic in order to protect US borders and that military vessel and aircraft mobility and transport throughout the Arctic should be preserved. Furthermore, it urged the Senate to ratify UNCLOS to ensure military transportation and sovereignty over resource-rich areas[197]. This

directive was important because it elevated the posture of the Arctic within American foreign policy priorities, which has the potential to expand even further when the United States assumes the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2015[198]. This lends additional weight to the United States as an actor in Arctic cooperation and it is imperative that Washington shows leadership in moving towards an ANWFZ[199].

The initiative for an Arctic NWFZ was Mikhail Gorbachev's 1987 speech in Murmansk. It is time that the current Russian leadership take up the "zone of peace" initiative once more. Given Russia's ever-present fears regarding NATO expansion, its perceived self-isolation and its disadvantage in terms of conventional forces, the ANWFZ would be a chance for Russia to address many of its perceived security concerns.

Support from the remainder of the Arctic states would likely be easily forthcoming if the United States and Russia are both seen to be onboard. None of the other Arctic states have nuclear-weapon capabilities. Both Norway and Denmark (and therefore Greenland) have committed to not positioning nuclear weapon devices on their territory during peacetime. All Arctic zonal states have expressed apprehension about nuclear weapons and have been supportive of the global abolition movement generally. They have signed on to all relevant international protocols that have sought to reduce international threats, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and actively support efforts internationally to have their provisions enforced. Support from these states will likely be strong and sustained as long as the United States and Russia come to the table and that there is a chance of concluding a treaty, so that the time and energy of these small-to-medium states are not floundered on unattainable goals[200].

The counterplan solves the aff – it's effective and forces compliance – independently it helps curb global proliferation

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This section will provide an introduction to the NWFZ concept by explaining its goals, outlining the principles that the United Nations has set for NWFZs, presenting the arguments for how NWFZs contribute to non-proliferation, introducing the existing NWFZs, and providing a history of NWFZ proposals in the Arctic.

What do NWFZ try to achieve? According to Weerakoon-Gonnewardene, "the aims of the proposal for a ... Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone ... are to raise the nuclear threshold and reduce the risk of escalation in a region where strategic, tactical and conventional weapons are located, and to lessen the danger of a surprise attack..."[25] It does so through mandating the non-possession, non-deployment and non-use of nuclear weapons within the zone[26]. This has the end goal, as so aptly put by Nobel Prize winning Mexican diplomat Alfonso Garcia Robles of gradually increasing the areas "from which nuclear weapons are prohibited to a point where the territories of the powers which possess these

terrible weapons of mass destruction will be something like contaminated islets subject to quarantine”[27]. **By isolating nuclear weapon states, NWFZs send the powerful message that there is a consensus against the presence of nuclear weapons and that this should be the norm of the entire world.** Weerakoon-Gonnewardene concludes that a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone is “a confidence-building measure with political implications in addition to its military significance[28]”. Subsequently, **a NWFZ can be seen as a building block towards a more comprehensive peace[29]. This momentum could then be used to create a world free of nuclear weapons[30].**

NWFZs contribute to non-proliferation through their rigorous verification procedures which are stringent than the International Atomic Agency (IAEA) safeguards. This is because IAEA verification procedures are geared towards ensuring that non-Nuclear Weapon States are not diverting nuclear materials meant for civilian purposes towards building nuclear weapons. NWFZ verification procedures extend further to ensure that the sanctity of the NWFZ is not being violated by clandestine import of nuclear weapons or the use of territory within the zones for the manufacturing or testing of nuclear weapons[31]. Consequently, **the more stringent verification procedures not only ensure that there are not nuclear weapons related activities occurring within the zone, but they also seek to build confidence that the regime is being respected, something that the IAEA verification procedures cannot boost after numerous problems relating to verification in both Iran and North Korea.** Moreover, **NWFZs contribute to non-proliferation, because of their stringent control measures. The existing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone treaties have opted to set up regional control mechanisms to facilitate the verification regime, as well as information exchange, consultations, and even a complaints procedure for dealing with perceived violations of the treaty requirements[32].**

Most importantly, **NWFZs contribute to non-proliferation by limiting the number of potential nuclear actors.** NWFZs often require each party to declare any ability they have to manufacture or test nuclear explosives and destroy these facilities or convert them to peaceful purposes. With the accompanying verification procedures, **this requirement of a NWFZ reduces the salience of the argument that while it may be a good idea to abolish nuclear weapons, it is impossible that they stay abolished, because the facilities and know-how continue to exist.** Xia Liping rightfully asserts that “these measures will return nuclear threshold states or de facto nuclear weapon states to the status of non-nuclear weapon states, and prevent them from going nuclear again” and cites South Africa under the Pelindaba Treaty as a successful example[33]. **Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones, therefore, contribute importantly towards non-proliferation efforts by reducing the nuclear-weapons related capacity of the participating states.**

In order to help regions achieve NWFZ status, the United Nations Disarmament Commission in its April 30, 1999 report put forth a set of four principles and guidelines for establishing Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones. The first principle is that the decision to create a NWFZ should be freely arrived at by the states that make up the region. The second principle is that the proposal to establish a NWFZ should emanate from within the region itself and not be the result of the coercive action of outside actors. Third, it is necessary to consult the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), so that they may sign and ratify the protocols of the treaty. This would mean that they have made a legally binding commitment to respect the zone and not deploy nuclear weapons against states that are party to the treaty. The fourth and final principle set out by the UN Disarmament Commission is that a NWFZ should not prevent the use of nuclear science and technology for civilian purposes, but should encourage cooperation to ensure that its use remains peaceful[34].

There are currently five existing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties. These are: Antarctica (1959), Latin America (1967), South Pacific (1985), Southeast Asia (1995) and Africa (1996)[35]. This means that states are not permitted to acquire, test, station or develop nuclear weapons in over one hundred countries, including the entirety of the Southern Hemisphere[36]. The Antarctica Treaty should be taken as a starting point for the negotiation of an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, as the geography and climate create similarities between the two and there is a substantial overlap in key players in both areas. In addition, the Southeast Asia Treaty can serve as a guide, because it includes provisions including to straits and EEZs (Exclusive Economic Zones) within the Zone, which is analogous to the situation in the Arctic of both the Northeast and Northwest Passages[37]. It is helpful to learn from the experiences of the existing NWFZs when designing the Arctic NWFZ[38]. However, at the same time, no perfect analogy exists. The Antarctica Treaty relates to a region with no permanent human population, while the other treaties relate to heavily populated areas. **The Arctic, however, has a mixture of both. As well, the Arctic is mostly ocean, while the other treaties relate primarily to land[39]. Therefore, an innovative approach that takes into account the best practises and lessons learned from the existing treaties is what is needed to conclude a treaty marking the Arctic as a NWFZ[40].**

The concept of a NWFZ in the Arctic is not a new one. Proposals have been made as early as 1961 when Norway and Denmark decided not to deploy nuclear weapons on their territory during peacetime, the Swedish Foreign Minister proposed setting up a club of states, which would agree not to deploy nuclear weapons[41]. According to Hamel-Green, the first proposal for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in the Arctic was put forward in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in 1964[42]. It has subsequently been picked up by Inuit organizations (including the Inuit Circumpolar Council), regional and international peace organizations, academic researchers and Arctic region specialists[43]. This paper builds on this body of literature to develop a workable framework for a NWFZ in the Arctic, in the hope that this will contribute to making progress towards the end goal of a world without nuclear weapons[44].

Global proliferation causes extinction

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//J.N.E

Ultimately an assumption, **rational deterrence theory lacks any empirically tested evidence. Nuclear proliferation exponentially increases the possibility of non-proliferation regime collapse and nuclear conflict, reducing all states' relative power. Nuclear peace theory seems plausible, but like any mathematical model it may only marginally apply to world politics** and the dynamics of nuclear proliferation, due to the fact that "international security is not reducible to the theory of mathematical games" (Bracken, 2002, pg. 403). Rather, **the spread of nuclear weapons exponentially decreases the stability of regional and global politics by intensifying regional rivalries and political tensions, both of which may potentially catalyze a nuclear catastrophe. Frustrated with a lack of results through conventional conflict, desperate states may look to nuclear arsenals as a source of absolute resolution for any given conflict. The use of nuclear weapons, even in a limited theater, could plausibly trigger chain reactions rippling across the globe.** With their interests and sovereignty threatened, other nuclear states will eventually use their own weapons in an effort to ensure national security. President Kennedy warned of the danger of nuclear proliferation in 1963: I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in

so many hands, in the hands of countries...there would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security...**there would only be the increased chance of accidental war, and an increased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts** (Cirincione, 2007, pg. 103). Proliferation decreases the relative security of all states not only through the possibility of direct conflict, but also by threatening foreign and domestic interests. As the sole international hegemon, the U.S. seeks to use its power to insure its security and influence international politics in a way that reflects its own interests and values (Huntington, 1993, pg. 70). **In addition to creating a direct security threat, further proliferation jeopardizes the United States' ability to project its primacy and promote its interests internationally.**

Uranium Mining Net Benefit

*1nc evidence says the treaty would prevent uranium mining

The counterplan solves uranium mining – that checks ecological destruction and biodiversity loss

FOEE '13 - largest grassroots environmental network in Europe, uniting more than 30 national organisations with thousands of local groups ("Uranium mining fears in arctic region", May 3rd, <https://www.foeeurope.org/uranium-mining-fears-arctic-region-030513>) //J.N.E

Over 50 groups, including Friends of the Earth Denmark, warned the Greenlandic and Danish governments today that they risk jeopardising the vulnerable arctic environment with their plans to allow uranium mining in the region [1].

Proposals to overturn a 25-year decision that prevents the extraction of uranium in the region coincide with several plans for mining uranium, along with rare earth minerals, in Greenland. These **plans threaten to irreversibly damage the sensitive arctic environment and ecosystems, and include one open-pit mine in Kuannersuit, Southern Greenland, which alone would make Greenland the fifth largest uranium exporter in the world.**

Palle Bendsen, from NOAH Friends of the Earth Denmark, said: "Denmark rejected nuclear power in 1985, and in 1988, alongside Greenland, implemented a zero-tolerance policy towards uranium extraction. Now, **Denmark and Greenland are u-turning on their stance towards nuclear, and risk sullyng one of the last pristine environments on earth for a fuel they don't need.**"

Uranium mining in Greenland, in addition to causing substantial chemical pollution, will create millions of tonnes of radioactive tailings – the leftovers from extraction. These tailings contain thorium, radium, radon and polonium, amongst the most radiotoxic substances known to man, and will remain dangerously radioactive for hundreds of thousands of years.

These **pollutants risk leaching into the local environment, accumulating in the food chain and causing comprehensive radioactive contamination – with significant impacts on local communities, farming and fishing in Southern Greenland.**

In addition, **there are currently no financial resources to cover potential accidents or to restore any ecological damage as a result of extraction – long-term economic costs of radioactive pollution in Greenland could exceed the short-term economic benefits of uranium mining, according to the organisation. There are no nuclear reactors, nor industries, that require uranium in the Danish realm.**

The groups called on the Greenlandic and Danish government to preserve the arctic region's unique ecosystems by keeping their zero-tolerance policy on uranium extraction.

Solvency

The counterplan is a prerequisite to legitimate cooperation and resolves the nuclear crisis

Stampe '14 – member of the Danish parliament sitting on the defence committee “No nukes in the Arctic”, January 8th, <http://arcticjournal.com/opinion/331/no-nukes-arctic>) //J.N.E

After the Second World War, many a Nordic politician dreamt of combining their militaries with other countries in the region to form a co-operative defence force. The vision never emerged, to the disappointment of Hans Hedtoft, who served as PM of Denmark twice in the 1940s and '50s, and who labelled the breakdown in negotiations “my generation’s greatest political defeat”. Hedtoft needn’t have been so hard on himself. Seen from today’s perspective, it’s clear that the time wasn’t right for grand international collaborations. What’s more, the various Nordic countries each had vastly different challenges and Cold War priorities. The Cold War is over, but the historic differences can still be seen in defence policies of the Nordic countries. Denmark, Norway and Iceland are all Nato members. Finland and Sweden take part in EU defence policy. Denmark and Norway purchase mostly American war materiel. Sweden has its own defence industry. Finland purchases Russian and Swedish equipment. In Denmark, we are, generally speaking, more likely to take part in international military coalitions than our Nordic neighbours are. Preventing, pollution, shipwrecks and nuclear war These are big differences, and they would likely make co-operating difficult. But, allowing them to prevent closer military co-operation in the region would be a serious political mistake. Unlike during Hedtoft’s day, the time is ripe. It also necessary, thanks in large part to the emergence of the Arctic as a geo-political hotspot. The need for combined Nordic environmental surveillance and search and rescue efforts in the Arctic has already been stated. Such a proposal was made in 2009, by Thorvald Stoltenberg, Norway’s defence and foreign minister at the time, who put the idea forward as part his recommendations for closer Nordic co-operation in defence and foreign policy. But pollution and the safety of cruise ship passengers are, unfortunately, the least of our worries right now. We need to wake to the Arctic’s new status as an area of significant economic and geo-political interest. It is an area that world powers are gradually taking note of. Their new-found interest opens up the potential for conflict, and leaves us with the possibility of nuclear-armed powers coming into conflict over the region. Avoiding this needs to be one of the most important security policy goals for the Nordic countries. Such a goal is so important that it will require us to set aside differences in military equipment and attitudes towards international intervention. What it requires is for us to come up with a common vision for Nordic security policy that calls for the Arctic to be made free of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are already banned from a number of areas, including Antarctica, Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, Central Asia and the South Pacific. Adding the Arctic to this list would only be natural. A Nobel idea Were such a ban to be put in place, countries would be prohibited from developing, producing, stationing, or using nuclear weapons in the Arctic. The ban, however, would not prevent countries from mining uranium or using atomic energy, meaning that Greenland’s plans to develop its mining industry would not come into conflict with an Atomic weapon-free zone. Atomic-powered submarines, ships and icebreakers would also be permitted – provided they weren’t armed with nuclear weapons. For Danes, the proposal would no doubt call to mind the 1980s and calls to ban nuclear weapons from the Nordic region. At that time, it was Nato that stood in the way. Today,

however, it is official policy in America to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. In 2007 Henry Kissinger caught the world off guard when he argued in favour of eliminating nuclear weapons and drew up a roadmap for how it could happen. In 2009, the US and Russia shook hands on the New START Treaty and agreed to reduce the number of operational nuclear weapons. When Barack Obama later that year was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the awarding committee stated that they had done so because of Obama's vision of a world without nuclear weapons. This is a positive development, but it isn't a development we should take for granted. We must contribute to efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals. One way we can do that is to drive the process of banning nuclear weapons from the Arctic. SEE RELATED: The new cold war This is a realistic vision, but we must begin the fight now. Posturing among the great powers in order to claim the rights to oil and minerals in the Arctic already under way. If we wait, we will lose the chance to act We must also understand that the countries of the Nordic region must be a part of the solution. The Arctic Council's members include the Nordic countries, the US, Russia and Canada. No-one doubts that the Nordic countries lack the global influence the other members do, but together with Canada, which does not possess nuclear weapons, we can give our argument not just moral weight but we can also back it up with geo-political influence. Nuclear weapons do not belong in the Arctic. The Nordic countries have the chance to work towards a common goal. Some would call the opportunity historic. It would be more correct to say that history obliges us to do so.

The counterplan checks nuclear conflict in the Arctic and allows cooperation

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A Proposal to Neutralize Nuclear Threats in the Arctic: Establishing an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone **The Canadian Pugwash Group issued a call in 2007 for an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (ANWFZ), which has been widely distributed and commented upon.** ⁶³ While nuclear weapons are not the only threat to peace in the region, they are the most potent. The proposal has served to spark the imagination of many people concerned about the militarization, or re-militarization, of the Arctic and increased U.S.-Russian tensions. But, as with all substantive and original arms control proposals, there are obstacles that will hinder the negotiation of an ANWFZ. We will proceed by outlining the requirements established by the UN for such a nuclear-weapon-free zone, discuss the major political and military barriers that might hinder its establishment, and then explore strategies that various nation parties might work around them to reach our goal of de-nuclearizing the Arctic littoral. We will begin with the guiding principles for creating a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. **In 1975 the UN General Assembly recommended that the establishment of NWFZ's be guided by the following principles:** ⁶⁴ **1. Obligations relating to the establishment of such zones may be assumed either by groups of states, continents, or geographical regions, or by smaller groups of states or even individual countries (emphasis added); 2. NWFZ arrangements must ensure that the zone would be – and remain – effectively free of all nuclear weapons; 3. The initiative to establish a NWFZ must come from within the region, and participation must be voluntary; 4. If a zone is intended to be specifically regional, its effectiveness would be enhanced by the participation of all militarily significant states; 5. NWFZ agreements must include an effective system of verification; 6. Arrangements should provide for the peaceful economic and scientific development of state parties; 7. The treaty establishing the zone should be of unlimited duration.** The Canadian Pugwash Group issued a call in 2007 for an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (ANWFZ)... ¹⁰ Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue There are three major obstacles that make an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone extremely difficult to negotiate. The first we discussed at some length above: The Russian Federation (and perhaps other

nuclear weapon states as well) routinely deploys a large proportion of its ballistic missile-firing submarines on patrol in Arctic waters. These patrols are the object of endless cat-and-mouse games involving the Russian SSBN's and the fast-attack submarines of the U.S. Navy and other NATO navies, joined with other NATO anti-submarine forces: antisubmarine-capable surface ships, aircraft and helicopters. 65 In response, Russian fast-attack submarines 66 and aircraft enter the fray. The second major set of "facts" creating obstacles for a negotiated Arctic NWFZ directly follows from the first: virtually all of the largest and most important naval bases of the Russian Northern Fleet are located north of the Arctic Circle. The largest of these, Zapadnaya Litsa, is located on the Kola Peninsula at latitude 69° 27', and its support bases are scattered throughout the area between Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. However, as we argue below, neither the presence of nuclear-capable submarines under Arctic waters nor the presence of nuclear weapons possessed by a nuclear weapon state need necessarily prevent the creation of a NWFZ in the Arctic littoral. 67 A third major obstacle is the position of the United States. Like the Russian Federation, it is both an Arctic State and a Nuclear Weapon State (NWS). Unlike the Russian Federation, the U.S. does not currently deploy nuclear weapons in its Arctic territory (Alaska), but it is almost unimaginable that the Americans would agree to declaring any portion of their territory free from nuclear weapons. 68 But this is not the only – and perhaps not the most important – obstacle presented by the United States. To begin with, all of the other Arctic States save the Russian Federation – Norway, Denmark, Canada and Iceland – are close military allies of the U.S. through their common membership in NATO. Historically, NATO member states have almost never undertaken a major security initiative without at least the tacit acquiescence of the United States. But membership in NATO has implications for an ANWFZ that go beyond the inevitable pressure that a militarily dominant state exerts over its lesser partners. Partners in the NATO alliance are committed to its core military doctrine, known as its "Strategic Concept," which includes specific reliance upon nuclear weapons. 69 According to NATO doctrine, nuclear weapons are not merely one tool in the arsenals of the three NWS's that are NATO members. Nuclear weapons make a "unique contribution" to the deterrence provided by the NATO alliance, and are therefore "essential to preserve peace." 70 Furthermore, "deterrence" is construed so generally as to "permit the use of nuclear weapons when deemed militarily useful in virtually any circumstance." 71 Further yet, five other NATO partners who are not NWS's – Germany, Belgium, Greece, Turkey and Italy – allow American tactical nuclear weapons to be stationed on their territory as part of their commitment to NATO. 72 It might well be possible 73 to draft an Arctic NWFZ Treaty that does not conflict with the letter of NATO members' commitments to the Alliance's Strategic Concept, but the discussion above makes it clear that membership in a NWFZ would be incompatible with its spirit. Even if this were not the opinion of the participating NATO member, it would almost certainly be the view of the United States. And, historically, NATO members have almost never challenged the U.S. on matters of NATO military policy. As if this were not enough, there is still another way in which U.S. policy could pose obstacles to an ANWFZ. The U.S. has laid down conditions for its support of NWFZ's 74 that might very well prove obstacles to the negotiation of an Arctic treaty. The most important of these are the following: 1. The content of a NWFZ Treaty should in no way disturb existing security arrangements or interfere with the rights of individual or collective self-defence guaranteed to states under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter; 11 Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue 2. A zone should not affect the rights of the parties under international law to grant or deny transit privileges, including port calls and overflights; 3. No restrictions should be imposed on the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflights by military aircraft, 75 the right of innocent passage through archipelagic seas, and the right of transit passage through international straits. It is reasonable to assume that condition 1 would apply directly to the security obligations of NATO members as discussed above, and in particular their adherence to NATO's Strategic Concept. Since all Arctic states save the Russian Federation are NATO members, must we assume – as suggested above – that NATO nuclear doctrine would preclude participation in an ANWFZ treaty from the outset? We will argue, as we have previously in reference to Russian naval bases, that this need not necessarily be so. Condition 2 poses another sort of problem, because although most NWFZ treaties permit the zonal state to grant transit rights, these are allowed only for ships and aircraft not carrying nuclear weapons. 76 This would seem to conflict with the long-standing U.S. policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons on board its ships and aircraft. But, as we have argued elsewhere, 77 there are ways in which this seeming conflict could be circumvented. For Canada, the most important sticking point will be condition 3, because of the long-standing, albeit low-key, dispute between Canada and the United States over the status of the Northwest Passage. The Canadian government has long declared the Northwest Passage – a narrow ship channel wending its way through the Islands of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago – to be Canadian internal waters. 78 But the United States, joined by the E.U., claims that the Northwest Passage is an international strait. 79 "The Canadian claim of sovereignty would permit her government to deny transit of nuclear weapons, but otherwise Canada could not deny or impair any legal right of transit passage, in compliance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea." 80 If the NW passage is deemed an international strait all ships may transit freely under the traditional right of "innocent passage." As Michael Byers writes, "these new threats would best be dealt with through Canadian domestic law, enforced by an enhanced Coast Guard, RCMP and Canadian Forces presence. It simply does not benefit the United States – and other responsible countries and reputable shipping companies – to have foreign vessels shielded from scrutiny and reasonable regulations by maintaining that the Northwest Passage is an international strait." 81 Finding a solution to the problems created by conflicting claims of Canada, U.S. and the E.U. will be one of the most difficult challenges for any Canadian attempt to join an ANWFZ. In any case, even if the U.S. concedes Canadian sovereignty, the Americans may argue that Canada's obligations to the NATO alliance prevent Canada from denying passage to American ships. While Canada has often taken differing positions from the Americans on some foreign and military policy issues, they have never refused American requests when these are presented as an obligation under the NATO Treaty. If the Americans were to insist on untrammelled passage of their warships in order to fulfill the mutual security obligations under Article V of the NATO Treaty, it is inconceivable that Canada would refuse. But despite all of these daunting obstacles, we should not give up before even getting started. It would be useful to take a step back and remind ourselves of the provisions that must be included, and the criteria that must be met to create a new Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. We might argue that **while the creation of an ANWFZ poses new challenges, these are not insurmountable.** An important feature of The Canadian claim of sovereignty would permit her government to deny transit of nuclear weapons... 12 Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: **A Task Long Overdue NWFZ agreements will guide our reasoning: they do not have to be created by negotiating a single, all-**

encompassing legal instrument. They can be, and often have been, put together piecemeal, step by step. What follows is, first, a recapitulation of the “rules of the road” for the creation of NWFZ’s. Then, we put forward a series of initial steps of a move toward the goal of a nuclear-free Arctic. Finally, we will attempt to demonstrate that factors and forces external to the region may help us move toward the final goal of an inclusive ANWFZ treaty. In short, we are not claiming that building an ANWFZ will be an easy task, or that it will necessarily closely resemble previous agreements. But we can combine the lessons of history with the unique circumstances of the Arctic to achieve our goal.

Say Yes

The counterplan is possible and the US has pushed non-proliferation before – proves it solves the link to politics

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The **process towards creating an ANWFZ is not “doomed”**. It is true that debates and negotiations on nuclear disarmament issues are often shut down outright by those who do not think that the major nuclear weapon states of Russia and the United States would be willing to ever give up their freedom to action with nuclear weapons. They envision any process working towards this end as “naive” and “doomed” from the outset[213]. Such a view is overly deterministic. **There has already been progress made towards restricting nuclear weapon use, including a plethora of arms control agreements – from the NPT Treaty to the recent New START - including the pledge by all five nuclear-weapon states to negative security assurances to not attack or threaten to attack with nuclear weapons those that do not have them[214].**

The **progress towards the completion of an ANWFZ is not likely to be linear. It should be expected that the progress towards completing the treaty will likely be “two steps forward, one step back”**. It is also possible, as Hamel-Green has argued that even if Russia and the United States were not willing to include their territories within the zone that the remaining Arctic states could establish a NWFZ in their regions and continue to push the two nuclear weapons superpowers to join[215]. Dhanapala writes that, “...if the non-nuclear countries among the group together with indigenous peoples living in the region combine with civil society sufficient pressure could be exerted on the US and Russia to agree to a ANWFZ primary as an environmental measure to safeguard the Arctic”[216]. The UN criteria for NWFZ does not prohibit this kind of strategy, because it simply mandates that it is desirable that all states in the region are involved, not that they must be involved[217]. While this is not an ideal solution, it is a means by which there can be forward progress, instead of standing still in the dangerous position which exists today.

The United States has previously laid down three conditions for its support of any NWFZ. According to Wallace and Staples, these are:

1. The content of a NWFZ Treaty should in no way disturb existing security arrangements or interfere with the rights of individual or collective self-defence guaranteed to states under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
2. A zone should not affect the rights of the parties under international law to grant or deny transit privileges, including port calls and over flights.

3. No restrictions should be imposed on the high seas, freedom of navigation and over flights by military aircraft, the right of innocent passage through archipelagic seas, and the right of transit through international straits[218].

Based on these criteria, it seems unlikely that the United States would sign on to the proposed ANWFZ, as all three conditions are contravened by the proposed treaty. The first is contravened by the fact that it calls for rethinking of the NATO Strategic Concept. The second and third are contravened because the goal of the zone is to deny transit to all vessels and aircrafts transporting nuclear weapons or weapons related materials. Subsequently, a change in US policy will be absolutely essential if the ANWFZ is to move forward. This will require political leadership that is willing to use much political capital to accomplish this.

However President Barack Obama has indicated that his outlook is amendable at least in entertaining the policy stance advocated in this paper. In Prague he outlined a vision of a world in which nuclear weapons would not have the prominent role that they do today[219], and has since worked towards this goal with New START. Obama has proposed an extensive working program for the United States on nuclear non-proliferation which indicates a move in a positive direction. His working program includes reducing the US arsenal, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the national security strategy and promising to ratify the CTBT[220]. However, he has also been criticized by his base for failing “to break away from Bush era national security policy in some fundamental ways”[221]. His support for this initiative would be a legacy issue and he is best placed out of any President to conclude these types of negotiations.

As mentioned earlier in this paper, Russia’s nuclear force structure poses the greatest threat to the establishment of an ANWFZ, as the bulk of the force falls within the proposed perimeter of the NWFFZ. Bases located on the Kola Peninsula - such as Zapadnaya Litsa - are home too much of the Russian SSBM fleet. From there these submarines can find sanctuary below the noisy ice of the relatively unmonitored Arctic Ocean[222]. When viewed through the lens of nuclear deterrence, Russia can be expected to be extremely reluctant to give up these bases and the Arctic patrols of its nuclear ballistic submarines.

However **one should bear in mind the time element of this paper; what seems likely improbable now could become possible later. The major goal of the short term (2010-2012) action plan of this paper is to reduce the perceived need of nuclear weapons and the international prestige that comes with them. Indeed, it is not until the medium term (2012-2025) action plan, after substantial advances in nuclear arms reduction and control measures, does the paper envision establishing an ANWFZ.**

While this paper focuses on the medium term, **in the short term, the success of moving Russia towards accepting an ANWFZ would be greatly enhanced by positive framing and communications; minimizing the international prestige of nuclear weapons.** Michael Byers has said that “the Russian government seeks to remind people that Russia is a powerful country...” by strengthening its Arctic posture[223]. **Communications and engagement strategies must be cognoscente of this fact in treating Russia as the great power that it is in the Arctic.** There is a distinct Russian fear that they will lose their international status if they agree to reduce or eliminate their nuclear arsenals, and so **to get Russia engaged there needs to be great sensitivity to this fact**[224]. Furthermore, the argument has rightfully been made that “great power status” is no longer contingent on the possession of a large nuclear arsenal. Citing the “peaceful rise of China,” which is believed to have one of the smallest arsenals out of the nuclear weapon states the argument is made that it is economic strength that demarcates who is and who is not

a great power[225]. Consequently, instead of trying to get Russia to relinquish Great Powers ambitions, communication strategies and diplomatic interactions with Russia should emphasize that it can maintain its great power ambitions despite committing to an ANWFZ.

Ultimately, the important part of “getting to yes” is to not become deadlocked in circular argumentation. The argument that it is necessary to get rid of all conflict and only then will it be possible to get rid of arms is fallacious[226]. The presence of nuclear weapons encourages their use. Rydell argues that there is little logic to the argument that the elimination of nuclear weapons or any other weapon of mass destruction “is to await the prior establishment of world peace and security...”[227]. It is thus necessary to get rid of nuclear arms, because only then can there be a world without nuclear war.

AT: Doesn't Solve Cooperation

The counterplan solves Arctic cooperation best – it sets a standard for multilateral treaties with the Arctic Council

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The prominent scholar Oran Young once told a Canadian parliamentary committee that **“we’re still in the first grade in terms of learning to cooperate in the Arctic”**[45]. **There is room for more intensified cooperation and one such cooperative project could be a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. The Arctic is a good potential candidate to be the next area covered by a NWFZ because of the history of nuclear activities in the region, climate change, bringing with it new challenges to state sovereignty and subsequently increasing military activity, the continued presence of the superpower’s nuclear arsenals, and the existence of current treaties which can serve as a foundation to build an ANWFZ upon.**

Historically, **the Arctic has been construed in the minds of southern defence planners as a “military theatre” in which all interests – including those of the local indigenous population – were subordinated to national security concerns**[46]. During the Cold War, **in the event of a nuclear exchange, most of the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals would have transited through the Arctic on their way to their targets.** In addition to this, **the Arctic has been home to “great power transit and deployment of strategic nuclear weapons above and below the ice; nuclear weapon accidents; atmospheric and underground nuclear testing; and radioactive waste and fallout contamination (and associated health impacts for indigenous peoples); and displacement of indigenous peoples as a result of military bases and infrastructure”**[47].

Both the United States and the USSR have carried out nuclear tests in the Arctic region. Three American underground nuclear tests occurred on Amchitka Island, Alaska, in the Bering Sea from 1941 to 1992. The largest was a 5 Megaton (Mt)[48] bomb on November 6, 1971. In 1996 Greenpeace reported that there had been leakage of radionuclides from the test sites, contaminating the surrounding environment, including freshwater sources, which has affected the subsistence food supplies of the Aleut natives.

Soviet testing was much more extensive. Beginning in 1954 atmospheric, underground and oceanic testing of nuclear weapons were carried out on Novaya Zemlya, which consists of two large islands approximately 450 kilometers from the Arctic Circle between the Barents and Kara polar seas. Under the supervision of the Soviet Navy, a total of 130 tests have been carried out at Novaya Zemlya with 224 separate explosive devices equal to about 265Mt (the 50 Mt Tzar Bomba, the largest nuclear explosion to date, was tested here on October 20, 1961). The underground tests are unique in that they were conducted in frozen rock, which has not occurred elsewhere. There have been three accidental releases of significant radioactive materials, including two which resulted in what the Soviets termed "emergency situations". Testing at Novaya Zemlya continued even after the LTBT (1963), which banned nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere, underwater and in space, as well as tests that cause fallout outside of the

borders of the Soviet Union (Norway has been affected by the tests). Not only was Novaya Zemlya the site of many nuclear tests, but it also served as a graveyard for various nuclear weapons, nuclear-powered submarines and reactors.

The Canadian Arctic was also home to extensive uranium and radium mining from the 1930s until the 1960s. The mining negatively impacted the environment and harmed the long-term health of Northerners working in the mines. For example, Dene men worked in transporting the materials, but they and their communities were never informed of the potential health risks that this entailed. As a result, the Dene people of Great Bear Lake have suffered grossly inflated cancer rates[49].

In addition to nuclear testing, uranium mining, and being a dumping ground for Soviet-era nuclear materials, the Arctic has been radioactively contaminated by accidents involving nuclear fuel and weapons, most famously the 1968 crash of a B-52 carrying four MK28 nuclear bombs, each with a yield of 1.5 Mt during a route patrol over Greenland. In the massive clean-up operations that ensued, many Greenlandic workers were exposed to high levels of radiation from the wreckage of the bombs, at instances as much as three hundred times the US military lower limit. It even became necessary to ship to Greenland polar bear skins, so that the Inuit could replace their clothing, which had become heavily contaminated[50].

Unlike the invisible threat of radioactive contamination, **climate change is having discernable effect on the Arctic region. As has been demonstrated in countless documentaries, studies, reports and news pieces, the Arctic ice is receding.** Depending on who is consulted the rates at which this is occurring vary remarkably. The Arctic Council's Arctic Climate Impact Assessment in 2004[51] projected the "near total loss of sea ice in summer for late this century". Rapid ablation of sea ice in recent years and the conclusions of the 2007 Fourth Assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has some to conclude that the Arctic Ocean and its littoral states may be free of ice in summer within the next five to fifteen years, while the majority predicts that sometime shortly after 2030 is a more reasonable date. Eventually it is expected that the Arctic Ocean will come to resemble the Baltic Sea, with a thin layer of seasonable ice covering it during the winter months, so that it is navigable year round with the right equipment[52].

The receding ice will make the vast natural resources of the region increasingly accessible for extraction. Several states have laid claim to these resources, often in the same area. Sovereignty is the issue du jour in the Arctic with boundary disputes and inflammatory domestic legislation abounding[53]. There are several boundary disputes in the Arctic, as neighbouring states lay claim to the same, resource-rich territory. For example, Canada has six outstanding boundary-related disputes, including most significantly in the Northwest Passage, a body of water connecting the Arctic and Pacific Oceans. On September 10, 1985 then External Affairs Minister Joe Clark announced Canada would draw straight baselines around its archipelago and since that time the United States, the European Union, and Japan have all refuted that claim[54]. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev stated on September 17, 2008 that Russia should pass a law to mark its Arctic territory in the disputed areas where significant natural resource deposits can be found[55]. To ensure Canada's sovereignty the Canadian Government under Stephen Harper has promised to increase military resources in the region through large procurement programs and increased military activity.

Like Canada, other governments around the region have been devoting increasing resources to further developing their military presence in the Arctic. Denmark has released a defence position paper

recommending the establishment of a dedicated Arctic military contingent drawing on all divisions of its armed forces. Norway is purchasing new fighter jets and has built and continues to build ships that are suitable for Arctic patrols. Russia too, has approved the establishment of a stronger military presence in the Arctic in the form of a special brigade designated towards defending Russia's Arctic and the necessary resources to pay for it[56]. The United States Navy has declared that it will increase its Arctic operations as the ice recedes[57]. For example, in 2005 a Los Angeles-class American submarine spent two weeks under the North Pole, a feat that was considered to be a technological achievement that will have implications for future missions[58].

These **competing sovereignty claims cause concern for increased military activity in the Arctic, but there is little consensus as to whether military conflict in the Arctic is likely or not. There are those who argue that war in the Arctic is a sure thing.** For example, Borgerson writes that "the combination of new shipping routes, trillions of dollars in possible gas and oil resources, and a poorly defined picture of state ownership makes for a toxic brew"[59]. Similarly, Jayantha Dhanapala, the former UN Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs has written that, "...as someone who has devoted most of his working life to the cause of disarmament, and especially nuclear disarmament, I am deeply concerned over the fact that two nuclear weapon states ... converge on the Arctic and have competing claims. These claims ... could, if unresolved, lead to conflict escalating into the threat of use of nuclear weapons"[60]. However, there is equal evidence to suggest that this can be avoided, because disagreements "are being handled in an orderly fashion" and that there is a history of cooperation among the concerned states and interest in preserving the stability of the region[61]. It should be noted that the May 2008, Ilulissat Declaration the five coastal nations bordering the Arctic Ocean agreed to refer to and respect have the law of the sea as the basis for resolving all of their outstanding maritime boundary disputes[62]. While this did not specifically reference the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), it is hoped that the sovereignty disputes over jurisdiction will be resolved by UNCLOS with no need to resort to military means[63]. Indeed, in 2010 Russia and Norway peacefully negotiated a settlement to a forty-year-old boundary dispute in the Barents Sea[64].

The Arctic is also a favourable candidate for a NWFZ because -like UNCLOS - there are existing arrangements covering non-proliferation concerns in the Arctic, including the Seabed Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty though none of these are comprehensive enough to adequately address nuclear issues[65]. The Seabed Treaty (1971) requires that parties to the treaty (which all Arctic states are) do not place nuclear weapons on the seabed, ocean floor or subsoil, or facilities designed to store, test, or use nuclear weapons[66]. In addition, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's Article VII commits the Arctic states (again because they are all state parties) to conclude regional treaties to "assure the total absence of nuclear weapons from their respective territories"[67]. The fact that regional states were able to agree to these non-proliferation efforts is a positive starting point for the negotiation of a NWFZ Treaty. The fact that there is already a somewhat robust legal framework governing activities in the Arctic means that there is a positive foundation upon which a NWFZ treaty can be built. However, these agreements are not wide enough in their scope or specific enough to address the Arctic's unique security issues[68].

AT: No Proliferation

Yes proliferation – North Korea, Pakistan, and key Middle Eastern states are developing – new treaties are key

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Weapons of mass destruction are back in the news, raising fresh fears of proliferation and use. On April 2 North Korea announced its nuclear reactor would restart. Two weeks earlier the Syrian government and rebel forces accused each other of discharging a deadly chemical near the city of Aleppo, although what exactly happened remains murky. The threat from nuclear, chemical and biological weapons hangs over the planet.

Six conventions, two treaties, one protocol, one regime, one arrangement, one code, one initiative and ten regional or zone treaties have been instituted since 1925 to control these instruments of mass murder. **Most of the accords require only passive agreement and are trumped by influence-peddling, profit-seeking and ideology-spreading considerations. As a result the danger of nuclear, chemical and biological agents passing to non-state actors is on the rise, too.**

Countries have spurred proliferation of every WMD category since the 1950s. Figure 1 shows major patterns of WMD proliferation. Disseminating the weapons, relevant technologies and dual-use materials remains a surefire way for not only rogue states and terrorist organizations but even superpowers to sway other nations, make quick profits or destabilize foes. Not surprisingly, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research concluded: **“The non-proliferation treaties lack effective mechanisms to enforce compliance. The less formal export control regimes suffer from the same lack and have limited membership.”**

Mustard gas was used extensively during World War I. Negative public reaction led to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Yet Italy in 1936, Japan from 1937 to 1945, Egypt from 1963 to 1967 and Iraq in the 1980s all deployed chemicals against military and civilian targets. Owing to the transfer of materials and technologies, 23 countries stockpile or have chemical WMD capability: China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Libya, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Africa, South Korea, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan, United States and Vietnam.

Major Patterns of WMD Proliferation 1950s, 1960-1989. Enlarge Image

Syria, for example, began receiving material and technological assistance from Egypt in the early 1970s and from Iraq in the 1980s to establish its facilities and arm SCUD missiles with chemical warheads. Pakistan served as another source of dual-use technologies and raw materials for the Assad regime. Iran too added to Damascus’ stockpiles.

Nuclear WMD began as an offensive tool dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The horrific results meant that no rational, civilized state could use them again. Those weapons shifted toward defensive deterrent and emblems of power. So, other nations followed the path laid out by the US. The

Soviet Union proliferated technology and hardware widely. China supplied Pakistan with highly enriched uranium for a bomb in 1982. Presently nine countries possess nuclear warheads: Britain, China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia and the US.

The number of nations tempted by nuclear WMD is growing. Iran's nuclear program, having drawn upon Chinese, North Korean and Pakistani expertise, has fissile material for at least five warheads. China has benefited by receiving several billion dollars in revenue, securing access to crude oil, and strengthening its foreign footprint. Iran could even buy a nuclear weapon off the shelf from China or North Korea – the next stage in proliferation. So a broader nuclear acquisitions cascade is building as Sunni Arab nations like Saudi Arabia seek to neutralize both their Shiite neighbor's might and Israel's WMD program.

Major Patterns of WMD Proliferation 1990-2000. [Enlarge Image](#)

Biological WMD are popularly considered the most taboo of offensive capabilities. Nonetheless the Imperial Japanese Army from 1939 to 1940 and the Rhodesian Army in the 1970s deployed typhoid, bubonic plague, anthrax, botulism and cholera against Chinese and Africans, respectively. Several nations did relinquish biological WMD capability after acceding to international accords: the US in 1972, Britain, France, Germany and Canada by the late 1980s, the former Soviet Union/Russia in 1992. China signed the BTWC in 1984; however, the US suspects Beijing maintains capability plus provides assistance to Pyongyang and Tehran.

In the Middle East, **Egypt weaponized anthrax, botulism and plague in the 1970s with Soviet aid. Israel followed suit with poorly-documented offensive and defensive capabilities. Iran commenced its biological WMD program at Damghan, after experiencing Iraqi chemical WMD, with technical assistance from Russian scientists. Iraq appears to have possessed biological weapons capability under Saddam Hussein, but there is no evidence of the program's continuation. Likewise Syria is suspected of exploring biological weapons development. Again Russia, China and North Korea appear to be abettors.**

Major Patterns of WMD Proliferation 2001-Present. [Enlarge Image](#)

WMD proliferation usually focuses on technology and materials like precursor chemicals, biological agents, toxins and uranium. Yet delivery devices, projectile weapons, launch platforms and guidance systems are essential components. The Israelis sell those technically non-WMD items to the Chinese who resell to the North Koreans who then resell to Iran, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, the UAE and Pakistan. As countries like North Korea and Iran collaborate on missile development, the WMD one develops could fit the other's delivery systems.

Many deals are conducted covertly with countries like Malaysia and Dubai serving as third-party transfer venues. **Equally unsettling for global security, WMD trades for profit and ideology have taken place through private outlets such as Pakistan's former atomic chief A. Q. Khan. Materials siphoned from Russia and the Ukraine also continue fueling the nuclear black market.**

Indeed the danger of nuclear, chemical and biological agents passing to non-state actors is on the rise. Since 2001 Al Qaeda and its affiliates have sought WMD capability. During Syria's civil war some sarin, mustard gas and cyanide from government depots reportedly have fallen into illicit hands. The possibility of Islamists wresting materials from Pakistan's WMD facilities increases as that nation's

political instability grows. Iran for its part appears to have transferred some technologies to regional militant organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah.

Privatization CP

1nc

The United States federal government should retire the federal fleet of ice-breakers and replace them with contracted services provided by U.S.- operated commercial vendors, require that U.S. commercial vendors be capable of providing assets that will serve national security, law enforcement, and other federal maritime missions, and exempt U.S. commercial ice-breaker operators from the Jones Act.

The plan would jumpstart the US icebreaking abilities without billions in federal spending

Carafano and Dean 11 - Ph.D.is Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Davis Institute, and Deputy Director, Foreign, Defense, Trade, and Homeland Security Policy, in the Government Relations Department at The Heritage Foundation.

(James Jay, James, **Breaking an Ice-Bound U.S. Policy: A Proposal for Operating in the Arctic, February 24, 2011**, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/02/breaking-an-ice-bound-us-policy-a-proposal-for-operating-in-the-arctic>, JZG)

The United States is losing the race to protect its own interests in the Arctic region. It is important to create a sensible policy to field an adequate fleet of U.S.-owned ice-breakers. An adequate, competent, and sustainable fleet is the key to maintaining American presence in the region, protecting U.S. sovereignty, working with allies, and rebuilding the nation's edge in global commerce. Making America more competitive at a time when Washington is looking to cut corners in federal spending requires creative solutions to demanding problems. The U.S. can jump-start its fleet by **privatizing ice-breaker operations** and using ships as platforms for national security and federal scientific activities. This initiative would save federal dollars by eliminating old, inadequate, and expensive-to-operate assets while greatly expanding U.S. capacity to operate in the Arctic. Adapting to a Changing World Global shipping patterns will change in the years ahead. Melting of Arctic ice will open up new passages for transit, offering significantly shorter routes between Europe and North America and the Pacific—perhaps up to 40 percent faster sailing times and significant fuel savings and emissions reductions. Seasonal commercial lanes through the Arctic ice could appear within less than five years. The ability to navigate the region will increase the search for and development of significant natural resources including oil. Scientific research in the Arctic will also expand. America's capacity to exercise its sovereignty, protect its interests, and participate in global scientific research and commerce, however, is collapsing. The U.S. had eight polar ice-breakers in 1970. Today, the U.S. Coast Guard has three. The youngest was commissioned 10 years ago, and the other two are approaching 35 and 40 years old, respectively. One other ship is owned by the National Science Foundation. The Department of Homeland Security Inspector General recently concluded that the Coast Guard has neither sufficient ships nor budgetary authority to accomplish its current missions. In contrast, other powers including Russia, Finland, China, South Korea, and South Africa are looking to expand their capacity significantly. America is leaving itself out in the cold. The lead that other nations will enjoy includes more than just numbers. A new generation of energy-efficient ships with advanced ice-breaking capability is being developed. The best modern ships are multi-purpose vessels that remain operational throughout the year. Ice-breaker competition is important for more than just commercial advantages. Ice-breakers are a key component of maritime and national security infrastructure. They can

serve, for example, as mobile stations or search-and-rescue assets in addition to aiding maritime law enforcement and navigation. A New Paradigm Ensuring that the U.S. is not left behind will require a new paradigm. First, the U.S. should look to commercialize its ice-breaker fleet. The U.S. can learn a lesson from Finland. Nearly 80 percent of that nation's trade is exchanged by shipping—and the Baltic Sea around Finland freezes every winter. The Finnish ice-breaker fleet helps ensure that upwards of one-third of the nation's ports remain operational year-round. While the Finnish Transport Agency is responsible for coordinating, developing, and managing winter navigation, ice-breaking services are contracted out. Outside the ice-breaking season, the ice-breakers are leased to offshore operations around the globe. The U.S. government should consider turning over ice-breaking operations to American-owned and operated vendors. In order to protect U.S. commercial, national security, and scientific interests, U.S. operators should provide facilities, capabilities, and assets so that commercial ice-breakers can perform national security functions. For example, these ships should be capable of hosting U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments (maritime law enforcement personnel that deploy aboard vessels to conduct and support law enforcement). Leasing support from the commercial operators would be far more cost-effective than operating an old and increasingly obsolete federal fleet. To aid commercial ice-breaking, Congress should exempt U.S. firms from the requirement to comply with the Jones Act. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, also known as the Jones Act, was meant to save the merchant marine industry by requiring that ships that traveled American waters be built in the United States and manned by American crews. Like many other protectionist policies, the premises of the Jones Act seem plausible: Require goods moving from one U.S. port to another to travel on U.S.-built ships, with U.S. crews, and you will protect U.S. maritime and shipbuilding jobs. The last serious review of the Jones Act (a series of congressional hearings in the 1990s) revealed that more than 40,000 American merchant seamen and 40,000 longshoremen had lost their jobs despite Jones Act protectionism. Over the first 76 years of the act, more than 60 U.S. shipyards had gone out of business, eliminating 200,000 jobs. If the intent of the Jones Act was to save U.S. jobs, it failed. As a result, state-of-the-art ice-breakers can be built overseas today at far less expense. Exempting U.S. contractors from having to comply with an outdated law that has brought more damage than benefit to the U.S. maritime industry would provide a strong incentive for future ice-breaker operators. Breaking the Ice It is time for the United States to jump-start an Arctic policy that is as cold as a dead car battery. Moving ahead on what will be a crucial commercial, national security, and sovereignty issue for the U.S. in the future requires bold new solutions. The Administration and Congress should: Retire the federal fleet of ice-breakers and replace them with contracted services provided by U.S.-operated commercial vendors. Require that U.S. commercial vendors be capable of providing assets that will serve national security, law enforcement, and other federal maritime missions. Exempt U.S. commercial ice-breaker operators from the Jones Act. Washington's goal should be nothing short of providing America the most advanced and robust ice-breaker fleet in the world.

1nc --- jones act version

Repealing the Jones Act allows for effective Coast Guard leasing- that solves the case and avoids displacing other crucial programs

Slattery et al 14 (*Brian, Research Assistant for Defense Studies in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies AND **Bryan Riley, Jay Van Andel Senior Policy Analyst in Trade Policy Center for International Trade and Economics, AND ***Nicolas Loris, Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies The Institute for Economic Freedom and Opportunity at The Heritage Foundation, 5/22/14, "Sink the Jones Act: Restoring America's Competitive Advantage in Maritime-Related Industries," The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/05/sink-the-jones-act-restoring-americas-competitive-advantage-in-maritime-related-industries>, JHR)

The U.S. Coast Guard could **also benefit greatly from a repeal of the Jones Act**. With the increasing interest in natural resources in the Arctic, the Coast Guard's presence in the region will likely rise. Polar icebreaking capacity is a primary responsibility of the Coast Guard in this region, and **the Jones Act**

hinders its ability to carry out this mission.

The Coast Guard's "High Latitude Region Mission Analysis Capstone Summary" concluded that the Coast Guard needs three heavy and three medium polar icebreakers to accomplish all of its Arctic and Antarctic missions.[8] Today, the Coast Guard fleet has one medium polar icebreaker (USCGC *Healy*) and one heavy polar icebreaker (USCGC *Polar Star*). The *Healy* operates primarily as a research vessel under the direction of the National Science Foundation. The *Polar Star* is nearly 40 years old and was inactive from 2006 to 2012, when it returned to active service after a \$90 million overhaul.[9] This overhaul will extend the service life of the *Polar Star* for another seven to 10 years. In the meantime, the Coast Guard is trying to find funding for a new heavy polar icebreaker to begin filling its capability gap. This project could cost nearly \$1 billion.[10] To commission this new icebreaker within the desired time frame, the Coast Guard **would need to dedicate a large portion of its procurement budget** over several years. This is virtually **impossible**. Instead of allocating **precious funding that could be used elsewhere, the Coast Guard should pursue leasing foreign-owned commercial polar heavy icebreakers**. (The U.S. lacks a commercial heavy icebreaker fleet.) However, the Jones Act

inhibits this. The U.S. military already relies on Russian icebreakers to facilitate resupply missions to McMurdo Station in Antarctica.[11] In 2011, when an ice storm prevented the last winter fuel delivery to Nome, Alaska, the U.S. Coast Guard solicited the services of a Russian vessel to reach the community.[12] This response effort required the *Healy* to serve where a heavy icebreaker would have been much more effective. Ultimately, a Jones Act waiver allowed the Russian tanker to operate in U.S. waters, but repealing this law would allow the Coast Guard and other government services to lease foreign-built icebreakers more easily, while diminishing U.S. reliance on Russia.

Solvency

Relying upon commercial icebreakers solves

Slattery and Coffey 13 - Brian Slattery is a Research Assistant in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, and Luke Coffey is the Margaret Thatcher Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Davis Institute, at The Heritage Foundation ("Strengthen the Coast Guard's Presence in the Arctic" 4/2, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/strengthen-the-us-coast-guard-in-the-arctic>)/JV

The U.S. Cannot Afford to Dither

The U.S. should catch up with the other Arctic nations and field a presence that can legitimately protect U.S. sovereignty in the region. In order to do this, the U.S. should:

- **Develop a new strategy for icebreaking capability. The USCG should explore options such as buying commercial icebreakers with similar capabilities. Privately operated icebreakers could make way for commercial vessels and be called upon to support the USCG** in emergency scenarios. This would in turn require a reevaluation of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (also known as the Jones Act).[8]
- Build the entire required fleet of national security cutters. The U.S. should ensure that the USCG is properly funded to meet its fleet requirements.
- Provide permanent stationary assets in the Arctic region. Due to the increase in maritime traffic, there will be a great need for helicopters, as well as communication and maintenance personnel, based in the Arctic region for longer periods of time. Congress should work to fund Arctic operations at a level sufficient to make FOL Barrow a more capable base.
- Continuing to strengthen cooperation between the USN and the USCG. Combined with the blue-water-centric missions of the NSC, the joint operations between the sea services will become more significant in the future in the Arctic. Furthermore, the USCG cooperates effectively with the USN in its drug interdiction missions. The sea services should look to find lessons learned and apply them in the Arctic.

Needed: A Fully Resourced USCG

Interest in the Arctic region will only increase in the years to come. **As other nations direct resources and assets there, America cannot afford to fall behind. As an Arctic nation, the U.S. needs to field a strong Arctic presence. In order to make this a reality, the USCG will require adequate funding and resources.**

Private leasing solves faster- prefer evidence from the Commandant of the Coast Guard

O'Rourke 12 (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 6/14/12, "Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress," <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf>, JHR)

Another potential issue for Congress is whether future polar icebreakers should be acquired through a traditional acquisition (i.e., the government procuring the ship and owning it throughout its service life) or through a leasing arrangement (under which the icebreakers **would be privately built and privately owned, leased to the Coast**

Guard, and crewed by an all-Coast Guard crew or a mix of Coast Guard personnel and civilian mariners).

Factors to consider in assessing this issue include the comparative costs of the two options and the potential differences between them in terms of factors such as average number of days of operation each year and capability for performing various missions. Comparing the potential costs of leasing versus purchasing a capital asset often involves, among other things, calculating the net present value of each option. At a December 1, 2011, hearing that focused on the polar

icebreaker fleet (see "December 1, 2011, Hearing" in "Background"), Admiral Robert Papp, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, stated: As far as we can determine, there are no icebreakers available—no heavy icebreakers available for leasing right now. They would have to be constructed [and then leased]. If we were to lease an icebreaker, I'm sure that a company building an icebreaker outside of the government **does not have to contend with the same**

federal acquisition rules that we have to if we were to construct an icebreaker. It could probably be done quicker. Personally, I'm ambivalent in terms of how we get an icebreaker for the Coast Guard. We've done the legal research. If we lease an icebreaker, we can put a Coast Guard crew on it and still have it as a U.S. vessel supporting U.S.

sovereignty. But the—but they aren't available right now. And the other challenge that we face is the federal acquisition rules and [Office of Management and Budget Circular] A-11 requirements that [direct how to] score the money [in the budget] for leasing. We'd have to put up a significant amount of upfront money even with a lease that we don't have room for within our budget currently.⁵⁸ At another point in the hearing, Admiral Papp stated: We have looked at various business case scenarios, each and every time looking at, once again, from our normal perspective, the Coast Guard perspective, which has been owning ships forever. And generally, we keep ships 30-40 years or beyond. There is a point where leasing becomes more expensive, it's at or about the 20-25-year timeline. I just don't have the experience with leasing to be able to give you a good opinion on it. And once again, I'm ambivalent. We just need the icebreaking capability, I think it's for people who can do the analysis, the proper analysis of—but also have to take into account the capabilities required and we need to get about the business of determining the exact capabilities that we need which would take into account National Science Foundation requirements, Coast Guard requirements, requirements to break-in at McMurdo, to come up with a capable ship.⁵⁹ At another point in the hearing, he stated: As I said, sir, I am truly ambivalent to this except from what I experienced. I do have now two points, yes the Navy leases some ships, but we've got a Navy that has well over 300 ships. So if they lose a leased vessel or something is pulled back or something happens, they have plenty of other ships they can fall back upon. Right now, all I am falling back on is the Coast Guard cutter Healy. And it feels good to know that we own that and that is our ship for 30 or 40 years and we can rely upon it. In terms of leasing, I don't know. My personal experience is I lease one of my two cars and I pay a lot of money leasing my car. But at the end of the lease period, I have no car and I've spent a lot of money. So I don't know if that's directly applicable to ships as well, but right now I got half my garage is empty because I just turned one in.⁶⁰ At another point in the hearing, he stated: We've

looked through the legal considerations on this, as long as we have a Coast Guard crew. In fact, you can even make a mixed crew of civilians and Coast Guard people. But as long as it's commanding by—commanded by [a] commissioned officer, you can assert sovereignty, you can take it into war zones and, in fact, **the Navy does that** as well.⁶¹

Another witness at the hearing—Mead Treadwell, the lieutenant governor of Alaska—stated: [Regarding] The issue of the ships, the company that is building these ships for Shell [Oil] has visited with me and other state officials, and that's why you heard us say in our testimony that we think the leasing option should be considered. We don't have a way to judge the relative cost. But if on the face of it, it seems like it may be a way to get us the capability that the admiral needs.⁶²

Private companies build the ships now anyway

O'Rourke 12 (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 6/14/12, "Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress," <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf>, JHR)

The nation's **fourth polar icebreaker** is Nathaniel B. Palmer, which was built for the NSF in 1992 by North American Shipbuilding, of Larose, LA. The ship, called Palmer for short, is owned by Edison Chouest Offshore (ECO) of Galliano, LA, a firm that **owns and operates research ships** and offshore deepwater service ships.¹⁴ NSF uses a contractor, Raytheon Polar Services Company (RPSC), to lease the ship from ECO.¹⁵

Privatizing solves- solves fleet modernization and saves money

Davis 11 (Tyler, 12/9/11, "The Lone Icebreaker: U.S. Sovereignty in the Arctic," The Heritage Foundation, <http://blog.heritage.org/2011/12/09/the-lone-icebreaker-u-s-sovereignty-in-the-arctic/>, JHR)

The United States Coast Guard is being left behind in the Arctic. While countries such as Russia are building up their icebreaker fleet and actively increasing their presence in the Arctic, the United States is losing its only form of sovereignty in the region. On December 1, Rear Admiral Jeffrey M. Garrett, U.S. Coast Guard, testified before Congress on protecting U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic. He stated in Second Line of Defense that "the Icebreaker fleet represents the main surface presence that the U.S. can exert in what is essentially a maritime domain in the Arctic Ocean." Yet today, the Coast Guard has an icebreaker fleet of only three ships. Worse yet, two of these ships are out of commission due to maintenance work and will not be available for at least seven more years. The lone icebreaker in commission is the USCGC Healy, which conducts all types of missions from search and rescue to navigational aid to scientific research. Though the ship has been effective at its job in the Arctic, it is designed to break through ice of only medium

thickness; for ice of heavy thickness, the Healy is absolutely useless. And like the other two icebreakers, it is quickly aging. **Without efforts to modernize the fleet, the future of the U.S. national maritime interest and security in the Arctic is looking pretty bleak.** Icebreakers are a necessity in the region, and without them the U.S. might as well throw in the towel. These ships are key to year-round access to the Arctic and are the only U.S. insurance policy for future hazardous events. If something happens to the Healy, then the United States would not only lose access to the region but would not be able to react to potential oil spills and would become less effective in search-and-rescue missions. Complicating matters even further, ice in the Arctic is melting, producing more ocean area for the transportation of goods and services in the region. Essentially, whoever best utilizes this route will control trade and transportation of goods and materials in the upper hemisphere. With all other nations around the Arctic building their icebreaker fleets and exploiting the key transportation route that connects the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the United States is falling behind. In order to create an icebreaking fleet to maintain U.S. presence in the region, the Administration should look toward privatizing the fleet. **Allowing private companies to own and operate the U.S. icebreaking fleet** and perform national security functions would not only **allow for crucial modernization but also save federal dollars** and expand U.S. capabilities in the Arctic. This is particularly important at a time when **the government is looking to cut corners in federal spending.** Ultimately, something must be done. If the U.S. does not act fast, it will come in last in the race for the Arctic.

Leasing solves the case better immediately- it also avoids the disad

Slattery 14 (Brian, Research Assistant for Defense Studies in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, 5/12/14, "Congress Should Support the Coast Guard's Modernization Efforts," The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/05/congress-should-support-the-coast-guards-modernization-efforts>, JHR)

Polar Icebreakers. The Coast Guard icebreaking capability is lacking. Currently, the sea service sails one medium icebreaker, the *Healy* (which serves primarily as a research vessel for the National Science Foundation), and the *Polar Star*, which is over four decades old and recently received a \$90 million upgrade to extend its service life for seven to 10 years. This falls well below the Coast Guard's requirement for three medium and three heavy-duty polar icebreakers. A new heavy polar icebreaker is estimated to cost nearly \$1 billion. In the FY 2013 budget, the Coast Guard planned to direct \$380 million to the program in FY 2015, but this year only \$16 million was requested.[7] Considering the Coast Guard's overall budgetary pressures, other major recapitalization programs, and the icebreaker's unrealistic funding schedule, **the Coast Guard should look to other options, such as leasing** foreign icebreakers more readily available. This would fulfill the primary capability requirement more quickly while also saving the Coast Guard from having to dedicate an enormous portion of its budget to one vessel. Gains in Aviation Though the Coast Guard's aviation funding saw a dramatic decrease, requesting \$107 million less than in FY 2014, this is partly due to the transfer of C-27J Sherpa aircraft from the U.S. Air Force.

This transfer enables the Coast Guard to modernize its aircraft fleet without buying as many HC-144 Ocean Sentry aircraft. The sea service had planned to buy 36 HC-144s, but since they acquired 14 C-27Js, that number was significantly reduced.[8] However, this does not completely fulfill the Coast Guard's aviation recapitalization requirement and also does not address how the planes' different capabilities change operational planning. Robust Coast Guard Modernization

As Congress continues vetting the budget request, it should do the following to ensure that the Coast Guard continues to have the assets it needs to perform its missions into the future:

- Better fund the FRC fleet. If only two FRC vessels are procured in FY 2015, the consequences could include both per-unit cost increases and a failure to adequately replace legacy craft coming out of the fleet. Congress should support the Coast Guard's original plan to procure six FRCs in 2015.
- Support other fleet modernization. The Coast Guard has made progress in modernizing its fleet, and Congress should support the efforts to fulfill the NSC requirement this year. Congress should also require more explanation of the OPC program's development and how reductions in advanced funding will affect it.
- Look to alternatives to icebreaker procurement. **It is extremely unlikely that the Coast Guard will be able to afford a new heavy polar icebreaker without crowding out other acquisition programs,** let alone reach its requirement of six polar icebreakers. **Congress should enable the government to lease foreign-built icebreakers,** which would in turn require exemptions from the Merchant Marine Act of 1920.

Establishing public private partnerships is key to cost reduction

Conely et al 13 (Heather, director and senior fellow of the Europe Program at CSIS, B.A. in international studies from West Virginia Wesleyan College and M.A. in international relations from Johns Hopkins, July 2013, "Arctic Economics in the 21st Century The Benefits and Costs of Cold," Center for Strategic International Studies, http://csis.org/files/publication/130710_Conley_ArcticEconomics_WEB.pdf, JHR)

Should the United States choose to fully maximize the economic benefits of the American Arctic, the United States will need to make significant and long- term investments in its Arctic infrastructure to **develop the region's potential as well as to cope with challenges** of working in extreme climatic conditions and an increasingly fragile ecosystem. The range of infrastructure includes new ports, including deep water ports, and icebreaking capabilities and support vessels, improved satellites, aviation assets, as well as maintenance of airstrips, roads and pipelines. **The cost of such infrastructure development exceeds state and national infrastructure budgets.** Clearly, the private sector will play a prominent role in Arctic infrastructure development, particularly in **the form of innovative public- private partnerships** between state or federal governments and private corporations seeking to tap into the Arctic's natural resource wealth. **Brother, Can You Spare an Icebreaker?**

AT: Military Deficit

The counterplan solves sufficiently

Slattery 13 (Brian, The Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at The Heritage Foundation, 12/31/13, “Stranded Vessel in Antarctica Illustrates Need for New U.S. Icebreaker Policy,” The Daily Signal, <http://dailysignal.com/2013/12/31/stranded-vessel-antarctica-illustrates-need-new-u-s-icebreaker-policy/>, JHR)

With economic interests in the Arctic rising and capability gaps in the Antarctic, the U.S. needs to **forge a new path** when it comes to icebreaking. The Navy, which has been suggested as a potential bill payer for this fleet, has too many shipbuilding funding concerns of its own to legitimately take on an additional multi-billion-dollar project. Instead, the U.S. should look to **lease foreign heavy-duty icebreakers from the private sector**. These vessels are not as militarily robust as those in the Coast Guard, but they would provide the icebreaking capability the U.S. currently lacks, **immediately and cost-effectively**.

AT: Perm do both

Privatization solves – doing both causes the government to outcompete the private sector

Moore, 14 – Michael, Pacific Maritime Magazine, “The Age of the Arctic: The Rush Has Just Begun” 6/1, <http://www.pacmar.com/story/2014/06/01/features/the-age-of-the-arctic-the-rush-has-just-begun/256.html>)//DH

Most of today's Arctic commercial carriers (bulk carriers, tankers, and LNG carriers) **are designed as icebreaking ships capable of independent operations (without icebreaker escort)**. Most of the Arctic commercial carriers operating in the Canadian and Russian Arctic regions do not require icebreaker escort during a three- to four-month navigation season. **The availability of capable commercial icebreakers must also be taken into account when determining the requirements for a federal icebreaking capacity.**

The use of privately-owned icebreakers in the US maritime Arctic in support of offshore exploration and, potentially, the escort of commercial shipping to a US Arctic port is a compelling opportunity for the US maritime industry. US federal agencies and **Congress should be supportive of this commercial opportunity and** **not compete with industry** **by using a fleet of solely government-owned icebreakers.**

AT: CP Links to politics

The counterplan's creative financing mechanism is uniquely popular

Demarban 12 (Alex, University of Texas-Austin, former editor at Alaska Newspaper, 4/11/12, "Should Alaska take the lead in financing new icebreakers?" Alaska Dispatch, <http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/should-alaska-take-lead-financing-new-icebreakers> JHR) **He = Alaska Representative Don Young**

He continues: "Given the current fiscal climate in D.C., **funding the acquisition of new vessels presents a significant challenge**. It is clear **that we must consider creative financing and ownership options** to move forward." In addition to helping bankroll the project, the state should also think about owning an icebreaker with private firms. The state could refurbish the Polar Sea or the Polar Star. It could then lease its icebreakers to the Coast Guard and National Science Foundation, wrote Young.

2nc --- at: links to coast guard da

Leasing avoids the link- stops pressure on annual budgets

Laster 11 (Jill, reporter for The Navy Times in Washington, D.C., covering the Coast Guard, 9/15/11, "CG must balance cuts with Arctic mission," Navy Times, <http://www.navytimes.com/news/2011/10/coast-guard-arctic-mission-balance-cuts-101511w>, JHR)

"In these difficult budgetary times, **leasing should be considered as an option to relieve stress on annual budgets.**" Young said in a statement announcing the bill. "My legislation does that while modernizing our icebreaker fleet so that we are able to compete with any other country in the world."

Incremental Funding CP

1nc --- shell

The _____ should substantially increase its _____ through a process of incremental funding.

Here's a solvency advocate- the CP avoids the link to the tradeoff disad- spreading out costs over multiple years avoids a price spike that destroys other Coast Guard priorities

O'Rourke 14 (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 7/1/14, "Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/233529641/37/Procurement-vs-Leasing>, JHR)

Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service Incremental Funding vs. Full Funding Another potential issue for Congress concerns the Coast Guard's proposal to fund the acquisition of a new icebreaker using incremental funding (i.e., a series of annual funding increments) rather than full funding (i.e., placing most or all of the ship's acquisition cost into a single year). Section 31.6 of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11 normally requires executive branch agencies to use full funding for acquiring capital assets such as a new ship. The Coast Guard appears to have received permission from OMB to propose the use of incremental funding for acquiring a new polar icebreaker; Congress may choose to approve, reject, or modify this proposal. Supporters of using incremental funding to acquire a new polar icebreaker could argue **that funding this ship in a single year would create a one-year "spike" in Coast Guard funding requirements that could require offsetting and potentially disruptive one-year reductions** in other Coast Guard programs, and that using **incremental funding mitigates the spiking issue** by spreading the ship's cost over several years. Supporters could argue that avoiding such budget spikes is a principal reason why the Navy in recent years has been given permission by OMB and Congress to use incremental funding to procure aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships, and **that a polar icebreaker is analogous to an aircraft carrier or an amphibious assault ship in being a very expensive** (for the Coast Guard) ship that is procured once every several years.

2nc --- solves better

Incremental funding is superior- costs and flexibility

O'Rourke and Daggett 7 (*Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service AND **Stephen, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 6/15/7, "Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy — Background, Issues, and Options for Congress," CRS Report for Congress, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31404.pdf>, JHR)

A principal effect of the full funding policy is to prevent the use of incremental funding, under which the cost of a weapon is divided into two or more annual portions. **Incremental funding** fell out of favor because opponents believed it could make the total procurement costs of weapons and equipment more difficult for **Congress to understand and track, create a potential for DOD to start procurement of an item without necessarily stating its total cost to Congress, permit one Congress to "tie the hands" of future Congresses**, and increase weapon procurement costs by exposing weapons under construction to uneconomic start-up and stop costs. Supporters of incremental funding, however, could argue that its **use in DOD procurement programs could produce certain advantages in terms of reducing disruption to other programs, avoiding investment bias against very expensive items, improving near-term production economies of scale, and preserving flexibility** for future Congresses to halt funding for weapons under construction that have become unnecessary or inappropriate.

Incremental funding solves- the Coast Guard budget alone is insufficient

Conely et al 13 (Heather, director and senior fellow of the Europe Program at CSIS, B.A. in international studies from West Virginia Wesleyan College and M.A. in international relations from Johns Hopkins, July 2013, "Arctic Economics in the 21st Century The Benefits and Costs of Cold," Center for Strategic International Studies, http://csis.org/files/publication/130710_Conley_ArcticEconomics_WEB.pdf, JHR)

According to Rear Admiral Christopher C. Colvin, **the USCG requires additional icebreakers** or ice-hardened vessels with embarked helicopters to accomplish its objectives to project a sovereign U.S. maritime presence in the Arctic.

Additional icebreakers are required to carry out USCG duties to protect maritime commerce, critical infrastructure, and key resources in the Arctic region.⁹ **The U.S. Coast Guard has requested \$8 million in the fiscal year (FY) 2013 budget to initiate design activities for a new polar icebreaker,** and it plans to ask for another \$852 million over the next five years to incrementally fund its acquisition, with more funding (up to \$1 billion) required to

complete the order.¹⁰ **Congress must decide whether the acquisition costs should be incrementally funded,** as the Coast Guard proposes, or if the funds should be fully allocated in one fiscal year, as typically required by the Office of Management and Budget. Congress might also consider whether the funding should be allocated in the Coast Guard's budget (part of the Department of Homeland Security), or if it **should be partly funded through the Department of Defense and/or the National**

Science Foundation's budgets, in accordance with the USCG commandant's assessment that "an icebreaker ought to be a shared cost across the government."¹¹

According to the commandant, Admiral Robert Papp, the Coast Guard's goal is to have a fleet of three heavy- duty and three medium- duty icebreakers to fulfill its mission in the Arctic and Antarctic regions; this requires an investment estimated at \$3.2 billion. The past couple years have seen a decline in acquisition spending that until recently was around \$1.5 billion annually.

The White House budget proposal for the next fiscal year allocates just \$1.08 billion for Coast Guard acquisition. Papp has elsewhere said **the Coast Guard really needs \$2.5 billion** annually to

address all its outstanding needs, including recapitalization of an inland waters fleet that's around half a century old. One option under consideration is refurbishing the laid-up heavy icebreaker USCGC Polar Sea, possibly waiting to do so until the Coast Guard's other heavy icebreaker the USCGC Polar Star nears the end of its recently completed seven- to 10-year life extension. The Polar Sea, tied up "cold iron" in Puget Sound, experienced a catastrophic failure of one of its main propulsion diesel engines in April 2010. "I want to make sure for the record that I didn't say [it's] a good option. I said it may be an option," Papp told lawmakers. A Coast Guard analysis has concluded that it can make do without a

second heavy icebreaker through 2022. Papp also dismissed leasing as a serious possibility, stating that the annual leasing cost would eat into operations money, which would require further reducing the number of Coast Guard personnel. "We're down to the point now when we talk about displacing things, what we're talking about is displacing people," he said. The budget proposal for fiscal 2015 would decrease personnel by another 800, a number that would add up to a 2,000 position decrease since 2011, Papp said. "One of the most important things to me when I became commandant was preserving our end strength for our service. In my opinion, I've failed miserably," said Papp, who ends his four year term as commandant this May. Even

without an icebreaker in the proposed budget – except for \$6 million to study the matter – the Coast Guard must cut personnel-driven capability, such as reducing by four the number of Vessel Boarding and Search Teams. "We're making some very tough decisions as this budget gets tamped down, squeezed down. And, as I said earlier, **we have no other option now that to start cutting people** in specific locations," Papp said.

Specifically successful in the context of shipbuilding- empirics prove

O'Rourke and Daggett 7 (*Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service AND **Stephen, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 6/15/7, "Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy — Background, Issues, and Options for Congress," CRS Report for Congress, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31404.pdf>, JHR)

Advance Appropriations for Navy Ships in SCN. In 2001 and again in 2005, some Navy officials advocated the use of a funding arrangement called **advance appropriations for Navy ships, particularly as a means of increasing the number of ships** that could be placed under construction in the near term with available funding. Use of **advance appropriations would enable the Navy to begin construction on a ship** in a given year even though the budget authority for that year provided only an initial increment of the total procurement cost of the ship. Under advance appropriations, funding for the entire procurement cost of a ship would be approved by Congress in a single decision. In contrast, however, to traditional full funding, in which the full procurement cost of the ship is assigned to (i.e., scored in) the budget year in which it is procured, under advance appropriations, **the procurement cost of the ship approved in a given year would be divided into several portions,** or increments, that would be **scored across several budget years** starting with the original year of procurement. In contrast to incremental funding, under which Congress must take a positive action each year to approve the portion of the ship's cost assigned to that year, with advance appropriations, Congress each year would need to take a positive action to cancel the portion of the ship's cost assigned to that year. Although Navy supporters of the advance appropriation concept stressed that advance appropriations is a form of full funding rather than incremental funding, they acknowledge that advance appropriations could be described informally as a legislatively locked-in counterpart to incremental funding.

The CP ensures funding- ties down future congresses

O'Rourke and Daggett 7 (*Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service AND **Stephen, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 6/15/7, "Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy — Background, Issues, and Options for Congress," CRS Report for Congress, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31404.pdf>, JHR)

Alternative of Incremental Funding. Prior to the imposition of the full funding policy, DOD weapon procurement was accomplished through incremental funding. Incremental funding fell out of favor because opponents believed it did (or could do) one or more of the following: ! make the total procurement costs of weapons and equipment more difficult for Congress to understand and track; ! create a potential for DOD to start procurement of an item without necessarily understanding its total cost, stating that total cost to Congress, or providing fully for that total cost in future DOD budgets — the so-called "camel's-nose-under-the-tent" issue; ! **permit one Congress to "tie the hands"** of one or more future Congresses by

providing initial procurement funding for a weapon whose cost would **have to be largely funded by one or more**
future Congresses;

2nc --- at: links to nb

The CP avoids the link- cost distribution means no program displacement

O'Rourke and Daggett 7 (*Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service AND **Stephen, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 6/15/7, "Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy — Background, Issues, and Options for Congress," CRS Report for Congress, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31404.pdf>, JHR)

Although incremental funding fell out of favor due to the above considerations, supporters of incremental funding could argue that its use in DOD (or federal) procurement can be advantageous because it can do one or more of the following:

permit very expensive items, such as large Navy ships, to be procured in a given year without

displacing other programs from that year's budget, which can increase the costs of the

displaced programs due to uneconomic program-disruption start-up and start costs; ! avoid a

potential bias against the procurement of very expensive items that might result from use of full funding due to the item's large up-front procurement cost (which appears in the budget) overshadowing the item's long-term benefits (which do not appear in the budget) or its lower life cycle operation and support (O&S)

costs compared to alternatives with lower up-front procurement costs; ! permit construction to start **on a larger number of items in a**

given year within that year's amount of funding, so as to achieve better production economies

of that item than would have been possible under full funding;

Interagency CP

1nc --- shell

The United States Coast Guard, the Department of Defense, and National Science Foundation should all share necessary expenses to _____.

Here's a solvency advocate- sharing expenses among agencies avoids the link to the tradeoff disad

O'Rourke 14 (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 7/1/14, "Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/233529641/37/Procurement-vs-Leasing>, JHR)

At a March 12, 2014, hearing on the Coast Guard's proposed FY2015 budget before the Homeland Security subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, the

Commandant of the Coast at the time, Admiral Robert Papp stated: What concerns me, however, is—particularly as I'm being constrained closer to the billion-dollar range in my acquisition projects [i.e., the Coast Guard's Acquisition, Construction, and Improvements, or AC&I, account], I don't—**I don't know how you fit in a billion-dollar icebreaker.**

Because at some point, you're going to

have to take—even if you do it with a multi-year strategy [i.e., incremental funding], you're going to have go \$300 billion [sic:million] or \$400 billion [sic: million] in a couple

of years, which**would displace other very important things**.

So, we're having to take a hard look at this. One way of doing it is to say, OK, this icebreaker serves the interagency. The Department of Defense could call on us. NSF certainly does, and other agencies. **Why should**

that not be a shared expense?

And, oh, by the way, if all these companies are going to be making that much money off oil exploration and the arctic, maybe they can share in the cost of this icebreaker.

2nc --- solvency

The counterplan solves- the Commandant of the Coast Guard goes neg

O'Rourke 14 (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 7/1/14, "Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/233529641/37/Procurement-vs-Leasing>, JHR)

I can't afford to pay for an icebreaker in a 1-billion-dollar [per year] SIP [sic: CIP] because it would just displace other things that I have a higher priority for. So we're looking at other alternatives, perhaps one of those alternatives, the Congress came up with a requirement for a business base analysis on the remaining Polar Seal [sic: Sea]icebreaker,

Polar Sea and potentially, we might be able to overhaul Polar Sea and fit that into the SIP [sic: CIP] as an affordable means for providing an additional icebreaker as we await a time that we can build a new icebreaker. If we are going to build a new icebreaker, if that is a priority, **we just can't fit it within our acquisition account and I**

would look across the inter-agency [for the funding]. Later in the hearing, he stated: The Offshore Patrol Cutter is my highest priority for the Coast Guard. I need to fit that in the budget and I fear that if we try to fit the cost of an icebreaker in there, it would displace the Offshore Patrol Cutter or some other very important things. So my **number one option is to get support across the inter-**

agency, those agencies that benefit from the support of an ice breaker to contribute towards

the construction of it, that would be my first choice. My second choice however, when I start looking at what can I fit within our acquisition budget refurbishment of the Polar Sea maybe a viable option for that. I would say what you would want to do is overlap and so as Polar Star is coming towards the end of that decade of service after refurbishment, we have polar—I think I said Polar Star.

2nc --- more comparative ev

Here's comparative evidence- funding could come from DOD subagencies

Caldwell 11 (Stephen, Director of Homeland Security and Justice, December 1, "Coast Guard: Observations on Arctic Requirements, Icebreakers, and Coordination with Stakeholders" Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives,"

[http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/TestimonyCGMT/2011-12-1-](http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/TestimonyCGMT/2011-12-1-Caldwell.pdf)

Caldwell.pdf, JHR)

These two studies concluded that building new heavy icebreakers was the best solution to addressing the requirements, as well as from a budgetary perspective. The latter analyses included ancillary studies and

explored other options to obtain new polar icebreaking capabilities including: leasing, waiver from current government requirements that mandates the U.S. Coast Guard have full funding for vessel acquisition prior to award (unlike the U.S. Navy's incremental funding allowed for aircraft carriers), funding U.S. Coast Guard acquisition of new polar icebreaking capabilities from the U.S. Navy SCN budget (a similar process that was used for the acquisition of the USCGC Healy).

Arctic Council CP

1nc Arctic Council CP

Working through the Arctic Council solves Russian expansionism comparatively better

Mitchell, 14 - Jon Mitchell is an independent writer working to cultivate experience in foreign policy and political-military analysis. He is pursuing his Masters degree in public policy, with a concentration in international affairs ("Russia's Territorial Ambition and Increased Military Presence in the Arctic" 4/23, <http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/04/23/russias-territorial-ambition-and-increased-military-presence-in-the-arctic/>)/DH

Last month, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for a united Canadian-U.S. counterbalance to Russia's Arctic presence, pointing out "they have been aggressively reopening military bases." [25] While the U.S. cannot legitimately criticize Putin for opening military bases and simultaneously avoid blatant hypocrisy, it is worth noting that Russia is developing a strong military presence in a potentially competitive region. Russia's plans to reopen bases and create an Arctic military command fosters the conclusion that **Russia wants to be the first established dominant force in a new region** that will host economic competition and primary shipping lanes, albeit in a harsh environment that makes it difficult to extract resources. Nicholas Cunningham aptly stated "both Russia and the West fear losing out to the other in the far north, despite what appears to be a small prize." [26]

Although the Arctic holds a mass of the world's oil and gas deposits, the extreme environment and remote location makes it difficult to produce energy quickly and efficiently. Despite this, the Russian Federation is focused on developing disputed hydrocarbon areas that it claims are part of the country's continental shelf. In addition, Russia is allocating funds and forces to the Arctic to protect its interests. While the U.S. is currently lacking in natural resource development and exploitation in the Arctic Circle, it desires to display a show of strength in the cold region to compete with potential Russian domination and influence. But **because the Defense Department faces constant budget cuts, preparing an Arctic naval force will be slow and difficult**. For now, the United States can only show strength through nuclear submarines and drone technology.

Putin and the Russian Federation are laying disputed claims to territories both inside and outside the Arctic while creating the foundation for a potential military buildup in the Arctic – provided that the U.S. and Canada can even allocate sufficient budgets for Arctic military expansion. One thing is sure: if the Arctic region continues to melt and open up vital shipping lanes, there must be international cooperation to provide security and rescue elements for commercial shipping. Since Russia has significant territorial claims and the most coastlines in the Arctic Circle, it would be natural for the Russian Federation to have a wide security presence in the region, but this must be coupled with international cooperation in commercial shipping lanes and by providing support elements, such as search and rescue. **The United States will not be able to fully compete with a country that is heavily investing in the Arctic region – particularly due to budget constraints and lack of Arctic-prepared vessels. If the U.S. desires to limit Russian influence and territorial claims, it must do so by partnering with other members of the Arctic council – not by entering into a military buildup simply to dominate Russia in the Arctic.**

2nc Arctic Council CP

US action through the Arctic Council can solve climate change and support US Arctic leadership

Kelly et al 4-24-14 -- Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress. Michael Conathan is the Director of Ocean Policy at the Center. Vikram Singh is the Vice President for National Security and International Policy at the Center (Cathleen, "Helping the Arctic Council Find Its True North" The Center for American Progress, <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2014/04/24/88474/helping-the-arctic-council-find-its-true-north/>)BC

For millennia, the Arctic has lain beneath a blanket of ice and snow—an ocean locked out of all interaction with the rest of the world, save subsea currents and icebreaking marine mammals. Yet in recent decades, rapid declines in ice coverage due to global climate change have begun to unlock what may be the world's last undisturbed vault of natural resources, potentially opening trade routes dreamt of by explorers since the late 15th century. The opening of the Arctic has already begun to stimulate economic development, and the changes at the top of the world present massive global challenges. In the Arctic, which is warming two times faster than any other region on Earth, the effects of climate change are staggering. Arctic sea-ice volume has shrunk by 75 percent since the 1980s, and we are very likely to see ice-free summers by midcentury. These and other rapid changes directly affect the livelihoods, infrastructure, and health of the 4 million people who live in the region and have economic, environmental, geostrategic, and national security implications for the United States and the world. Despite growing interest in capitalizing on the region's rich and increasingly accessible resources, the profound changes in the Arctic pose grave risks and high costs to America and the planet. For example, melting sea ice in the Greenland Arctic is speeding up global sea-level rise; increasing flood risks; and endangering infrastructure and communities in coastal cities such as Miami, New York, and many others. Just five nations border the Arctic Ocean—Canada, Norway, Russia, the United States, and Denmark, via its dominion over Greenland. In 1996, they joined forces with Finland, Iceland, and Sweden* and established the Arctic Council, an international body designed to address emerging challenges in the region. The chairmanship of **the Arctic Council rotates among them, and in 2015, the United States will take its turn at the top when Secretary of State John Kerry assumes the role. By any metric, climate change is the key driver of growing Arctic commercial interests and profound environmental and economic risks in the region and around the globe.** For this reason, **Secretary Kerry should establish climate change as the overarching theme of his Arctic Council chairmanship.** As chairman, **he should also seek to conserve invaluable Arctic marine and coastal ecosystems, ensure global security by minimizing potential conflicts in the region, and promote sustainable Arctic development that will allow Arctic communities to become more resilient and prosperous. The federal government should also seize this opportunity to raise the domestic profile of Arctic issues and strengthen our presence in this emerging and vital region. This should include expansion of America's capabilities to manage Arctic oil spills** and other disasters, **including through our icebreaker fleet**, navigation and communication satellites, ports, and other infrastructure needed to support emergency preparedness and response. The United States is taking steps to respond to the challenges and opportunities of a rapidly changing Arctic, but **more action is needed**. President Barack Obama's National Strategy for the Arctic Region, the White House's Arctic Strategy Implementation Plan, the Department of Defense 2013 Arctic Strategy, and the U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap for 2014 to 2030 identify a suite of actions through which to advance national and international security, pursue responsible environmental stewardship, and strengthen international cooperation in the region. Consistent with these priorities, as well as with the president's Climate Action Plan, Secretary **Kerry should seize the opportunity to set an ambitious agenda to combat climate change.** To implement it, he should work closely with Canada—the current Arctic Council chair—to secure black carbon emission reduction commitments at the 2015 Arctic Council ministerial-level meeting. Lastly, President Obama should convene a presidential Arctic summit for Arctic Council members and observers in 2016 to make rapid progress on the priority initiatives described below. In this report, we recommend these actions and more. We propose policy initiatives that can be implemented domestically, as well as specific guidance to lead the Arctic Council to new and improved international policy standards. First, we provide a brief background on the rationale for urgent action in the Arctic region. We then provide specific guidance for both Arctic Council and U.S. domestic initiatives in the following three categories: 1. **Establish climate change as the overarching theme of Secretary Kerry's chairmanship term.** Reduce Arctic warming by centering the 2015–2017 Arctic Council agenda on the effects of global climate change and the efforts to combat it. 2. **Reduce climate change and**

build resilience in the Arctic region. The following attainable goals focus on reducing Arctic warming and strengthening community resilience in the region. Meeting these goals should be a top priority for Secretary Kerry during his chairmanship. **Reduce black carbon emissions in and beyond the Arctic region. Reduce methane emissions in and beyond the Arctic region. Expand Arctic communities' access to energy efficiency and renewable energy. Strengthen Arctic communities' resilience. Expand Arctic climate change research and information sharing. Ensure safe and clean Arctic transportation. Expand the commercial fishing moratorium to all Arctic Council nations and collaborate on fisheries research. Establish protected areas in the Arctic and conserve the region's unique and climate-sensitive wildlife.** 3. **Take domestic actions to support Arctic leadership.** The following unilateral steps will both help the United States drive an ambitious Arctic Council agenda centered on climate change and prepare the United States to better manage Arctic challenges going forward. Freeze U.S. oil and gas drilling in the Arctic Ocean. **Connect the U.S. public to the Arctic people and the value of a healthy climate and marine and coastal environments in the region. Ensure a peaceful, safe, and stable Arctic.** Ratify the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. These recommended priorities were developed through collaboration between members of multiple policy teams at the Center for American Progress, including leaders on the Energy, Public Lands, Ocean, and National Security and International Policy teams.

US action through the Arctic Council solves sustainable development in the Arctic
Ebinger 6-5-14 -- director of the Energy Security Initiative at Brookings, which is housed within the institution's Foreign Policy program (Charles K., "The Way Forward for U.S. Arctic Policy," The Brookings Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/planetpolicy/posts/2014/06/05-way-forward-us-arctic-policy-ebinger>)BC

A report recently released by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) offered recommendations for U.S. Arctic policy to the State Department—specifically on how best to enhance the United States' 2015 chairmanship of the Arctic Council. This report, although informative on the large issue at hand, leaves much to the imagination as to how exactly the United States should go about exacting effective participation in the Arctic. In the report, the GAO stresses that the State Department needs to track and follow through with its recommendations on Arctic policy. While these recommendations are a good start, clearer objectives are needed in order to capitalize on U.S. leadership in the Arctic going forward. This past March, the Brookings Energy Security Initiative (ESI) released a policy brief for the State Department that addresses very specific Arctic issues that should be part of the United States' agenda as Arctic Council chair in 2015. Based on our analysis and conclusions, we in ESI believe that it is in the national interest of the United States to take the lead in strengthening the Arctic offshore oil and gas governance regime. **The cornerstone of U.S. chairmanship should be enhancing oil spill prevention, control and response through the development of Arctic-specific standards for all equipment and resource sharing arrangements to ensure that adequate standards, procedures, financial resources, equipment and infrastructure are in place and available.** Our specific recommendations in our March policy brief are as follows: **Establish oil spill prevention, control and response as the overarching theme for U.S. chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2015-2017. Create the diplomatic post of "Arctic Ambassador." Establish a Regional Bureau for Polar Affairs in the U.S. Department of State. Accelerate the ongoing development of Alaska-specific standards and discuss their applicability in bilateral and multilateral forums. Strengthen bilateral regulatory arrangements for the Chukchi Sea with Russia, and the Beaufort Sea with Canada. Support the industry-led establishment of an Arctic-specific resource sharing organization for oil spill response and safety. Support and prioritize the strengthening of the Arctic Council's influence through enhanced thematic and global coordination of offshore oil and gas issues. Support the establishment of a circumpolar Arctic Regulators Association for Oil and Gas. While we wish that the GAO's report had outlined more specific recommendations, we applaud the increasing interest by the U.S.**

government in Arctic research. Last October, U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest J. Moniz requested that the National Petroleum Council undertake a study on major energy issues in the Arctic that is currently underway. **We hope that this and other reports will continue to reflect and reinforce the recommendations we have proposed. The changing Arctic is outpacing the U.S. government's current policy.** Russia, Norway, Denmark and even several non-Arctic nations such as China and Japan, all have Arctic strategies. **Perhaps it is time the U.S. viewed the Arctic not only as a security threat in a strictly military and geopolitical sense, but also as a safety threat in the context of climate change, sustainability of indigenous communities and the protection of the environment. Chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2015 will allow the U.S. to take leadership in these important issue areas going forward, and we in ESI hope that the U.S. will seize this opportunity.**

Military CP

Navy CP

CP Solves – Navy overseas all icebreaker development

Perera 4/7/14 – MA in International and Public Affairs at Columbia, Politico Reporter (David, “Coast Guard authorization bill sent to Senate”) <http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/story/coast-guard-authorization-bill-sent-senate/2014-04-07> //Laura T

A bill authorizing Coast Guard discretionary spending for two years at \$8.7 billion annually sailed through the House of Representatives – to the chagrin of some on the House Homeland Security Committee. **The House approved the reauthorization bill** (H.R. 4005) by a voice vote April 1. **It would cap annual Coast Guard spending on acquisition at \$1.54 billion for the next and subsequent fiscal years and reduce to 6,700 from 7,200 the number of commissioned officers on the active duty promotion list.** The actual amount of acquisition spending, which is controlled by lawmakers on the appropriations committees, could fall short of the caps by hundreds of millions, if recent years' enacted amounts constitute a trend. The bill went directly from the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee in late March to the House floor after the chairmen of the House Homeland Security and Armed Services committees waived jurisdiction over it – something that previous committee chairmen have also done for Coast Guard authorization legislation. During floor debate, House Homeland Security Committee Ranking Member Bennie Thompson (D-Miss.) criticized the lack of referral to his committee, saying that its members "could inform the bill's security-related provisions in an open markup setting." He cited as an example of an unaddressed security provision a concern voiced earlier by Rep. Janice Hahn (D-Calif.) **that the bill doesn't require port authorities to account for cybersecurity in the five year security plans they submit for Coast Guard review.** "The House has before it a bill that does not fully take into account the statutory mission of the Department of Homeland Security component it authorizes," Thompson charged. Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.), chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure subcommittee from where the bill originated said he will work to include cybersecurity as an element of port facility security plans. **"We need to figure out who is the best at it, who can do it," he said, suggesting that the Navy might be the best authority. The Coast Guard is a military service but forms a part of the Homeland Security Department; occasionally in its history, it's been a part of the Navy but has mostly been overseen by civilian federal departments.** Among the bill's provisions is one that would authorize the Coast Guard to enter into a multiyear contract for building Offshore Patrol Cutters. The statute permitting multiyear procurement within the Homeland Security Department requires that the thing being bought have "a stable design." Chuck Hill, a close Coast Guard observer, notes that "in the case of shipbuilding, this usually means that the first ship is at least complete" and adds that by then, at least three OPCs could be under contract. **The bill also would prevent the Coast Guard from dismantling Long Range Navigation** – better known as LORAN – infrastructure for a year or until the departmental secretary sends written notice that the system isn't required as a backup to the satellite-based GPS system. LORAN towers that pose a hazard to human life would be exempted from the delay in the planned dismantling; one such 650 foot tower in Florida reportedly is without warning lights due to a failed electrical system.

Navy Fund and Build CP

The Navy can build and fund Icebreakers for the Coast Guard to use

Dickie 13 – Seattle Times editorial columnist (Lance, “Spend money on needed Arctic icebreakers to assert U.S. interests,” The Seattle Times, http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2022405103_lancedickiecolumnicebreakers06xml.html)BC

Epic changes in the Arctic climate and landscape are seemingly unstoppable. Environmentalists concerned about what comes next should rally support for new U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers. That might sound like quirky advice, but **global excitement about a coveted maritime passage reinforces the need for a vigilant U.S. presence.** U.S. Rep. Rick **Larsen**, D-Everett, **has renewed efforts**, along with Washington Sens. Maria Cantwell and Patty Murray, **to point Congress toward spending money on four heavy polar icebreakers.** At more than \$850 million apiece, this proposal will take some patient politicking. Larsen explained in a Wednesday phone call **the approach for now is to support putting money in the Pentagon budget for the Navy to use its acquisition and procurement skills to get the icebreakers built. The Navy would transfer the icebreakers to the Coast Guard, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security. Larsen is intent on not only properly equipping the Coast Guard for its role, but also raising the priority and visibility of the assignment within Congress.** Getting lawmakers to pay attention to the changes in the Arctic and address the new reality is a challenge well beyond Capitol Hill. Michael **Byers**, who holds the Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia, **sees the same pattern. Prime Minister Stephen Harper** has talked about a stronger Canadian naval presence in the Arctic, but has done little to make it happen, Byers said in a Tuesday phone interview. **Canada is spending money expanding its fleet of offshore patrol ships,** but they are not designed for the rigors of polar duty. Byers wonders if Harper’s skepticism about climate change explains his reluctance to move ahead in the Arctic. Canada currently chairs the Arctic Council, an association of nations — Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia and the United States — that oversee policy. Six international organizations representing Arctic Indigenous People have permanent observer status. Byers gives the Obama administration credit for raising the visibility of the council. Larsen notes the Obama White House picked up on efforts started by the Bush administration. Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham **Clinton** **elevated the importance of the council for foreign ministers by being the first senior foreign-policy official to attend a session.** The U.S. will take over the council gavel in 2015. Playing against Cold War stereotype, Russia makes a point about promoting international cooperation. Byers quotes a 2010 speech by Vladimir Putin who said, “It is well known that if you stand alone, you cannot survive in the Arctic. It is very important to maintain the Arctic as a region of peace and cooperation.” Other nations watching the ice melt are as eager as the Russians to take thousands of miles off trade routes. China, Japan, South Korea, India, Italy and Singapore have observer status on the council. China has an enormous modern icebreaker of its own. Byers ticks off a compelling environmental checklist of issues to monitor: Are tankers double-hulled? What is the status of weather- and ice-forecasting capabilities and the adequacy of refuge, and search-and-rescue facilities? **Security issues, including smuggling and human-trafficking, loom with increases in shipping. Byers also points to oversight of future oil and gas exploration in exclusive economic zones. U.S. interests must be articulated in the international arena, and represented in the Arctic. This country lags far behind, and suffers from, oh, let’s call it an icebreaker gap.** The Coast Guard reported the icebreaker USCGC Polar Star left Seattle Tuesday for Antarctica to resupply the research station at McMurdo. “Safe journey” to the crew of 140. **The Polar Star was fresh from Arctic sea trials after a three-year, \$90 million overhaul at Vigor Shipyards in Seattle.** The USCGC Polar Sea, a mothballed heavy icebreaker, awaits a decision on refurbishing, that Larsen estimates at \$100 million. **The Arctic summer ice is melting, but through the darkness from fall to spring the Arctic will be frozen solid. The U.S., and Canada, must be present and equipped to assert their national interests, and enforce maritime protocols in a fragile environment. Icebreakers are a pragmatic investment to protect the Arctic. Spend the money.**

AT: Coast Guard key

Icebreakers themselves solve – the Coast Guard doesn't need to operate them as long as they are US-owned

Jones '06 – Ph.D, Carnegie Mellon, Director of Defense Research and Engineering for the U.S.

Department of Defense 93-97, researcher and director at National Academy of Sciences, Professor at the University of Virginia (Anita, "POLAR ICEBREAKERS IN A CHANGING WORLD: AN ASSESSMENT OF U.S. NEEDS", http://dels.nas.edu/resources/static-assets/materials-based-on-reports/reports-in-brief/polar_icebreakers_final.pdf, *Congressional Testimony*) //J.N.E

Renewal of the Nation's Polar Ice - breaking Fleet Based on the current and future needs for icebreaking capabilities, the Committee concludes that **the nation continues to require a polar ice - breaking fleet that includes a minimum of three multi-mission ships and one single-mission ship. The Committee finds that although the demand for icebreaking capability is predicted to increase, a fleet of three multi-mission and one single-mission icebreakers can meet the nation's future polar icebreaking needs through the application of the latest technology, creative crewing models, wise management of ice conditions, and more efficient use of the icebreaker fleet and other assets.** The nation should immediately begin to program, design, and construct two new polar icebreakers to replace the POLAR STAR and POLAR SEA. **Building only one new polar class icebreaker is insufficient for several reasons. First, a single ship cannot be in more than one location at one time. No matter how technologically advanced or efficiently operated, a single polar icebreaker can operate in the polar regions for only a portion of any year. An icebreaker requires regular maintenance and technical support from shipyards and industrial facilities, regular reprovisioning, and periodic crew change-outs. A single icebreaker, therefore, could not meet any reasonable standard of active and influential presence, and reliable, at-will access throughout the polar regions.** A second consideration is the potential risk of failure in the harsh conditions of polar operations. **Despite their intrinsic robustness, damage and system failure are always a risk and the U.S. fleet must have enough depth to provide back-up assistance.** Having only a single icebreaker would necessarily require the ship to accept a more conservative operating profile, avoiding more challenging ice conditions because reliable assistance would not be available. A second capable icebreaker, either operating elsewhere or in home - port, would provide assured back-up assistance and allow for more robust operations by the other ship. **From a strategic, longer-term perspective, two new polar class icebreakers will far better position the nation for the increasing challenges emerging in both polar regions. A second new ship would allow the U. S. Coast Guard to re-establish an active patrol presence in U.S. waters north of Alaska to meet statutory responsibilities that will inevitably derive from increased human activity, economic development, and environmental change.** It would allow response to emergencies such as search and rescue cases, pollution incidents, and assistance to ships threatened with grounding or damage by ice. Moreover, a second new ship will leverage the possibilities for simultaneous operations in widely disparate geographic areas (such as concurrent operations in the Arctic and Antarctic), provide more flexibility for conducting Antarctic logistics, allow safer multiple-ship operations in the most demanding ice conditions, and increase opportunities for international expeditions. **Finally, an up-front decision to build two new polar icebreakers will allow economies in the design and construction process, and provide a predictable cost reduction for the second ship.** **For the purposes of the single mission of resupplying McMurdo Station, the icebreakers do not necessarily need to be operated by the U.S. Coast Guard, but to best meet mission assurance requirements they should be U.S. flagged, U.S. owned, and U.S. operated.** While that ship might be leased commercially through a

long-term lease/build arrangement, from a total fleet perspective it may be more cost-effective if science mission users only pay incremental costs and if the U.S. Coast Guard provides McMurdo resupply support from the multi-mission icebreaker fleet. Lease arrangements do not assure that the United States could assert its foreign policy will at times and places of its choosing. **The Committee concludes that the research support mission and other U.S. Coast Guard missions can be, in many cases, compatibly performed with a single ship. The Committee believes that it is advantageous to configure the U.S. Coast Guard ships with appropriate science facilities as well as for the U.S. Coast Guard's more general missions.** In the long run, **constituting the nation's icebreaking fleet as a single fleet of complementary ships will yield more capability and should be more cost-effective than if each agency independently acquires icebreaking ships.** This approach is in line with the long held belief that the nation can gain the greatest economy from the sharing of assets across agencies and programs when appropriate and feasible and those users should share in the incremental increase in cost associated with directed usage of national assets. Transition to a New Fleet Given the length of time needed to program, budget, design, construction, and test a new ship, it is expected that the new polar icebreakers will not enter service for another 8 to 10 years. During this time the nation needs a transition strategy to assure a minimum level of icebreaker capability. A continuing maintenance and repair program for the POLAR SEA, building on the work recently completed, is needed to keep it mission capable until at least the first new polar ship enters service. The cost to keep the POLAR SEA mission capable will be much less than a full service life extension program. The resulting capability, an upgraded POLAR SEA together with a fully capable HEALY, is less than the nation needs, but a cost-effective strategy should emphasize new construction rather than maintenance of aging ships. The Committee also advises that the POLAR STAR continue to be kept in caretaker status, indefinitely moored at the U.S. Coast Guard pier. **If the POLAR SEA has catastrophic problems, the POLAR STAR could be reactivated and brought back into service. The nation may need to charter supplemental ship services during the transition to new ships. This transition strategy carries risk, but due to the long lead-time for new ships there are no alternatives.** **Conclusions and Recommendations** **The Committee finds that both operations and maintenance of the polar icebreaker fleet have been underfunded for many years, and the capabilities of the nation's icebreaking fleet have diminished substantially.** **Deferred long-term maintenance and failure to execute a plan for replacement or refurbishment of the nation's icebreaking ships have placed national interests in the polar regions at risk. The nation needs the capability to operate in both polar regions reliably and at will. Specifically, the Committee recommends:** • **The United States should continue to project an active and influential presence in the Arctic to support its interests. This requires U.S. government polar icebreaking capability to assure year-round access throughout the region.**

Oil spills CPs

Research and Development Counterplan

The United States federal government should establish a comprehensive, collaborative, long-term Arctic oil spill research and development program

Oil spill responses are ineffective because weak knowledge base – the counterplan researches the area and develops effective responses

Grabowski et al '14 – National Research Council (Martha R., “Responding to Oil Spills in the U.S Arctic Marine Environment”, *National Academy of Sciences*) //J.N.E

A comprehensive, collaborative, long-term Arctic oil spill research and development program that integrates all knowledgeable sectors and focuses on oil behavior, response technologies, and controlled field releases is needed. Laboratory experiments, field research, and practical experience gained from responding to past oil spills have built a strong body of knowledge on oil properties and oil spill response techniques. However, **much of the work has been done for temperate regions, and there are areas where additional research is needed to make informed decisions about the most effective response strategies for different Arctic situations**. In the presence of lower water temperatures or sea ice, **the processes that control oil weathering—such as spreading, evaporation, photooxidation, emulsification, and natural dispersion—are slowed down or eliminated for extended periods of time**. Due to encapsulation of oil by new ice growth, oil can also be separated from the environment for months at a time. **Understanding how oil behaves or changes in the Arctic environment can help define the most effective oil spill response actions**. In addition to ongoing research on oil properties and weathering in high latitudes, **there is a need to validate current and emerging oil spill response technologies on operational scales under realistic environmental conditions**. Carefully **planned and controlled field releases of oil in the U.S. Arctic would improve the understanding of oil behavior in the Bering Strait and Beaufort and Chukchi Seas and allow for the evaluation of new response strategies specific to the region**. Scientific field releases that have been conducted elsewhere in the Arctic demonstrate that such studies can be carried out without measureable harm to the environment. **Recommendation: A comprehensive, collaborative, long-term Arctic oil spill research and development program needs to be established. The program should focus on understanding oil spill behavior in the Arctic marine environment, including the relationship between oil and sea ice formation, transport, and fate. It should include assessment of oil spill response technologies and logistics, improvements to forecasting models and associated data needs, and controlled field releases under realistic conditions for research purposes**. Industry, academic, government, non-governmental, grassroots, and international efforts should be integrated into the program, **with a focus on peer review and transparency**. **An interagency permit approval process that will enable researchers to plan and execute deliberate releases in U.S. waters is also needed.**

Forecasting Counterplan

The United States federal government should implement a real-time Arctic ocean-ice-meteorological forecasting system.

Lack of coordination and research is the key internal link to solving oil spills – forecasting solves

Grabowski et al '14 – National Research Council (Martha R., “Responding to Oil Spills in the U.S Arctic Marine Environment”, *National Academy of Sciences*) //J.N.E

A fundamental understanding of the dynamic Arctic region (Figures S.1 and S.2) is needed to help guide oil spill response and recovery efforts. Information on physical processes— including ocean circulation, ice cover, marine weather, and coastal processes—is important to frame the environmental context for the Arctic ecosystem and can help responders predict where oil will spread and how weathering might change its properties. Parameters such as air and water Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Responding to Oil Spills in the U.S. Arctic Marine Environment 2 temperature effective Figure S.1 The red box select Alaska likely be high-quality traffic map population determine, wind velocity and safe response Location map shows the location of oil spill activity bathymetry management on dynamics nation of key velocity, and response strategy of Alaska and location of the ice also shown. of ice thickness in, under, a etry, nautica and oil spill risks and intercoastal species that Responding PREPUB hours of day egypt the continent inset map in Figure S.2. Bathymetry, and on ice an al charting, a response. Fr connections with are most important to Oil Spill BLICATION C ylight are important United States gure S.2. Bathymetry, and end determine nd shoreline from a biologist within the Arctic important for is in the U.S. OPY portant cons es, and surround ymetry, geopo extent is esse ng applicabl e mapping da gical perspec ctic food we monitoring S. Arctic Mar siderations in nding countries litical boundar ential for ant le response s ata are neede ctive, unders eb will enabl in the instan rine Environ n choosing a s and water bod ries, capitals, a ticipating the strategies, w ed for marin tanding le the nce of an oil nment an dies. and e while ne spill. Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Responding to Oil Spills in the U.S. Arctic Marine Environment Summary Figure S.2 Sea. Geopo correspond B provide r anticipate change. I points ov response · Sm · S · Id · R · S · H · M y Location map olitical bounda ds to the red box Baseline data reliable base e potential im Instead, mon ver time, rath in the Arcti patial and te mammals; ubistence a dentification Rates of chan ensitivity of High-resoluti Measurement p of Alaska and aries, principal ox in Figure S.1 a are critical lines to asse mpacts due t nitoring appr her than stati c include: emporal distr and cultural u n and monito nge for key s f key Arctic ion coastal to ts of ice cove PREPUB d U.S. Arctic w coastal commu 1. to assess cha ess current en to factors su roaches will ic baselines. ributions and use of living oring of areas species; species to hy opography a er, thickness BLICATION C waters, focused unities, cities, anges over t nvironmenta ch as season need to take Critical typ d abundance g marine reso s of biologic ydrocarbons and shelf bath s, and distrib OPY d on the Bering and bathymetr time. In the A al or ecosyst nal and intera e advantage es of benchm es for fishes, ources; cal significan s; hymetry; an bution. g Strait, Chukch ry are also show Arctic, histo tem states, no annual varia of benchmar mark data fo , birds, and m nce; d 3 hi Sea, and Be wn. Map area rical data do or can they f ations or clim rks, or refere or oil spill marine aufort o not fully mate ence

Additional research and development needs include meteorological-ocean-ice forecast model systems at high temporal and spatial resolutions and better assimilation of traditional knowledge of sea state and ice behavior into forecasting models. Releasing proprietary monitoring data from exploration activities would increase knowledge of Arctic benchmark

conditions. When appropriate, Arctic communities could also release data that they hold regarding important sites for fishing, hunting, and cultural activities. In many instances, frequent and regular long-term monitoring will be needed to determine trends. Because data are or will be collected by a number of local, state, and federal agencies, as well as industry and academia, a complete information system that integrates Arctic data in support of oil spill preparedness, response, and restoration and rehabilitation is needed. Achieving this goal requires the development of international standards for Arctic data collection, sharing, and integration. **A long-term, community-based, multiuse Arctic observing system could provide critical data at a variety of scales. Recommendation: A real-time Arctic ocean-ice-meteorological forecasting system is needed to account for variations in sea ice coverage and thickness and should include patterns of ice movement, ice type, sea state, ocean stratification and circulation, storm surge, and improved resolution in areas of potential risk. Such a system requires robust, sustainable, and effective acquisition of relevant observational data.**

Recommendation: High-resolution satellite and airborne imagery needs to be coupled with up-to-date high-resolution digital elevation models and updated regularly to capture the dynamic, rapidly changing U.S. Arctic coastline. **Nearshore bathymetry and topography**

should be collected at a scale appropriate for accurate modeling of coastline vulnerability and storm surge sensitivity. Short- and long-term Arctic nautical charting and shoreline mapping that have been identified in NOAA and U.S. Geological Survey plans should be adequately resourced, so that mapping efforts can be initiated, continued, and completed in timescales relevant to anticipated changes. To be effective, Arctic mapping priorities should continue to be developed in consultation with stakeholders and industry and should be implemented systematically rather than through surveys of opportunity.

Laundry List Counterplan

The United States federal government should

- spill oil in the Arctic for the sole purpose of research on cleanup
- increase exploration and mapping of the Arctic
- increase Coast Guard presence in the Arctic
- increase regional cooperation with Russia for the purpose of preventing oil spills
- develop an evacuation plan for wildlife

That solves oil spills effectively

Nunez '14 – energy correspondent for National Geographic (Christina, “What Happens When Oil Spills in the Arctic? A National Research Council report says we're far from ready.” April 23rd, <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2014/04/140423-national-research-council-on-oil-spills-in-arctic/>) //J.N.E

The 183-page report marks the first time in more than ten years that the NRC, an arm of the National Academy of Sciences, has taken a comprehensive look at the impact of oil and gas exploration in the Arctic. In the intervening decade, **sea ice cover hit a record low, shipping traffic increased dramatically, and the price of oil rose sharply, prompting such companies as Shell,* ExxonMobil, and ConocoPhillips to acquire new leases for oil and gas.** (Related: "Ice-Breaking: U.S. Oil Drilling Starts as Nations Mull Changed Arctic.") The Arctic contains an estimated 13 percent of the world's undiscovered oil, and one-third of that oil lies within U.S. territory. Shell's attempt to drill into it in 2012 illustrated the challenge of working in the Arctic: The campaign ended with the drilling rig, the Kulluk, running aground and needing to be rescued. (See: "Coast Guard Blames Shell Risk-Taking in Kulluk Rig Accident.") **Shell and other companies have suspended Arctic drilling plans for 2014, but there is little doubt the push to develop the region's energy resources will continue.** (Read more Arctic coverage from the Great Energy Challenge.) The NRC report invokes the Kulluk incident, as well as the BP Deepwater Horizon and Exxon Valdez disasters, as cautionary tales. It was authored by a committee that included representatives from academia, research and environmental organizations, and the energy industry. (Related: "Summer Arctic Sea Ice Recovers From 2012, But Trend 'Decidedly' Down.") **Here are five of the gaps that the panel says need to be addressed for the U.S. to be ready for an oil spill in the Arctic: 1. We need to spill some oil (on purpose). Much of the existing research on oil properties and spill response has been done for temperate regions, the report notes. More research is needed to understand how oil behaves in an Arctic environment—and unfortunately, the best way to find out is to spill some in a controlled way. Research facilities such as the Ohmsett test center in New Jersey have simulated spills in icy conditions. But permits to deliberately release oil into U.S. waters for research have become harder to obtain in the United States in the past 15 years.** The NRC advocates a streamlined permit process. (Related: "As Arctic Melts, a Race to Test Oil Spill Cleanup Technology.") 2. **We need to know more about the Arctic. The technology available for monitoring and mapping the Arctic has improved markedly over the last decade, but there are significant holes. "A decade ago, I think there was hope we might have filled some of these data gaps," says Mark Myers of the University of Alaska, Fairbanks, who contributed to the report.** "Fundamental, high-resolution data that we need sometimes just isn't there." Existing nautical charts for the Arctic shoreline are "mostly obsolete," the NRC says, with many of them last updated in the 1950s. Less than 10 percent of the coastline, some 2,200 miles (3,540 kilometers), has adequate data on seafloor topography, Myers says. That increases the chance a vessel could run aground and spill oil, according to the report, and it could hamper a cleanup too. So could ice and stormy seas, of course. The report points to a need for better real-time data and forecasts of sea ice coverage and thickness. Though energy companies target late summer and early fall for exploration activity, "ice-free regions can transition to ice-covered conditions in a matter of days at the start of a fall freeze-up," the report says. Sea ice does offer one advantage, though, according to the report: It could help contain spilled oil in a way that would make it easier to set fire to and burn off. 3.

We need more U.S. Coast Guard presence. "The U.S. Coast Guard has a low level of presence in the Arctic, especially during the winter," the NRC warns. Its closest station to the Arctic, in Kodiak, is more than 900 air miles (1,448 kilometers) south of Alaska's North Slope, limiting its ability to respond to a spill quickly. "A 'presence' is bodies, but it is also vessels or platforms, and aerial capability for airlift in the event of an oil spill response," says Martha Grabowski, who chaired the NRC report committee.

"The transportation infrastructure that the rest of us would presuppose to be existing as it is in the lower 48 simply doesn't exist up north." But

"the Coast Guard can't do this alone," Grabowski says; it doesn't have the budget. The NRC report stresses the need for public-private partnerships and community engagement to address the challenges of dealing with an Arctic spill. 4. We need to work with the Russians. Last year, the Northern Sea Route between Asia and Europe saw many firsts: the first transit for a container ship, the first voyages for Chinese and South Korean vessels—and the first tanker accident. Russia has promoted use of the route, where its state-operated icebreaker fleet offers mandatory escort in exchange for a fee. Among the ships traveling the Northern Sea Route last year, the NRC says, were oil tankers carrying more than 800,000 barrels of oil. (Related: "Arctic Shipping Soars, Led by Russia and Lured by Energy.") The

expansion of the Northern Sea Route has in turn led to increased traffic through U.S. waters in the Bering Strait. This points to the need for better traffic management—the U.S. doesn't have a system for monitoring ships in the Arctic. But "the international demarcation line [between Russian and U.S. waters] runs right down the middle of the Bering Strait, so we can't make a unilateral determination with respect to what to do for vessel traffic monitoring," Grabowski says. The United States should also conduct joint oil spill response exercises with Russia, the report says. Such planning has already taken place with Canada, but even though the U.S. has an oil spill response agreement with Russia, it has not conducted formal exercises or hammered out any contingency plans. 5. **We need a plan for wildlife. The Arctic is home to**

endangered species such as bowhead whales, polar bears, and ringed seals. Rehabilitating wildlife affected by an oil spill in the Arctic is complicated by remote locations, adverse conditions, the use of marine mammals for subsistence by indigenous people, and safety concerns (dealing with an injured walrus or polar bear is more hazardous than dealing with, say, an oiled pelican). What's more, there's no plan

for keeping animals out of harm's way in the Arctic. "There is a general lack of scientific study, approved protocols, and consensus" on how best to deter wildlife from entering a spill zone, the report says. (Take the quiz: "What You Don't Know About Energy in the Changing Arctic.")

Disads

Politics

Political capital link

Plan's a huge fight

Klotz, 12 – senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (Frank, “Trouble at the Ends of the Earth” National Interest, 10/8, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/trouble-the-ends-the-earth-7561>)//DH

Needless to say, the U.S. Antarctic program would be in dire straits if the NSF were unable to arrange for icebreaking services with overseas providers. Yet, **efforts to restore an American heavy-icebreaker capability have been beset by bureaucratic and congressional inaction and years of chronic underfunding.**

This year, the Obama administration finally called for construction of a new American heavy icebreaker in its budget proposal for fiscal year 2013. Specifically, it requested \$8 million to begin designing the new vessel and projected a total of \$860 million would be spent during the first five years of the program. Even if work started right away, it would still take a decade to actually build and deliver an operational icebreaker—by which time the refurbished Polar Star would be retired, or close to it.

While support for the U.S. interests in Antarctica is clearly important, an equally if not more compelling rationale for building a new icebreaker may actually lie at the other end of the Earth. Climate changes and shrinking ice coverage during the summer months have opened up new possibilities for commercial shipping and resource exploration in the Arctic. This in turn has heightened concerns about protecting national interests in the higher latitudes. Interestingly, the commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard justified a new American heavy icebreaker in recent congressional testimony solely in terms of maintaining “a surface presence in the Arctic well into the future.”

Whatever case is made, the ultimate fate of a new heavy icebreaker is by no means certain. **Like many new spending proposals, it has encountered the perfect storm of the current budget-making chaos on Capitol Hill—including the looming threat of sequestration—and the need to compete with other coast-guard priorities as the service seeks to recapitalize ageing cutters** and other boats critical to its wide-ranging mission.

Plan costs political capital

Smith, 14– investment columnist for The Motley Fool, an investment website that analyzes political trends for investors (Rick, The Motley Fool, “As Global Warming Melts the Arctic, Who Will Build America's New Navy?” 1/18, <http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/01/18/as-global-warming-melts-the-arctic-who-will-build.aspx>)//DH

The melting of the polar ice caps presents the U.S. Navy with a crisis. But if the experts' numbers are accurate, **there's** upward of **\$16 billion in potential contract revenue** to be made -- and a significant opportunity for U.S. defense contractors to help resolve this crisis. If contracts are issued **for a fleet of 10 new icebreakers**, Lockheed would be the logical company to turn to for construction. Similarly,

shipbuilder Huntington Ingalls (NYSE: HII) owns the shipyard that put USCGC Healy in the water, and likewise stands in good position to win contracts.

Huntington is also, along with General Dynamics (NYSE: GD) , one of the nation's two builders of nuclear-powered submarines -- which as you can see up above, are perfectly capable of projecting power all the way up to the North Pole itself. (In fact, Huntington built the USS Hampton, pictured at the beginning of this article.)

Meanwhile, the company that spun off Huntington Ingalls three years ago, Northrop Grumman (NYSE: NOC) , has already begun winning contracts to upgrade the integrated bridge systems, navigation systems, and software on both of America's remaining icebreakers. If efforts get under way to begin retrofitting more than two dozen warships for polar duty, expect Northrop Grumman to share in the revenue from this work.

Is all of this really necessary?

In an era of constrained defense spending, convincing Congress to fund additional ships for the Navy and Coast Guard to conduct Arctic missions may be a hard sell -- so none of this revenue is assured. But this mission is quite simply essential to the national interest.

Past pushes failed

Dickie '11 – Seattle times editorial columnist (Lance, “The Coast Guard needs new icebreakers to protect U.S. interests in the Arctic”, December 8th, http://seattletimes.com/html/editorialsopinion/2016970405_lance09.html) //J.N.E

Dramatic climate change in the Arctic is rapidly diminishing the polar ice cover, exposing serious environmental, economic and security issues across the top of the world.

Ecological upheaval is producing a long coveted Northwest Passage for shipping, with all its opportunities and complications.

U.S. Rep. Rick Larsen, D-Lake Stevens, is working to focus congressional attention on giving the U.S. Coast Guard the ability to protect America's interests. As the ranking member of the House Transportation subcommittee on the Coast Guard, and a member of the House Armed Services Committee, he is well positioned to do so.

Icebreakers are the key to "assured access to ice-covered seas independent of ice conditions." Those words, from a 2007 National Research Council report, are reinforced by Coast Guard studies, including "The High Latitude Region Mission Analysis," and a comprehensive look at icebreaker issues and options published in November by the Congressional Research Service.

All conclude the Coast Guard lacks the icebreaker capacity to represent U.S. interests in coming years. At least two new ships are needed. In the face of such clarity, the political jumble in Congress is a bit of a puzzle. Just to be clear:

"Changing conditions in the Arctic are driving domestic and international discussions and debate on boundary claims and freedom of navigation, natural resources, scientific research, climate, homeland security, and national defense," the Coast Guard reported to Congress in 2008.

Nonetheless, the Coast Guard chose to spend its capital budget on National Security Cutters, a smaller, nimble ship for coastal security operations. Money for icebreakers went into a \$61 million rehab of the Polar Star, being overhauled at Vigor Shipyards in Seattle. A second, also aged heavy-duty icebreaker, the Polar Sea, has an unknown fate.

That leaves the Coast Guard with the 12-year-old Healy, adequate for scientific research but not hefty enough for the thickest ice in the depth of winter.

House Republicans want to decommission the Polar Sea and Polar Star and lease icebreakers for the Coast Guard. Nevermind none are available. Leasing supplemental equipment — aircraft — is one thing. Owning, operating and maintaining resources fundamental to a mission is basic.

The Coast Guard said it needs three heavy-duty icebreakers and three medium-duty icebreakers. The cost for one is put at \$895 million, with volume discounts.

Get started. These monster icebreakers take years to build, but have an operating life of several decades. If the Chinese will not loan us the cash, spread the cost among the Department of Defense, and other federal clients. Do not lay it all off on the Coast Guard.

Arctic conditions, and duties in Antarctica, demand the capacity to navigate year round. More shipping, ecotourism, resource extraction and transport, and fights over sovereignty require protection of basic U.S. interests very close to home.

Grab funds from Iraq and Afghanistan contingencies. Close U.S. bases in Germany. Now it's an icebreaker gap, not the Fulda Gap. Get real about the gravy in defense contracts, including the leasing of icebreakers.

Once again, **spread costs and be honest about our thin capabilities and options in U.S. polar operations. Spend the money; this is like arguing about needing a fire truck.**

Larsen's subcommittee recently heard temporary options from an executive with Vigor Shipping who estimated the Polar Sea could be operational with engine work for \$11 million. A retired commander of the Polar Sea told the same Dec. 1 hearing the icebreaker was otherwise in decent shape.

The Navy has new combat ships designed to work close to shore around the world. Give the Coast Guard the capacity to serve and protect in all U.S. territorial waters.

Icebreaker funding is empirically contentious despite past precedent – other priorities swamp

Perera '12 – executive editor of the FierceMarkets Government Group, which includes FierceGovernment, FierceGovernmentIT, FierceHomelandSecurity, and FierceMobileGovernment. (David, "Coast Guard faces icebreaker funding challenges", April 15th,

<http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/story/coast-guard-faces-icebreaker-funding-challenges/2012-04-15>) //J.N.E

Multi-agency funding for a new Coast Guard heavy icebreaker could be problematic despite past precedent, according to information in a Congressional Research Service report.

In an April 6 report (.pdf) posted online by Secrecy News, the CRS notes that Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Robert Rapp has expressed a belief that other agencies besides his should help pay for a new heavy icebreaker.

"The National Science Foundation needs it, the Department of Defense from time to time needs it. Yes, the Coast Guard needs it. But this is something that really begs for an across-government response, and I would say sharing as well," Papp told a March 6 hearing of the House Appropriations subcommittee on homeland security.

The Coast Guard currently has only one medium polar icebreaker in service, the USCGC Healy, which entered service in 2000. Its two heavy icebreakers, both commissioned in the late 1970s, are out of service with one of them slated for decommissioning later this fiscal year. The other, the USCGC Polar Star, is undergoing refurbishment with a plan for it to resume operations during 2013.

The Coast Guard's fiscal 2013 budget request includes \$8 million to initiate survey and design activities for a new heavy icebreaker and calls on Congress to appropriate an additional \$852 million for icebreaker acquisition through fiscal 2017.

The last icebreaker to be commissioned by the Coast Guard--the Healy--was built with \$329 million from the Navy's shipbuilding and conversion account. Funding a new heavy icebreakers through the Navy "could permit the funding of new icebreakers while putting less pressure on other parts of the Coast Guard's budget," the CRS report says.

However, the **Defense Department views the Arctic region as peripheral to national security interests for at least the next decade while the Coast Guard is already confronting now the fact of increased human activity in the area as global warming makes it more accessible. The DoD also faces its own budget pressures, as well.**

Another possibility, the CRS report notes, would be to tap NSF funding, although a Coast Guard-funded study on icebreaker recapitalization concluded that option would be unlikely, since (according to a GAO summary [.pdf]) "it would have significant adverse impacts on NSF operations and that the capability needed for Coast Guard requirements would exceed that needed by the NSF."

The NSF has already looked elsewhere for icebreaker support, the CRS report says. The agency has found it cheaper to charter Russian or Swedish contractor-operated icebreaker to annually clear a path to McMurdo Station in the Antarctic, for example. (In July 2011, the Swedish government canceled the NSF icebreaker contract, citing a need for its icebreaker closer to home.)

Coast Guard officials have repeatedly stressed the fact that **the service's typical annual capital expenditure budget won't support full recapitalization of the United State's icebreaker fleet. The Coast Guard needs at least three heavy and three medium icebreakers to fulfill its statutory requirements in polar regions, concluded a study on Coast Guard high latitude missions commissioned by the service.**

The Coast Guard also may have forsaken plans to purchase two additional National Security Cutters in its fiscal 2013 budget proposal in order to fund the icebreaker. Without those two NSCs, Papp has said, the service may have to cut back operations including anti-drug smuggling activities in the Pacific and Caribbean and actions against illegal high seas drift net fishing boats.

Icebreaker funding is unpopular – current ships are perceived as sufficient

Ewing '11 - POLITICO Pro's senior defense reporter, former managing editor for news of Military.com, edited the defense policy blog DoDBuzz.com and covered the U.S. Navy for the Military Times newspapers (Philip, "White House: We must keep our icebreakers", November 4th, www.dodbuzz.com/2011/11/04/white-house-we-must-keep-our-icebreakers/) *gender modified //J.N.E

That same day, this year's Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act was referred to the full House, prompting this message from the Office of Management and Budget: **The Administration strongly opposes House passage of H.R. 2838 because it includes a provision that would require the Coast Guard to decommission the icebreaker USCGC POLAR STAR. The Administration has requested, and Congress has appropriated, funds to reactivate the USCGC POLAR STAR by December 2012 and extend that vessel's service life for seven to 10 years.**

This effort will stabilize the United States' existing polar fleet until long-term icebreaking capability requirements are finalized. By directing the Commandant to decommission the USCGC POLAR STAR within three years, the bill would effectively reduce the vessel's service life to two years and create a significant gap in the Nation's icebreaking capacity. The Administration supports Title II (Coast Guard and Servicemember Parity), which would promote parity between the Coast Guard and the other branches of the armed forces. The Administration looks forward to working with the Congress to improve H.R. 2838 as the bill moves through the legislative process.

Because of the nature of the federal bureaucracy, **the Coast Guard and its needs don't enjoy the mother-hen protections of the Armed Services Committees, now in see-no-evil overdrive mode trying to protect the DoD budget. Instead, as they have for years, Transportation Committee lawmakers are looking at the bottom line and saying, well, it's gonna cost a lot to keep the old girl ship in service, so off she it goes.**

Although all the fashionable D.C. think-tanks and white-paperists love to talk about the growing importance of the melting Arctic, the **discussions over the past few years have been mostly disconnected from the reality of America's ability to operate at the top of the world. The Coast Guard has three Arctic-capable ships: The Polar Star, its sibling Polar Sea and an ice-strengthened research ship, the Healy. The Polars are purpose-built, heavy-duty icebreakers. They're remarkable ships; they were designed with complex internal water tanks, for example, that enable them to ride up on heavy ice and rock themselves back and forth to crush it, clearing a path for other ships.**

But they're decades old and expensive to operate, and **because the Coast Guard has much less throw weight than the DoD services, it got into a bind a few years ago:** One of the polar rollers' main missions was to break channels for resupply ships headed to the U.S. Antarctic research center at McMurdo Station. So **the National Science Foundation paid for the icebreakers' missions, even though they were owned and crewed by the Coast Guard. When Polar Sea and Polar Star got too expensive and NSF realized it was cheaper to charter a private icebreaker, it stopped backing the Coasties' ships.** That **lack of steady funding, along with the ships' age and condition, has put them into a slow tailspin, kept them mostly tied up in Seattle and now in Congress' crosshairs.**

(The Healy is a comparatively new and highly capable ship, but it was built for science, not the kind of heavy navigational icebreaking as the Polars.)

The Coast Guard has been caught in this vortex for years — maybe the polar rollers will go away, maybe they'll be upgraded — and the Obama administration's caution is just the latest delay. This was one of the things former Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Thad Allen always said required a "national discussion," because the U.S. needed to determine what exactly it was willing to do, defend and concede up in the Arctic. But as you see from OMB's message, **the Obama administration's desire to add 10 years of life to the Polar Star is only another stopgap "until long-term icebreaking capability requirements are finalized."**

Translation: We consider this one of those nice things but not nice enough to actually deal with — and, most importantly, to fund. So file the polar icebreakers along with the Navy's submarine tenders and amphibious command ships: Old vessels that perform critical missions, but which probably will remain low priorities in Austerity America.

Arctic interaction is unpopular

Bergh '12 – Stockholm International Peace Research Institute with SIPRI Armed Conflict and Conflict Management Program, master's degree in social sciences from uppsala (Kristofer, "The Arctic Policies of Canada and the United States: Domestic Motives and International Context", July 2012, *SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security*, No. 2012/1) //J.N.E

Much of the United States' ambition in the Arctic is hampered by its inability to ratify the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (**UNCLOS**).^a The USA played an integral part in the negotiation of UNCLOS and, although an agreement on implementation that was acceptable to the US negotiators was reached in 1994, **the US Senate has since failed to ratify the convention.**^b While **the USA did not sign the agreement at the time** of its negotiation **because of the Department of the Interior's strong feelings on seabed mining rights**, it managed to omit the controversial deep-sea mining clause during negotiations in 1994. As the Arctic opens up and the USA begins to look north, more attention is given to the treaty and the stipulations under it that may allow the USA to expand its maritime territory along its extended continental shelf. Today, nearly all US maritime stakeholders, including the US Navy, the US Coast Guard and industry, as well as the administration, support ratification of UNCLOS. **The US Senate's Foreign Relations Committee** also approves of the ratification of UNCLOS, having **twice sent it to the full Senate, where the vote was blocked.** Meanwhile, **a handful of Republican senators oppose the convention on the grounds that it undermines US sovereignty, and they may seek to prevent the motion to ratify UNCLOS from reaching a vote on the Senate floor. Their opposition** to the convention **is,** however, **likely to be based on an ideological desire to damage the current administration at any cost,** rather than real concern over security or sovereignty. Even though the two-thirds majority that is needed in the Senate is likely to exist, **the political costs associated with pursuing ratification are high for the already weakened administration** of President Barack Obama. **The ratification process for the 2010 Russian-US New START treaty proved that even a motion with broad bipartisan support can face difficulties in the current US political environment.**^c In May 2012, Senator John Kerry made a new push for the convention with strong support from the secretaries of State and Defense and the army chief of staff. Kerry plans to hold a series of senate hearings and hopes for a vote in the US Senate following the presidential elections in 2012. In order to achieve ratification, Democrats must emphasize the existing bipartisan support for the convention and depoliticize the issue. Republicans, for their part, must show statesmanship and responsibility, even at the cost of criticism from more conservative elements of their party.

Republicans don't want to fund the plan

Ahlers '11 - CNN reporter (Mike, "Polar icebreaker dispute ties up Coast Guard appropriations", November 3rd, <http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/03/politics/congress-polar-icebreakers/index.html>) //J.N.E

With the nation's only two heavy-duty polar icebreakers broken and out of service, the Obama administration and congressional Republicans are clashing on how best to put the U.S. Coast Guard back into the ice-busting business.

House **Republicans**, who say they want to force the administration's hand, **are pushing a Coast Guard authorization bill that would decommission the icebreaker Polar Star, which is now being repaired, in just three years, saying that keeping the 35-year-old ship afloat is "throwing good money after bad."**

The bill requires the administration to come up with a comprehensive plan to replace the aging icebreaker fleet.

On Thursday, the administration responded by announcing it is opposing the bill, citing the icebreaker issue.

Decommissioning the Polar Star would "create a significant gap in the nation's icebreaking capacity," the administration said. The ship is needed until long-term plans can be developed, it said.

The icebreaker issue is one that has been decades in the making, and has gained urgency with the thawing of ice in the Arctic Circle.

Diminishing ice, widely believed to be caused by global warming, may actually increase the need for icebreakers, according to a recent report by the Congressional Research Service. The opening of waterways could lead to expanded commercial, cruise and military ship operations, and increase exploration for oil and other resources, the report says.

The Coast Guard uses icebreakers to defend U.S. sovereignty and interests, monitor sea traffic, launch search and rescue missions, conduct fisheries and law enforcement operations, and support scientific research, including resupplying McMurdo Station in Antarctica, a mission that is now contracted to Russian and Swedish icebreakers.

Currently, the U.S. Coast Guard has only three Polar icebreakers -- the Polar Star and its sister ship the Polar Sea, and the newer but less robust medium polar icebreaker Healy. In addition, the National Science Foundation leases a smaller ship, Nathaniel B. Palmer, for research in the Antarctic.

The U.S. Coast Guard cutter Polar Sea has also exceeded its 30-year design life.

Both the Polar Star and Polar Sea have already exceeded their 30-year design life, and both have been removed from service because of breakdowns. The Polar Star was laid up in 2006, and the Polar Sea suffered unexpected engine problems in June 2010, and it has been out of service ever since.

Since mid-2010, the United States has had no heavy-duty icebreaker. Russia, which has a much larger Arctic border, has a fleet of about 20 icebreakers, including seven nuclear-powered ones.

The Coast Guard says it needs at least three heavy and three medium polar icebreakers to fulfill its statutory missions, but would require even more ships if the Coast Guard is to comply with a Naval Operations Concept issued in 2010 requiring a presence in both the Arctic and Antarctic.

The Coast Guard also has a fleet of icebreakers in the Great Lakes that keep shipping lanes open there.

The Congressional Research Service said one potential concern for Congress is the absence of a plan for replacing the Polar Star upon completion of its seven- to 10-year life after it returns to service in late 2012.

That is why Rep. Frank LoBiondo, R-New Jersey, included the provision to decommission the Polar Star, said spokesman Jason Galanes. "We absolutely support the Arctic icebreaker mission," Galanes said. "We're forcing this decision rather than allowing the administration to kick the can down the road."

In a statement, the Office of Management and Budget said the administration "strongly opposes" the provision, and that the repairs to the Polar Star "will stabilize the United States' existing polar fleet until long-term icebreaking capability requirements are finalized."

Regardless of the outcome of the dispute, a gap in icebreaking capabilities is almost certain, according to the CRS report. Following any decision to design and build new icebreakers, the first replacement polar icebreaker might enter service in eight to 10 years, the report says.

Icebreaker proposals breed legislative battles

Song '11 – staff writer for Seattle Times (Kyung M., “2 parties’ icebreaker plans on collision course” November 8th, http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2016713336_icebreaker08m.html) *modified for ableist language //J.N.E

For a pair of battered ships that in recent years have mostly sat docked in Seattle, the Coast Guard's heavy-duty icebreakers are facing roiling waters in Congress.

The Coast Guard wants to mothball the hobbled Polar Sea and scavenge the 33-year-old vessel for parts for its sister ship, the Polar Star.

Sen. Maria Cantwell, D-Wash., opposes the move. Last week, the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee passed a two-year Coast Guard authorization bill that included an amendment co-sponsored by Cantwell barring the service from decommissioning the Polar Sea.

But over in the House, Republicans are pushing for the exact opposite: They want the Coast Guard to permanently mothball the Polar Sea in six months, and to decommission the Polar Star — now undergoing a \$57 million overhaul near West Seattle — in three years. That measure passed a House committee in September and was scheduled for consideration by the full House on Friday before being postponed.

And on Thursday, the White House issued a statement that it "strongly opposes" the House version of the reauthorization bill on grounds that it would prematurely yank the Polar Star from service and "create a significant gap in the nation's icebreaking capability."

The legislative tussle is playing out as warming climates are opening up frozen regions to increased exploration just as the nation's two biggest icebreakers are past their original life spans. Experts say the thinning ice will increase demand for icebreakers as more people flock to the hazardous polar environs.

House Republicans are using the threat of decommissioning in an effort to push the Coast Guard and the administration to articulate its Arctic mission and just how large an icebreaker fleet is needed. Out of the Coast Guard's three general-purpose icebreakers, all based in Seattle, only the medium-duty Healy is currently operating.

The 399-foot Polar Sea was refurbished in 2006, only to be ~~crippled~~ debilitated by engine failure last year. The rehabbed Polar Star, the Polar Sea's twin, is slated to return to service in 2013 with hopes of squeezing an additional seven to 10 years of use out of it.

"These icebreakers have not been in regular service since 2006, but we have been spending tens of millions of dollars every year just to keep them tied to the dock," said Justin Harclerode, Republican spokesman for the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.

Just last month, Congress received an independent analysis of whether the Coast Guard should build new icebreakers or keep going with its two aged vessels. The report has not been made public.

Rep. Rick Larsen, of Lake Stevens, the top Democrat on the House transportation panel's Coast Guard subcommittee, said it would be unwise to order the two icebreakers decommissioned before concluding a definitive study about how the United States can best maintain economic and scientific presence in the polar regions. Larsen has scheduled a hearing on Dec. 1 titled "Protecting U.S. Sovereignty: Coast Guard Operations in the Arctic."

Earlier, Larsen withdrew an amendment to block the decommissioning provision after Republicans agreed to address his concerns before the bill went up for a floor vote. But Larsen said he "couldn't convince the Republican majority" to drop the language.

The full House is expected to consider the bill after it returns from recess next week. Passage likely will put it on collision course with the Senate's Coast Guard reauthorization bill.

Larsen said he will work hard to "see the Senate version prevail."

Unpopular – no one sees the benefits

Abrams '11 – The Associated Press (Jim, "Congress, White House differ on CG icebreakers", November 4th, <http://www.navytimes.com/article/20111104/NEWS01/111040305/Congress-White-House-differ-CG-icebreakers>) //J.N.E

WASHINGTON — The country's only two heavy-duty icebreaker ships are old and broken, and Congress and the White House are at odds over how to respond as the melting of polar ice increases the economic and security stakes in the Arctic region.

The House on Friday was working on a Coast Guard spending bill that would decommission Polar Star, slated to be the last somewhat seaworthy icebreaker after its sister ship, Polar Sea, goes out of service in the near future.

The White House, in a statement issued Thursday, said it "strongly opposes" the legislation because decommissioning Polar Star would "create a significant gap in the nation's icebreaking capacity."

In the Senate, Sen. **Maria Cantwell, D-Wash., is trying to block the decommissioning of either ship with a provision she added to a Coast Guard bill. The ships are based in the Seattle area and support hundreds of jobs there.**

"Our nation needs icebreakers," she said at the committee meeting. "With Russia moving many troops to the Arctic and Chinese investors buying parts of Greenland, this is also a national security issue."

There's little disagreement on the need for a U.S. presence in the Arctic. The Congressional Research Service, in a report last year, said the shrinking of the icecap will result in increased commercial and military ship activity, and greater exploration for oil and other resources.

That calls into demand the functions of icebreakers: defending U.S. sovereignty and economic interests, monitoring sea traffic, law enforcement, and conducting search and rescue operations and scientific research.

"We desperately need the Coast Guard and the administration to do what we have asked them to do really now for more than 10 years — define what our mission is in the Arctic," said Rep. **Frank LoBiondo, R-N.J., chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee's Coast Guard subcommittee.**

He said it costs tens of millions of dollars a year to keep the two vessels tied up at the dock, and he hopes the House move to take them out of service will push the administration into deciding how large a fleet is needed in the future.

The lone Alaska congressman, **Republican Don Young, opposes decommissioning icebreakers and wants to increase the number of vessels in any way possible, spokesman Luke Miller said. Young has introduced a bill that would authorize the Coast Guard to enter into long-term lease agreements for two new icebreakers.**

The icebreakers are supposed to have a 30-year service life. Polar Star, commissioned in 1976, is docked in Seattle, in caretaker status since 2006. Polar Sea, commissioned in 1978, suffered an engine breakdown last year and has been out of service. The Coast Guard also has a third, medium-duty icebreaker, Healy, that is used mainly for scientific research.

The White House said Congress has previously approved funds to reactivate Polar Star by the end of next year, extending the life of the ship for seven to 10 years. That, it said, "will stabilize the United States' existing polar fleet until long-term icebreaking capability requirements are finalized."

Cantwell cited estimates that the **Coast Guard needs a minimum of six heavy-duty icebreakers and four medium-duty icebreakers to meet Coast Guard and Navy mission requirements.**

That still wouldn't match Russia. The Congressional Research Service said last year that one estimate put the Russian fleet at 25, including six active heavy icebreakers. Finland and Sweden each had seven icebreakers, and Canada six, it said.

The CRS also put the cost of extending the service life of the existing ships for 25 years at about \$400 million a ship, in 2008 dollars. It said that replacement ships might cost \$800 million to \$925 million.

Cantwell said refurbishing a vessel would take five years and employ more than 300 workers, while rebuilding it could take eight years and employ more than 1,000 workers.

Russia SOI

Russia SOI link

The plan causes war with Russia – not acting in the Arctic cedes influence

Thórsson, 14 – journalist for the Arctic Journal (Elías, “Washington’s folly” The Arctic Journal, 5/20,

<http://arcticjournal.com/politics/619/washingtons-folly>)/DH **Huebert = associate professor at the University of Calgary’s political science department**

Instead of sparking a conflict, however, Washington’s Arctic indecisiveness might actually help avoid the type of one-upmanship we saw during the Cold War. Huebert points to the enigma surrounding Putin’s goals in the region, and says **increased US attention could actually be seen as aggression by Moscow.**

He argues that we need to be trying to decipher what Moscow’s Arctic goals are.

“Is it responding in defence of what it sees as fascist thugs, such as the prospect of Sweden and Finland joining Nato, or is this the beginning of an increasingly aggressive Russia, which is planning future actions in country’s such as Moldova and Belarus?”

“Some argue that all this is for internal consumption, that this is just to consolidate Putin’s power in Russia. If that is the case and the West responds, it creates a very dangerous dynamic. If you get one wrong you will be making the system that much worse. Do nothing is fine, but only if he is just doing this for internal consumption.”

Currently, the Pentagon is downplaying any Russian threat to stability in the region. Derrick-Frost, though, says the military has its eyes on the situation.

AT: Deterrence solves

Russia won't back off – ideological and market relevance

Keil '13 – Europe Director for the Arctic Institute, Project Scientist at the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS) in Potsdam, Germany, in the Sustainable Interaction with the Atmosphere (SIWA) cluster, PhD at the Berlin Graduate School, Fellow at the NVP-Nansen interdisciplinary PhD and Post-doc Summer School (“The Arctic: A new region of conflict? The case of oil and gas”, June 6th, SagePub) //J.N.E

Market relevance. According to the US Geological Survey (USGS), **Russia has the biggest estimated Arctic oil and gas potential, amounting to 52% of the total, with 216 billion barrels of oil equivalent (BBOE).**⁵ Table 1

indicates how estimated Arctic hydrocarbon resources are distributed among the five Arctic coastal states. **Russia's Arctic resources account for the major part of the country's hydrocarbon reserves: the biggest share is in Western Siberia, especially the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District, with more than two-thirds of Russian oil and gas production. The lion's share of the Eurasian resource base consists of natural gas, accounting for approximately 88% of its total.** Gas is generally the more important Arctic commodity: **the region is expected to contain three times as much undiscovered gas as oil.** However, many of the older Russian wells are declining and Russia is very active in exploring for new sources, particularly its promising continental shelves in the Barents and the Kara Seas (Bambulyak and Frantzen, 2011: 10–17; Budzik, 2009: 7; Lesikhina et al., 2007; Schröder et al., 2011: 20).

According to the USGS, **Russia accounts for approximately 34% of undiscovered oil resources in the Arctic,** which in comparison to gas is rather the minor share (Budzik, 2009: 7). Russia has the most proven gas reserves, with an absolute base of 44.8 trillion cubic metres (Tcm) giving it 23.9% of the world's total (see Figure 1). However, the global gas market is changing. The USA has developed new technologies to extract huge amounts of unconventional gas, and the global economic crisis since 2008 has led to an overall decline in energy demand. Increased gas production and international decline in demand for gas have created an oversupplied gas market, which weakened demand for Russian gas. This might, however, hold for only the short- to midterm future as gas is generally considered a cleaner form of energy than coal and oil, and lower prices can, in the mid- to long-term, generate increasing demand, which in turn can lead to rising prices. Given this uncertain market situation, Russia is at the moment hesitant to move forward with big gas exploitation projects, as the August 2012 decision to postpone the Shtokman gas project for the foreseeable future illustrates (Macalister, 2012). The launch of the Prirazlomnoye oil field in the Pechora Sea has also been postponed several times in the past, which would be Russia's first ever offshore oil field in the Arctic (BarentsObserver, 2010c).

Ideological, cultural and historical relevance. According to the Russian definition, ‘the North’ (and so-called areas equivalent to the North) encompasses more than 60% of Russian territory (Rowe, 2009: 1; cf. also map in Sapper et al., 2011: 113). Thus, more than any other state, Russia is to be described and understood as a northern country. The **memory of glorious Soviet Arctic expeditions, for example the first aircraft landing at the North Pole in 1937 by Valerii Chkalov, adds to many peoples' belief that ‘the Arctic is by rights a Russian preserve’** (Emmerson, 2010: 52). As Rowe (2009: 2) concludes, **Soviet successes in mastering the North ‘positioned the Arctic firmly as a factor in both Russian national identity and conceptions of security and sovereignty’.** Russia's active role in the Arctic has also been interpreted as **playing a pivotal role in Russia's plan to return to great-power status by means of becoming an ‘energy superpower’** (Penkova, 2009: 1, 8; Petersen, 2009: 45; Rowe, 2009: 5). Ingo Winkelmann (2009: 10) points out that **Russian Arctic activities are rather to be interpreted as part of a national identification process or national identity shaping instead of a pure military approach to alleged Russian possessions.** This is also in line with Pavel Baev's (2009: 21; also 2007: 9–10) assessment of Russia's military capacity: **‘the far too apparent weaknesses in Russia's strategic posture make it senseless to consider relaunching a military brinkmanship in the North, in which Moscow would hardly be able to impress its potential competitors.’** Rather, Russian ‘patriotic propaganda, combining stories of “heroic” exploration with

the advertising of military muscle-building, is aimed at creating a positive message pertaining to the
very 23.9% 15.8% 13.5% 4.3% 4.3% 4.1% 3.2% 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% 30.0% Proven Natural Gas Reserves Figure 1. Proven
worldwide natural gas reserves (by end 2010). Source: BP (2011: 20). Downloaded from cac.sagepub.com at UNIV OF MICHIGAN on July 20,
2014 170 Cooperation and Conflict 49(2) core of the still vague Russian national identity. In sum, emotional and
symbolic issues play a crucial role in Russian Arctic policies.

Overall, the Arctic is of outstanding importance for Russia and Russians. This holds economically and
strategically with the vast hydrocarbon resources found and expected to be found, as well as
ideologically, given the meaning of the North for the biggest northern country and its ambition to
restore Russia's political standing internationally.

Energy Internal Link

Energy is the lynchpin of Russian soft power

Misje '12 – Geography Department, Fullerton ("RUSSIAN HEGEMONY IN THE ARCTIC SPACE? CONTESTING THE POPULAR GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSES", April 16th, Thesis Presented to the Faculty of California State University, Fullerton) //J.N.E

Ultimately, the reactions to Russian policies in the Southern Caucasus and to the Nord Stream project shed light on a new outlet for Russian power in two ways. First, Russian energy policy has become a mechanism that allows the state to assert power over the post-Soviet states and to influence or shape the decisions of various stakeholders involved in resource development. Russia could merely participate in energy dialogues and thus invoke opposing energy policies based on the geography of the elusive pipelines. Mainly, "the Nord Stream project addresses the manner in which gas pipelines influence, embody and reflect relations of discourse and power across transnational 35 political spaces" (Bouzarovski and Konieczny 2010, 2). But it also reveals how a "nonmaterial object" such as a pipeline, can "gradually became embedded into a specific set of policy initiatives aimed at transforming the material realities of surrounding regions and cities" (Bouzarovski and Konieczny 2010,12).

Second, Russian strategies have a positive impact on energy development for the opposing countries, while still allowing Russia to reap benefits when their energy initiatives are actually instituted. In the Southern Caucasus, the United States was able to find more viable energy routes while indirectly bending to Russia's will in Armenia and Georgia. Thus, the persuasive technique of engaging in political dialogue to motivate action is a complex strategic medium that gives Russia an immense amount of geopolitical clout. Through rhetorical dialogue of energy development and expansion of infrastructure, Russia strategically plants a seed of paranoia in the minds of other states and effectively sways geopolitical action within its periphery.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Russia can be considered a great power when the arena for measuring power is the energy sector and the assessment is based on political influence. Power can be circumstantial and contingent upon the benchmarks that are most applicable to the state of affairs. Furthermore, a nation's powers can truly be assessed when it is comparable to its opponents. When the stage is Russia's backyard, the country has the geopolitical strength to dominate the energy sector within its periphery and to act as the hegemonic power over the opposition. Within its non-Arctic margins, Russia is 36 able to remain a great power because the geopolitical and economic attempts to destabilize Russian energy development in its periphery have yet to make headway. However, this energy strategy cannot be so easily employed in the Arctic Ocean. In the Arctic, energy strategies are based on the language of the articles in the UNCLOS. Russia is utilizing the provisions under Article 76 to stake its claim to Arctic resources. Therefore, the counter attempts to stop Russia will also be based on the provisions of the UNCLOS. It is the view of this study that, like the pipelines, Article 76 will be a mechanism for Russian power that influences and provokes the other Arctic nations, whether or not the provisions actually provide Russia with sovereign rights beyond their EEZ. But unlike the geopolitical games in the post-

Soviet space, the competing states will be more capable in at least delaying Russia's political goals for some time, or until the United States joins the game. Yet, **Russia will retain its geopolitical power through its continued attempts to claim sovereign rights, which will perpetually provoke a response from its Arctic neighbors.** The following chapter will outline the theoretical framework for this line of reasoning.

AT: N/U – Exxon drilling

Recent drilling is a joint venture with a Russian Rosneft - it skirts sanctions

Marshall, 7/22/14 (Steve, “Rig sails for troubled Russian waters”,

<http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/1370147/Rig-sails-for-troubled-Russian-waters//DH>

A Seadrill rig is reported to be heading for Russian waters to carry out a controversial drilling effort in the Kara Sea for partners ExxonMobil and Rosneft after departing a Norwegian yard at the weekend.

The semi-submersible West Alpha was reported to have sailed under escort by the Norwegian Coast Guard, along with a flotilla of tugs and an anchor-handler, as it begun its long voyage following completion of winterisation and upgrade work at the Westcon yard in west Norway.

Local newspaper Bergens Tidende reported both the police and Coast Guard were called in to supervise the departure of the rig and prevent a possible boarding by Greenpeace after activists earlier this year climbed aboard the semisub at the Olen yard in a protest against Arctic drilling.

The environmental group’s protest vessel Esperanza was earlier reported to be in the vicinity of the yard amid rumours that activists may carry out further disruptive action.

Greenpeace Norway leader Truls Gulowsen, who has earlier characterised the planned Kara Sea drilling effort as an “environmental crime” due to the potential risk of an oil spill in Arctic waters, would not tell Reuters whether the group was planning another protest.

ExxonMobil , which has chartered the 1986-built rig until July 2016 for a dayrate of \$532,000, aims to start drilling of the Kara Sea probe next month.

The proposed probe targeting the Universitetskaya structure at the East Prinovozemelsky block **will be the first to be drilled by the US supermajor under its Arctic exploration pact with Russian state-owned Rosneft.**

The drilling operation, targeting potential resources of a reported 9 billion barrels in the overall play, **is estimated to cost at least \$600 million – making it one of the most expensive wells ever to be drilled by the US giant.**

Drilling is set to take place in a licence that overlaps Russia’s Arctic National Park that is a habitat for a diversity of wildlife, including polars bears and walruses, and also hosts a bird colony.

However, aside from environmental concerns, **the passage of the rig has now assumed greater political significance amid tighter sanctions being imposed by the West on Russia – including Rosneft** – over escalating violence in Ukraine.

Rosneft was added to the list of Russian entities barred from debt financing with US sources under the latest sanctions imposed last week by the US Treasury Department.

US President Barack Obama said the sanctions were "designed to have maximum impact on Russia while limiting any spillover effects on American companies or those who are allies".

He also warned though that additional steps were on the table if Russia does not change course in eastern Ukraine - a signal that joint ventures with US companies could face risks.

While ExxonMobil's joint exploration effort with Rosneft may not break sanctions, it could be seen as a sign of support for Moscow from the US giant.

Coast Guard tradeoff

1nc

New icebreaking funding trades off with Coast Guard cutters – collapses port security NDM 12

National Defense Magazine, “High-End Ships, Ice-Breakers Compete for Precious Coast Guard Dollars,”
<http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=671>

The Coast Guard is down to one operational icebreaker, a less than favorable situation given the increased role the service is being asked to take in the Arctic. The service used to have eight icebreakers, but all but one have been decommissioned or are in disrepair, commandant Adm. Robert J. Papp Jr. told a Feb. 13 Center for Strategic and International Studies conference. A second icebreaker will be ready to return to action next year, he said, speaking just hours before the release of President Obama’s fiscal year 2013 budget proposal. That document contains \$8 million to “initiate acquisition of a new polar icebreaker to ensure that the nation is able to maintain a surface presence in the Arctic well into the future.” **Washington insiders are suggesting that the Coast Guard also take money from a program for new large cutters and spend it on icebreakers and less expensive ships. But the future of the nation’s maritime security depends upon ships such as the National Security Cutter that are effective away from the shore, Papp said. The service is in good shape with a substantial fleet of patrol boats to deal with threats close to the shore**, he said. He also feels comfortable with the assets the service has in the nation’s ports. But there is a security layer he worries about. “So if you’re inspecting overseas and you have good resources in the ports, **you want some sort of middle layer to be able to intercept any threats before they get into your ports**,” Papp said. “**Unfortunately for us, that is the most expensive layer that we deal with**, because in order to do that you have to have stout capable ships that have high-endurance and speed.” **This “middle layer” of maritime security is hard for the Coast Guard**, he said. “**How do you provide persistent sovereign presence in the offshore waters? You can’t do it with patrol boats. It takes ships** and ships are expensive,” he said. Coast Guard **officials have been fighting for funding to get eight National Security Cutters** to replace the 378-foot high-endurance cutters that have been in service since the 1960s. The third NSC was delivered to the Coast Guard last fall. A \$482 million contract for the fifth has been awarded to Huntington Ingalls Industries. And Obama’s budget includes funding for a sixth. The **funding for the rest is far from certain**. During a January speech at the Surface Navy Association’s annual symposium, the commandant said **the NSC will remain in competition for dollars** with smaller, less expensive Offshore Patrol Cutters that can be built quicker.

Port attack is most likely- security is key to prev

Konkel 5 – Professor @ U of St. Thomas

Container Security: Preventing a Nuclear Catastrophe Todd Konkel Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University Leslie Comstock Editor <http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/004/5372.pdf>

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. government passed a significant number of measures to improve aviation security – an area with a high level of public visibility. **This nation faces a potentially greater threat, however, from a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) making its way into the U.S. in one of the thousands of cargo containers that enter this country every day**. In June 2004, the House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation issued a memo reflecting this view:

“Despite the importance of seaport security, perhaps no other mode of transportation is currently more vulnerable to future attacks than our Nation’s Marine Transportation System.” ¹ Although a future attack involving a chemical or biological WMD could have tragic consequences, **a nuclear weapon**, which could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths in an instant, **presents the most concerning threat**. In Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, Harvard professor Graham Allison shares a brief but revealing excerpt from a private conversation that took place with former Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge in February 2004. When asked what worried him most, Secretary Ridge replied with a single word: “nuclear.” ² Later in his book, Allison states that **a nuclear weapon used by terrorists in an attack on the United States “is far more likely to arrive in a cargo container than on the tip of a missile.”** ³

Nuclear terrorism sparks global nuclear war

Hellman 8 – Professor @ Stanford

Martin Hellman, Stanford Professor Emeritus, 2008, “Why worry about nuclear weapons now? Isn’t the Cold War over?”, http://nuclearrisk.org/1why_now.php,

One of the possible triggers for a **full-scale nuclear war** is an act of nuclear terrorism. Particularly if directed against an American or Russian city, the resultant chaos has the potential to push the world over the nuclear cliff, much as a terrorist act in Sarajevo in 1914 was the spark that set off the First World War. Conversely, the danger of nuclear terrorism is increased by the large number of nuclear weapons. With over 25,000 still in existence and thousands of people involved in their maintenance, storage and security, the chance for error, theft or illicit sale is much **too high**.

More than fifteen years after the bipartisan Nunn-Lugar Act initiated funding for dismantling and protecting “loose nukes” in the former Soviet Union, that effort is only about half complete [NTI 2007]. Loose nukes are not just a problem in Russia. On August 29, 2007, six American cruise missiles with dummy warheads were to be transported from North Dakota to Louisiana. After a day and a half it was discovered that missiles with real nuclear warheads had inadvertently been transferred instead [Washington Post 2007]. Until that mistake was uncovered, these six nuclear weapons were inadequately protected from theft by terrorists and others intent on obtaining such a prize. Society is paying some attention to the possibility of nuclear terrorism, but section 3 of this primer provides strong evidence that such a disaster is still far too likely. This high risk and slow progress shows that significantly more public concern and attention is warranted for the threat of nuclear terrorism. While nuclear terrorism gets much less respect that it deserves, the threat of nuclear war has been almost entirely absent as a societal concern since the end of the Cold War. That is unfortunate since Russian-American relations are again becoming very chilly. Over Russian objections, NATO admitted the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999, and added Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004. While the West saw NATO’s expansion differently, Russia feels threatened by it. One of the new NATO members, Estonia, is involved in a deeply emotional conflict with Russia. Having been horribly subjugated when it was part of the Soviet Union, the newly independent Estonia has treated its large Russian-speaking minority (one third of the population) so poorly that Amnesty International issued a report entitled “Estonia: Every third person a potential victim of discrimination.” [Amnesty International 2006]. Tensions reached a new high in April 2007 when Estonia removed a memorial to the Russian troops who died defeating Hitler. Seen as a memorial to fallen soldier-liberators by Russia and many Russian-speaking residents of Estonia, the monument was a symbol of past Russian subjugation to the majority of ethnic Estonians. Soon after the memorial was removed, a cyber-attack caused a major disruption of Estonia’s Internet access. This attack was believed to have emanated from within Russia, with many people believing the Russian government to be responsible. With Estonia a NATO member, this raised a very serious question: “If a member state’s communications centre is attacked with a missile, you call it an act of war. So what do you call it if the same installation is disabled with a cyber-attack?” asks a senior [NATO] official in Brussels. Estonia’s defense ministry goes further: a spokesman compares the attacks to those launched against America on September 11th 2001. [The Economist, May 10, 2007] If these tensions between Russia and Estonia escalate into a major crisis, we could face the prospect of having to either renege on our NATO obligations or threaten actions that would expose the entire United States to a nuclear attack. No one wants such a confrontation, but nuclear weapons lose all utility if we admit we can never use them. The U.S., Russia, and all other nuclear weapons states therefore behave as if these weapons have military utility, which is a very dangerous game in times of crisis. NOTE ADDED AUGUST 2008: Recent developments have made the former Soviet Republic of Georgia an even more dangerous flashpoint than Estonia. For details see email #5 sent to participants in this project. Another irritant to relations is the differing Russian and American views of our deployment of a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. The U.S. says that the system is intended solely to protect against the possibility of an Iranian attack, so Russia has nothing to fear. Russia sees the deployment as a major new threat, and questions whether the missiles might really be offensive in nature [Moscow News Weekly, October 25, 2007]. Even former President Mikhail Gorbachev, hardly a Cold Warrior, has voiced concern: Milos Zeman, the former Czech prime minister, said, “What kind of Iran threat do you see? This is a system that is being created against Russia.” ... I don’t think Zeman is alone in seeing this. We see this as well as he sees it [targeting Russia, not Iran]. [Moscow News Weekly, November 29, 2007] I have been concerned for some time that these differing views could lead to a repeat of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In one scenario, despairing of getting us to understand why they see this deployment as threatening, the Russians ask how we would feel if they deployed a similar missile defense in Cuba. While these Cuban missiles would be only hypothetical and defensive in nature, our nation might well see just the suggestion as intolerable. We might therefore respond in a forceful manner so that, to maintain face, Russia felt it had to deploy at least a token missile defense system. If that happened, the resultant crisis could well end with us reimposing a naval blockade of Cuba, at which point there would be a high risk of further escalation. While such a scenario may at first sound improbable, as detailed in section 3 of this primer it is very similar to the progression of events that resulted in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Somewhat ominously, several months after I first voiced the above concern, Russian President Vladimir Putin likened the current American deployment to the Cuban Missile Crisis: I recall how things went in a similar situation in the mid 1960s. Similar actions by the Soviet Union, when it put rockets in Cuba, precipitated the Cuban Missile Crisis. For us the technological aspects of the situation are very similar. We have removed the remnants of our bases from Vietnam and dismantled them in Cuba, yet such threats for our country are today being created on our own borders. [Putin, October 26, 2007] Putin disclaimed that such a crisis could occur in the friendlier climate that currently exists, but those good relations are clearly fraying. Further evidence of the decline in Russian-American relations came in November 2007 when, partly in response to this missile defense system, Russia unilaterally “suspended” implementation of its commitments under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe or CFE [Pravda, November 30, 2007]. In December 2007, events deteriorated further when Russia noted that it might target the system should it be deployed [Reuters, December 17, 2007]. NOTE ADDED AUGUST 2008: Recent developments have realized some of my worst fears and point to a rapidly increasing risk on our present course. For details see email #4 sent to participants in this project. On January 30, 2008, at the Russia Forum in Moscow, former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov stated: Russia’s military doctrine, in conditions in which its armed forces are being reduced, is known to envisage the possibility of using nuclear weapons. But this is only on condition of an attack on it and its allies, and only against countries that also possess nuclear weapons. ... In this (Russia’s) military doctrine is no different from the military doctrines of other nuclear states. [Primakov is probably referring to the fact that the U.S. has always rejected calls for a policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons.] ... This policy – anti-Russian – increases the chances of “a fatal accident.” The world may be made to face the threat of a global conflict without anyone whatsoever wanting it. [Interfax, January 30, 2008] In the U.S., presidential candidate Barack Obama had to back pedal after initially saying in an interview that he would not use nuclear weapons against terrorists in Afghanistan or Pakistan. His opponent for the Democratic nomination, Hillary Rodham Clinton, attacked that position, saying, “I think that presidents should be very careful at all times in discussing the use or non-use of nuclear weapons. Presidents, since the Cold War, have used nuclear deterrence to keep the peace. And I don’t believe that any president should make any blanket statements with respect to the use or non-use of nuclear weapons.” [New York Times, August 3, 2007] Turning to the question raised in the title of this section “Why worry about nuclear weapons now? Isn’t the Cold War over?”, an ominous chill is descending once more on Russian-American relations. The nuclear threat didn’t die with the fall of the Berlin Wall. At best, it merely went into hibernation. There are two primary failure modes of deterrence: a partial one that results in either a nuclear terrorist incident or a limited nuclear war, and a complete failure that results in full-scale

nuclear war. Even a small partial failure would be horrific: **A 10-kiloton bomb [less than one-tenth the power of many of today’s warheads] detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage.** America and its way of life would be changed forever. [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix] A complete failure of deterrence is almost

beyond imagination and conjures up mythic analogies. In a 1961 speech to a Joint Session of the Philippine Congress, General Douglas MacArthur, stated, “Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. ... If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide.” In 1986, former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara expressed a similar view: “If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western civilization will be destroyed” [McNamara 1986, page 6]. In January 2007, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn echoed those concerns when they quoted President Reagan’s belief that nuclear weapons were “totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.” [Shultz 2007] DoD and related studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that a full-scale nuclear war would exact: “The resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent. Executive branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., from 79 million to 160 million dead) ... a change in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side ... These calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would eventually die from lack of adequate medical care ... millions of people might starve or freeze during the following winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. ... further millions ... might eventually die of latent radiation effects.” [OTA 1979, page 8] The same 1979 OTA report also

noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that assumed a new potentiality when the "TTAPS Report" [TTAPS 1983] noted that the ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous nuclear explosions and their resultant firestorms might usher in a "nuclear winter" that could erase homo sapiens from the face of the earth, much as many scientists now believe the dinosaurs were wiped out by an "impact winter" caused by ash and dust from an asteroid impacting the Earth 65 million years ago. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a full-scale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that even a limited nuclear exchange, or one between newer nuclear weapons states, such as India and Pakistan, could have devastating long-lasting climatic consequences due to

the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern megacities. In a full-scale nuclear war civilization would almost surely be destroyed,

and there a reasonable possibility that **no human beings would survive**. As in the last section, we need to deal with the two failure

modes of deterrence: a partial one that results in either a nuclear terrorist incident or a limited nuclear war, and a complete failure that results in full-scale nuclear war. With respect to terrorism, Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of such a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50-50 [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, puts those odds at less than 1%, but notes, "We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1 percent ... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can't live in a world where it's anything but 'extremely low-probability.'" [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found an average estimate of 29% for the "probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years," with 79 percent of the respondents believing "it more likely to be carried out by terrorists" than by a government [Lugar 2005, pages 14-15]. While even the most optimistic of these estimates is alarming, their wide range emphasizes the need for our proposed in-depth studies to reduce the uncertainty. There is significant evidence [Bunn 2007] supporting the need for greater attention to this issue: Al Qaeda has ... explicitly set inflicting the maximum possible level of damage on the United States and its allies as one of their organizational goals. Intercepted al Qaeda communications reportedly have referred to inflicting a "Hiroshima" on the United States. Al Qaeda's spokesman, Sulaiman Abu Ghath, has argued that the group "has the right to kill 4 million Americans – 2 million of them children," in retaliation for the deaths the group believes the United States and Israel have inflicted on Muslims. Bin Laden sought and received a religious ruling (fatwa) from an extreme Saudi cleric in May 2003 authorizing the use of weapons of mass destruction to kill American civilians [page 38]. The al Qaeda terrorist network and elements of the global network it has spawned have made repeated attempts to get nuclear bombs or weapons-usable nuclear materials to make them, and they have repeatedly tried to recruit nuclear weapons scientists to help them [page 15]. Osama bin Laden has made his desire for nuclear weapons clear in public statements. Al Qaeda launched a focused effort to get such weapons ... long before the 9/11 attacks, and this effort has continued [page 20]. terrorist teams [have been] carrying out reconnaissance at nuclear weapon storage sites and on nuclear weapons transport trains in Russia, whose locations and schedules are [supposed to be] state secrets; [There have also been] reports that the 41 heavily armed terrorists who seized hundreds of hostages at a theater in Moscow in October 2002 considered seizing the Kurchatov Institute, a site with enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for dozens of nuclear weapons ... Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese doomsday cult [responsible for the 1995 poison gas attack on the Tokyo subways which killed 12 and injured over 1,000] ... reportedly recruited staff members at the Kurchatov Institute [page 36 and 44-45]. It is small comfort that terrorist nuclear ambitions have been thwarted thus far. Al Qaeda failed to destroy the World Trade Center with its 1993 truck bomb but, to almost everyone's great surprise, succeeded eight years later. The bipartisan National Threat Initiative is dedicated to preventing another, even more catastrophic shock, but needs greater public awareness and support to combat the current complacency. Society is even less concerned about the risk of a full-scale nuclear war, largely seeing it as a relic of the past. Many people believe that the arms reductions of the last twenty years have made the world safe. But, reducing from roughly 75,000 nuclear weapons to 25,000 today made the

world only relatively safer, not truly safe. Others believe that because World War III would be so destructive, no one in his right mind would start such a devastating conflict, and there is therefore no need to worry. But in times of crisis we are often not in our right minds. Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara [McNamara 1986, page 13] sums up what he learned from participating in three world crises – Berlin in 1961, Cuba in 1962, and the Mideast war of 1967 – each of which had the potential to go nuclear: "In no one of the three incidents did either ... [the United States or the Soviet Union] intend to act in a way that would lead to military conflict, but on each of the occasions lack of information, misinformation, and misjudgments led to confrontation. And in each of them, as the crisis evolved, tensions heightened, emotions rose, and the danger of irrational decisions increased." Because the Cuban Missile Crisis was the closest the world has come to nuclear war, studying its evolution can help us avoid making the same mistakes twice. In 1962, over Soviet objections, America deployed nuclear-armed Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM's) in Turkey. From our perspective, installing these weapons secured NATO's southern flank, helped cement relations with Turkey, and enhanced our nuclear deterrent. The Russians viewed these missiles very differently. While the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion and other factors contributed to Khrushchev deploying similar IRBM's in Cuba, this disastrous decision started with a nuclear version of tit-for-tat as noted by Khrushchev's advisor Fyodor Burlatsky: "Khrushchev and [Soviet Defense Minister] R. Malinovsky ... were strolling along the Black Sea coast. Malinovsky pointed out to sea and said that on the other shore in Turkey there was an American nuclear missile base. In a matter of seven or eight minutes missiles launched from that base could devastate major centres in the Ukraine and southern Russia. ... Khrushchev asked Malinovsky why the Soviet Union should not have the right to do the same as America. Why, for example, should it not deploy missiles in Cuba?" [Burlatsky 1991, page 171]. Once the crisis started, it developed a life of its own. George Ball, a member of the White House ExComm which advised Kennedy during the crisis, stated that when a group of Kennedy's advisors met years later "Much to our own surprise, we reached the unanimous conclusion that, had we determined our course of action within the first forty-eight hours after the missiles were discovered, we would almost certainly have made the wrong decision, responding to the missiles in such a way as to require a forceful Soviet response and thus setting in train a series of reactions and counter-reactions with horrendous consequences." [Ury 1985, page 37]. Douglas Dillon, another member of Kennedy's ExComm, was less concerned and, at a 1987 conference commemorating the crisis' 25th anniversary stated: "My impression was that military operations looked like they were becoming increasingly necessary. ... The pressure was getting too great. ... Personally, I disliked the idea of an invasion [of Cuba] ... Nevertheless, the stakes were so high that we thought we might just have to go ahead. Not all of us had detailed information about what would have followed, but we didn't think there was any real risk of a nuclear exchange." [Bligh & Welch 1989, page 72]. In contrast to Dillon's belief that some other ExComm members had detailed information about what would have followed an invasion of Cuba, facts that later became available showed that none of them had the least idea of what would likely have transpired. Unknown to Kennedy and his ExComm, the Russians had battlefield nuclear weapons in Cuba and came close to giving permission for their use against an American invasion, without further approval from Moscow [Chang & Kornbluh 1998; Blair 1993, page 109; Fursenko & Naftali 1997, pages 212, 242-243, 276]. Not knowing of these weapons, there was strong pressure within the ExComm and from Congress [Fursenko & Naftali 1997, pages 243-245] to invade Cuba and remove Castro once and for all. Another ominous aspect of the crisis was uncovered when key players from both sides met on the 40th anniversary of the 1962 crisis. A Soviet submarine near the quarantine line had been subjected to signaling depth charges, commanding it to surface, which it eventually did. But not until forty years later did Americans learn that this submarine carried a nuclear torpedo and that the Soviet submarine captain, believing he was under attack, had given orders to arm it. Fortunately, the submarine brigade commander was on board, over-ruled the captain, and defused the threat of a nuclear attack on the American fleet [Blanton 2002]. The world held its breath as Soviet ships approached the American blockade. If neither side backed down, war seemed inevitable. Finally, Khrushchev stopped the Soviet ships just short of the blockade. While Kennedy won that round of the Cold War, nuclear chicken does not always have a winner. It is a dangerous game to begin with, and even more so when, as in the Cuban Missile Crisis, winning depends on your opponent having less concern than you for maintaining political power. (As part of the resolution of the crisis, Kennedy agreed to remove the American missiles in Turkey, but he insisted that part of the agreement be kept secret. The 1962 midterm elections occurred soon after the crisis ended. With the secret protocol unknown, Kennedy was seen as winning the standoff and the Democratic Party fared significantly better than anticipated prior to the crisis. In contrast, Khrushchev fell from power two years later, partly due to Russia's humiliation in the Cuban Missile Crisis [Dobrynin 1995, page 93].) It might be hoped that humanity, after staring World War III in the face, had learned its lesson and that a similar crisis was inconceivable post-1962. Unfortunately, at least two events that could initiate a similar crisis have since occurred. As noted in an earlier section, the current deployment of an American missile defense in Eastern Europe has the potential to produce a second Cuban Missile Crisis, and has been likened to that standoff by Putin [Putin 2007]. (See also my recent update for ominous new warning signs.) And, in the 1980's, Ronald Reagan threatened to reimpose a naval blockade of Cuba to stop it from aiding a leftist insurgency in El Salvador [LeoGrande 1981]. Such an action would have violated one of our key concessions (lifting the blockade) in return for which the Russians removed their Cuban missiles. Had Reagan reimposed the blockade, the Russians might well have threatened to redeploy missiles unless the blockade was immediately lifted. Such a reaction was made more likely by the fact that, at that time, Reagan was in the process of deploying Pershing IRBM's (the "Euromissiles") in Western Europe. While not as close to the Soviet border as the Turkish Jupiters, the only way the Soviets could match such weapons was with missiles based in Cuba. Nuclear proliferation and the specter of nuclear terrorism are creating additional possibilities for triggering a nuclear war. If an American

(or Russian) city were devastated by an act of nuclear terrorism, the public outcry for immediate, **decisive**

action would be even stronger than Kennedy had to deal with when the Cuban missiles first became known to the American public. While the action would likely not be directed against Russia, it might be threatening to Russia (e.g., on its borders) or one of its allies and precipitate a crisis that resulted in a full-scale nuclear war.

Terrorists with an apocalyptic mindset might even attempt to catalyze a **full-scale nuclear war** by disguising their act to look like an attack by the U.S. or Russia.

Collapses the global economy

Flynn 3 - Ph.D. Commander, U.S. Coast Guard (ret.) Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies and Director, Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Homeland Security Imperatives

Stephen, Written Testimony before a hearing of the U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, March 20, 2003 <http://www.cfr.org/defensehomeland-security/fragile-state-container-security/p5730>

On October 12, 2001, I had the opportunity to testify before this committee at its first post 9-11 hearing on homeland security. At that time, I asserted that “the economic and societal disruption created by the September 11 attacks has opened Pandora’s box. **Future terrorists bent on challenging U.S. power will draw inspiration from the seeming ease at which America could be attacked and they will be encouraged by the mounting costs to the U.S. economy and the public psyche associated with the ad-hoc efforts to restore security following that attack.**” A year later I joined with former senators Warren Rudman and Gary Hart in preparing our report, “America: Still Unprepared—Still In Danger.” We observed that “nineteen men wielding box-cutters forced the United States to do to itself what no adversary could ever accomplish: a successful blockade of the U.S. economy. **If a surprise terrorist attack were to happen tomorrow involving the sea, rail, or truck transportation systems that carry millions of tons of trade to the United States each day, the response would likely be the same—a self-imposed global embargo.**” Based on that analysis, we identified as second of the six critical mandates that deserve the nation’s immediate attention: “Make trade security a global priority; the system for moving goods affordably and reliably around the world is ripe for exploitation and vulnerable to mass disruption by terrorists.” This is why the topic of today’s hearing is so important. **The stakes are enormous. U.S. prosperity—and much of its power—relies on its ready access to global markets.** Both the scale and pace at which goods move between markets has exploded in recent years thanks in no small part to the invention and proliferation of the intermodal container. These ubiquitous boxes—most come in the 40’x8’x8’ size—have transformed the transfer of cargo from a truck, train, and ship into the transportation equivalent of connecting Lego blocks. The result has been to increasingly diminish the role of distance for a supplier or a consumer as a constraint in the world marketplace. Ninety percent of the world’s freight now moves in a container. Companies like Wal-Mart and General Motors move up to 30 tons of merchandise or parts across the vast Pacific Ocean from Asia to the West Coast for about \$1600. The transatlantic trip runs just over a \$1000—which makes the postage stamp seem a bit overpriced. But **the system that underpins the incredibly efficient, reliable, and affordable movement of global freight has one glaring shortcoming in the post-9-11 world—it was built without credible safeguards to prevent it from being exploited or targeted by terrorists** and criminals. Prior to September 11, 2001, virtually anyone in the world could arrange with an international shipper or carrier to have an empty intermodal container delivered to their home or workplace. They then could load it with tons of material, declare in only the most general terms what the contents were, “seal” it with a 50-cent lead tag, and send it on its way to any city and town in the United States. The job of transportation providers was to move the box as expeditiously as possible. Exercising any care to ensure that the integrity of a container’s contents was not compromised may have been a commercial practice, but it was not a requirement. The responsibility for making sure that goods loaded in a box were legitimate and authorized was shouldered almost exclusively by the importing jurisdiction. But as the volume of containerized cargo grew exponentially, the number of agents assigned to police that cargo stayed flat or even declined among most trading nations. The rule of thumb in the inspection business is that it takes five agents three hours to conduct a thorough physical examination of a single full intermodal container. Last year nearly 20 million

containers washed across America's borders via a ship, train, and truck. Frontline agencies had only enough inspectors and equipment to examine between 1-2 percent of that cargo. Thus, **for would-be terrorists, the global intermodal container system that is responsible for moving the overwhelming majority of the world's freight satisfies the age-old criteria of opportunity and motive.** "Opportunity" flows from (1) the almost complete absence of any security oversight in the loading and transporting of a box from its point of origin to its final destination, and (2) the fact that growing volume and velocity at which containers move around the planet create a daunting "needle-in-the-haystack" problem for inspectors. "Motive" is derived from the role that the container now plays in underpinning global supply chains and the likely response by the U.S. government to an attack involving a container. Based on statements by the key officials at U.S. Customs, the Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Department of Transportation, should a container be used as a "poor man's missile," the shipment of all containerized cargo into our ports and across our borders would be halted. As a consequence, **a modest investment by a terrorist could yield billions of dollars in losses to the U.S. economy by shutting down—even temporarily—the system that moves "just-in-time" shipments of parts and goods.** Given the current state of container security, it is hard to imagine how a post-event lock-down on container shipments could be either prevented or short-lived. One thing we should have learned from the 9-11 attacks involving passenger airliners, the follow-on anthrax attacks, and even last fall Washington sniper spree is that terrorist incidents pose a special challenge for public officials. In the case of most disasters, the reaction by the general public is almost always to assume the event is an isolated one. Even if the post-mortem provides evidence of a systemic vulnerability, it often takes a good deal of effort to mobilize a public policy response to redress it. But just the opposite happens in the event of a terrorist attack—especially one involving catastrophic consequences. When these attacks take place, the assumption by the general public is almost always to presume a general vulnerability unless there is proof to the contrary. Government officials have to confront head-on this loss of public confidence by marshalling evidence that they have a credible means to manage the risk highlighted by the terrorist incident. In the interim as recent events have shown, people will refuse to fly, open their mail, or even leave their homes. If a terrorist were to use a container as a weapon-delivery device, the easiest choice would be high-explosives such as those used in the attack on the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. **Some form of chemical weapon, perhaps even involving hazardous materials, is another likely scenario.** A bio-weapon is a less attractive choice for a terrorist because of the challenge of dispersing the agent in a sufficiently concentrated form beyond the area where the explosive device goes off. **A "dirty bomb" is the more likely threat vs. a nuclear weapon, but all these scenarios are conceivable since the choice of a weapon would not be constrained by any security measures currently in place in our seaports or within the intermodal transportation industry.** This is why a terrorist attack involving a cargo container could cause such profound economic disruption. **An incident triggered by even a conventional weapon going off in a box could result in a substantial loss of life.** In the immediate aftermath, the general public will want reassurance that one of the many other thousands of containers arriving on any given day will not pose a similar risk. The President of the United States, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other key officials responsible for the security of the nation would have to stand before a traumatized and likely skeptical American people and outline the measures they have in place to prevent another such attack. **In the absence of a convincing security framework to manage the risk of another incident, the public would likely insist that all containerized cargo be stopped until adequate safeguards are in place. Even with the most focused effort, constructing that framework from scratch could take months—even years. Yet, within three weeks, the entire worldwide intermodal transportation industry would effectively be brought to its knees—as would much of the freight movements that make up international trade.**

Tradeoff links

The plan wrecks the Offshore Patrol Cutter acquisition program

Perera, 14 (David, "Papp: Coast Guard can't afford new icebreaker" 3/31, Fierce Homeland Security, 3/31, proquest)//DH

[Image omitted] - Disagreement among administration officials over the priority a new U.S. icebreaker should assume within the Coast Guard acquisition budget is one reason why the service has yet to submit a five year capital investment plan.

Given the likelihood of Coast Guard acquisition spending hovering around \$1 billion annually in the foreseeable future, the service cannot afford a new heavy icebreaker without making cuts to other programs, such as the Offshore Patrol Cutter acquisition, said Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Robert Papp.

A new icebreaker, estimated to cost around \$1 billion to build, "would displace other things that I have a higher priority for," he said while testifying March 26 before a House Transportation and Infrastructure subcommittee.

"There are other people who have the opinion with an opening Arctic and other things that perhaps an icebreaker ought to be a higher priority," he said.

New icebreaker funding would crowd out all other budget options – specifically prevents the new cutter fleet from being funded

Beidel '12 (Eric, "High-End Ships, Ice-Breakers Compete for Precious Coast Guard Dollars", February 13th, <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=671>) //J.N.E

The Coast Guard is down to one operational icebreaker, a less than favorable situation given the increased role the service is being asked to take in the Arctic.

The service used to have eight icebreakers, but all but one have been decommissioned or are in disrepair, commandant Adm. Robert J. Papp Jr. told a Feb. 13 Center for Strategic and International Studies conference.

A second icebreaker will be ready to return to action next year, he said, speaking just hours before the release of President Obama's fiscal year 2013 budget proposal.

That document contains \$8 million to "initiate acquisition of a new polar icebreaker to ensure that the nation is able to maintain a surface presence in the Arctic well into the future."

Washington insiders are suggesting that **the Coast Guard also take money from a program for new large cutters and spend it on icebreakers and less expensive ships.**

But the future of the nation's maritime security depends upon ships such as the National Security Cutter that are effective away from the shore, Papp said.

The service is in good shape with a substantial fleet of patrol boats to deal with threats close to the shore, he said. He also feels comfortable with the assets the service has in the nation's ports. But there is a security layer he worries about.

"So if you're inspecting overseas and you have good resources in the ports, you want some sort of middle layer to be able to intercept any threats before they get into your ports," Papp said.

"Unfortunately for us, that is the most expensive layer that we deal with, because in order to do that you have to have stout capable ships that have high-endurance and speed."

This "middle layer" of maritime security is hard for the Coast Guard, he said.

"How do you provide persistent sovereign presence in the offshore waters? You can't do it with patrol boats. It takes ships and ships are expensive," he said.

Coast Guard officials have been fighting for funding to get eight National Security Cutters to replace the 378-foot high-endurance cutters that have been in service since the 1960s. The third NSC was delivered to the Coast Guard last fall. A \$482 million contract for the fifth has been awarded to Huntington Ingalls Industries. And Obama's budget includes funding for a sixth.

The funding for the rest is far from certain. During a January speech at the Surface Navy Association's annual symposium, **the commandant said the NSC will remain in competition for dollars with smaller, less expensive Offshore Patrol Cutters that can be built quicker.**

The Coast Guard wants eight NSCs to replace 12 high-endurance cutters that have an average age of 43 years. The OPCs would replace medium-endurance cutters, some of which are even older.

Even if the Coast Guard was able to secure funding for all eight NSCs, the service's total fleet of high-endurance ships eventually will be reduced by 11, Papp said.

"I just don't get it — why we're not building more ships in this country," he said.

The Coast Guard would like to send one of the new cutters to Alaska to deal with increasing activity in the Bering Strait. Obama's 2013 budget also provides \$6.1 million to the Coast Guard to recapitalize and expand helicopter hangars and aviation refueling facilities in Alaska.

"These investments will sustain the Coast Guard's ability to establish effective presence in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Chain — the 'gateway' to the Arctic," the budget document says.

Icebreakers more like bank breakers- newest evidence shows the aff destroys funding towards the Offshore Patrol Cutter

O'Rourke 14 (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 7/1/14, "Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/233529641/37/Procurement-vs-Leasing>, JHR)

I can't afford to pay for an icebreaker in a 1-billion-dollar [per year] SIP [sic: CIP] because **it would just displace other things** that I have a higher priority for. So we're looking at other alternatives, perhaps one of those alternatives, the Congress came up with a requirement for a business base analysis on the remaining Polar Seal [sic: Sea] icebreaker, Polar Sea and potentially, we might be able to overhaul Polar Sea and fit that into the SIP [sic: CIP] as an affordable means for providing an additional icebreaker as we await a time that we can build a new icebreaker. If we are going to build a new icebreaker, if that is a priority, **we just can't fit it within our acquisition account** and I would look across the inter-agency [for the funding]. Later in the hearing, he stated: **The Offshore Patrol Cutter is my highest priority for the Coast Guard**. I need to fit that in the budget and I fear that **if we try to fit the cost of an icebreaker in there, it would displace the Offshore Patrol Cutter** or some other very important things. So my number one option is to get support across the inter-agency, those agencies that benefit from the support of a nice breaker to contribute towards the construction of it that would be my first choice. My second choice however, when I start looking at what can I fit within our acquisition budget refurbishment of the Polar Sea maybe a viable option for that. I would say what you would want to do is overlap and so as Polar Star is coming towards the end of that decade of service after refurbishment, we have polar—I think I said Polar Star.

Plan forces Coast Guard tradeoffs

David, 13 - Mihaela David worked as a part-time research associate in the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) ("Pragmatic Thinking: How the U.S. Coast Guard Is Making Do with Less in the Arctic" 6/6, http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2013/06/pragmatic-thinking-how-us-coast-guard_6.html)/DH

Breaking the (Budgetary) Ice

The U.S. is in dire need of more icebreakers for assured access to the ice-covered Arctic waters: it currently relies on only one medium icebreaker, Healy, and one heavy icebreaker, the recently reactivated Polar Star. The strategy document does not discuss at length the Coast Guard's plans to increase its icebreaking capability. The only mention of icebreakers is buried within a paragraph entitled "Science and Technology" in a final chapter on concepts to ensure long-term success. The document merely states that the U.S. "must have adequate icebreaking capability to support research," and "must also make a strategic investment in icebreaking capability to enable access to the high latitudes over the long-term." [13]

However, like all government entities, **the Coast Guard is operating within a severely austere fiscal climate, and is forced to make tough decisions regarding the use of its limited financial resources**. The U.S. Coast Guard is slated for a 13 percent budgetary cut in FY 2014, which will make its acquisition budget fall far short of what the service needs to modernize and maintain its infrastructure. [14] **These fiscal constraints have already impacted the Coast Guard's plan to upgrade its icebreaker fleet, forcing the service to push back its incremental funding timeline for the construction of a new heavy-duty polar icebreaker**, which is projected to cost between \$900 million and \$1 billion.

Tradeoff inevitable – Congress won't increase the total Coast Guard budget

David, 13 - Mihaela David worked as a part-time research associate in the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) ("Pragmatic Thinking: How the U.S. Coast Guard Is Making Do with Less in the Arctic" 6/6, http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2013/06/pragmatic-thinking-how-us-coast-guard_6.html)/DH

Acknowledging its institutional and resource limitations, the Coast Guard is looking to forge domestic and international partnerships that it can leverage to more effectively fulfill its responsibilities in the Arctic. This is a cooperative and cost-effective approach to governance that, if implemented successfully, can be a blueprint for other departments' and agencies' engagement in the region. Burden-sharing within and among multiple levels of government is not just strategically wise, but also necessary given the fiscal austerity climate.

The Coast Guard is also aware of its capabilities gaps and the necessity for both assured access and sustained presence in Arctic waters. **The budget requests and operational decisions it has made thus far reflect the difficult choices the Coast Guard leaders had to make under the constraint of finite financial resources. The Coast Guard would ideally want to expand and modernize its icebreaker fleet to multiple heavy and medium vessels, but the costs are much too high and any budget request beyond the current plans for one new icebreaker would be deemed unrealistic and promptly rejected by the Administration and Congress.** The pragmatic Coast Guard leadership sees success where others see failure: it has been able, at least, to argue in favor of acquisition instead of leasing of icebreakers and, if budgets are approved, having a new icebreaker a decade from now is better than none at all.

Cuts have put the Coast Guard budget on the brink- new icebreakers collapse funding for key priorities

Laster 11 (Jill, reporter for The Navy Times in Washington, D.C., covering the Coast Guard, 9/15/11, "CG must balance cuts with Arctic mission," Navy Times, <http://www.navytimes.com/news/2011/10/coast-guard-arctic-mission-balance-cuts-101511w>, JHR)

Congress is ramping up demands for the U.S. to build its icebreaker fleet — although how the Coast Guard will acquire icebreakers while maintaining frontline operations under a tight budget remains in question. **Sen. Mark Begich, D-Alaska, proposed an \$8.7-billion discretionary budget earlier this month for fiscal 2012, in line with the service's request and about \$115 million below fiscal 2011 levels.** The Senate version of the authorization bill sets similar funding levels as the House bill, which authorizes \$8.5 billion. "Senator Begich strongly supports the Coast Guard and thinks its budget needs to be plussed up to account for increased missions in the Arctic," Begich spokeswoman Julie Hasquet said. **"But we also have to respond to demand from the administration and the public to cut spending."** The Senate's Coast Guard authorization bill, S 1665, requires the service to operate at least two heavy polar icebreakers at any one time and authorizes it to study building a deep-water sea port in the Arctic. "With increased energy development and maritime activity, our nation must ensure that the Coast Guard has the capabilities to operate in the Arctic waters," Begich said during a Senate subcommittee hearing this summer on the Arctic. "That includes icebreakers, which we are sorely lacking." **The Coast Guard estimates it will need at least three heavy and three medium icebreakers to meet minimum mission requirements as the polar ice cap melts.** The service has three polar icebreakers — one is inactive, and another isn't expected to return to operations until 2013. The Senate authorization bill **cuts \$200 million from acquisitions, to about \$1.4**

billion. Hasquet said cutting **acquisitions is "not ideal as the Coast Guard has major needs** for vessels and aircraft."

1 ship is the entire Coast Guard budget- the cutter program would have to get slashed

Perera 14 (David, executive editor of the FierceMarkets Government Group, including FierceGovernment, FierceGovernmentIT, FierceHomelandSecurity, and FierceMobileGovernment, 3/31/14, "Papp: Coast Guard can't afford new icebreaker," Fierce Homeland Security, <http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/story/papp-coast-guard-cant-afford-new-icebreaker/2014-03-31>, JHR)

Disagreement among administration officials over the priority a new U.S. icebreaker should assume within the Coast Guard acquisition budget is one reason why the service has yet to submit a five year capital investment plan. Given the likelihood of Coast Guard acquisition **spending hovering around \$1 billion annually** in the foreseeable future, the service **cannot afford a new heavy icebreaker without making cuts to other programs, such as the Offshore Patrol Cutter acquisition**, said Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Robert Papp. A new icebreaker, estimated to cost around \$1 billion to build, "would displace other things that I have a higher priority for," he said while testifying March 26 before a House Transportation and Infrastructure subcommittee.

Icebreakers would take up the entire Coast Guard budget- that trades off with cutters

Caldwell 11 (Stephen, Director of Homeland Security and Justice, December 1, "Coast Guard: Observations on Arctic Requirements, Icebreakers, and Coordination with Stakeholders" Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives,"

<http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/TestimonyCGMT/2011-12-1-Caldwell.pdf>, JHR)

The U.S. Coast Guard's recapitalization (acquisition) budget compared to the U.S. Navy's Shipbuilding and Construction Naval (SCN) budget **does not provide the ability to recapitalize the nation's polar icebreakers**. The cost to design and build a polar icebreaker is significant and **would consume virtually all of the U.S. Coast Guard's annual acquisition budget** (e.g. \$800M of \$1,200M) at a time when the U.S. Coast Guard **must recapitalize its extremely old ocean-going fleet of cutters** and surveillance aircraft (an effort formerly called the Deepwater Program). The impact on the U.S. Coast Guard to acquire a new polar icebreaker is essentially **the equivalent of the U.S. Navy acquiring a new aircraft carrier**. Despite the dire

outlook, efforts to prepare for the recapitalization of the U.S. polar icebreaker fleet have been ongoing. Over the last decade the U.S. Congress has repeatedly expressed reservations as to the lack of national polar icebreaking capability, and today those concerns appear to be mounting. In the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2010, Congress required the U.S. Coast Guard to begin survey and design and conduct a business case analysis for either a new heavy icebreaker class or a major service life extension project for existing heavy icebreakers.

The aff displaces key Coast Guard priorities- the head of the Coast Guard proves

O'Rourke 14 (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 7/1/14, "Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/233529641/37/Procurement-vs-Leasing>, JHR)

At a March 12, 2014, hearing on the Coast Guard's proposed FY2015 budget before the Homeland Security subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, the **Commandant of the Coast** at the time, Admiral Robert Papp stated: What concerns me, however, is—particularly as I'm being constrained closer to the billion-dollar range in my acquisition projects [i.e., the Coast Guard's Acquisition, Construction, and Improvements, or AC&I, account], I don't—**I don't know how you fit in a billion-dollar icebreaker**. Because at some point, you're going to have to take—even if you do it with a multi-year strategy [i.e., incremental funding], you're going to have to go \$300 billion [sic: million] or \$400 billion [sic: million] in a couple of years, which **would displace other very important things**. So, we're having to take a hard look at this. One way of doing it is to say, OK, this icebreaker serves the interagency. The Department of Defense could call on us. NSF certainly does, and other agencies. Why should that not be a shared expense? And, oh, by the way, if all these companies are going to be making that much money off oil exploration and the arctic, maybe they can share in the cost of this icebreaker.

The budget is zero sum- funding is capped

O'Rourke 14 (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 7/1/14, "Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/233529641/37/Procurement-vs-Leasing>, JHR)

Another potential issue for Congress concerns the timeline for acquiring a new polar icebreaker, which appears to have become less certain in the FY2015 budget submission. In the FY2013 budget submission—the submission that initiated the project to acquire the ship—DHS stated that it anticipated awarding a construction contract for the ship “within the next five years” and taking delivery on the ship “within a decade.” In the FY2014 budget submission, DHS stated that it anticipated awarding a construction contract for the ship “within the next four years.” In the

Coast Guard's FY2015 budget-justification book, **the entry for the polar icebreaker program does not make a statement as to when a construction contract for the ship might be awarded.** Coast Guard testimony about the icebreaker in 2014 suggests that if the Coast Guard's Acquisition, Construction and Improvement (AC&I) appropriation account remains at about \$1 billion per year in coming years (as opposed to some higher figure, such as \$1.5 billion per year or \$2 billion per year), the icebreaker could become something like **an unfunded requirement**. For example, at a March 26, 2014, hearing on the proposed FY2015 budgets for the Coast Guard and maritime transportation programs before the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation subcommittee of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Admiral Robert Papp, the Commandant of the Coast Guard at the time, testified that “It's going to be tough to fit a billion dollar icebreaker in our five-year plan without displacing other things,” that “I can't afford to pay for an icebreaker in a \$1 billion [per year capital investment plan] because it would just displace other things that I have a higher priority for,” and that **“I still believe firmly, we need to build a new one but we don't have [the] wherewithal right now,** but doing the preliminary work should inform decisions that are made three, four, five, maybe 10 years from now.”

2nc --- at: icebreakers are cheap

Icebreakers destroy the budget nearly \$1 billion a ship

O'Rourke 14 (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 7/1/14, "Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/233529641/37/Procurement-vs-Leasing>, JHR)

The High Latitude Study provided to Congress in July 2011 states that the above figure of \$800million to \$925 million in 2008 dollars equates to \$900 million to \$1,041 million in 2012 dollars.

The study provides the following estimates, in 2012 dollars, **of the acquisition costs for new polar icebreakers**: •\$856 million for 1 ship; •\$1,663 million for 2 ships—an average of about \$832 million each; •\$2,439 million for 3 ships—an average of \$813 million each; •\$3,207 million for 4 ships—an average of about \$802 million each; Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service 18 •\$3,961 million for 5 ships—an average of about \$792 million each; and •\$4,704 million for 6 ships—an average of \$784 million each. The study refers to the above estimates as "rough order-of-magnitude costs" that "were developed as part of the Coast Guard's independent Polar Platform Business Case Analysis."

Plan costs 4 billion

Tyler 12 – (David, Reporter for the Professional Mariner, "U.S. struggles to create icebreaking fleet to maintain Arctic presence," Professional Mariner, <http://www.professionalmariner.com/February-2012/US-struggles-to-create-icebreaking-fleet-needed-to-maintain-strong-Arctic-presence/>, JHR)

In July, the Coast Guard presented its High Latitude Region Mission Analysis report to Congress. In order to meet the Coast Guard's statutory requirements in the Arctic and the Antarctic, it would need a minimum of three medium polar icebreakers and three heavy icebreakers at **a cost of about \$4.1 billion**, the report said. It is **unlikely that the Coast Guard could pay** for new icebreakers through its budget, according to Caldwell.

Other options could be to use money from the Department of Defense or the National Science Foundation.

Tradeoff turns the case

The aff's investment disrupts other key polar missions

O'Rourke 14 (Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 7/1/14, "Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/233529641/37/Procurement-vs-Leasing>, JHR)

This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the sustainment and modernization of the Coast Guard's polar icebreaker fleet, which performs a variety of missions supporting U.S. interests in polar regions. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2015

budget requests \$6 million to continue initial acquisition activities for a new polar icebreaker. The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify Coast Guard plans for sustaining and modernizing its polar icebreaking fleet. Congressional decisions on this issue could affect **Coast Guard funding requirements, the Coast Guard's ability to perform its polar missions**, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.

drug smuggling/drift net fishing impact

New cutters are key to check drug smuggling and drift net fishing

Perera '12 – executive editor of the FierceMarkets Government Group, which includes FierceGovernment, FierceGovernmentIT, FierceHomelandSecurity, and FierceMobileGovernment (David, "Coast Guard could cut back operations without NSCs, says Papp", March 7th, <http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/story/coast-guard-could-cut-back-operations-without-nscs-says-papp/2012-03-07>) //J.N.E

The Coast Guard could be forced to cut back its anti-drug smuggling operations in the Pacific and Caribbean and curtail actions against illegal high seas drift net fishing boats if it does not receive funding for a seventh and eight National Security Cutter, service Commandant Adm. Robert Papp told a March 7 Senate panel.

The service is in the midst of an ongoing fleet recapitalization effort and steadfastly maintains that it needs at least eight NSCs. The Coast Guard fiscal 2013 budget request includes a \$683 million proposal to build the sixth NSC, but subsequent-year procurement funding for the 4,550 long-ton displacement ships are listed as zero dollars.

Due to strictures of the Budget Control Act, "**we're getting less money each year,**" Papp said. "**Our acquisition budget was reduced by nearly 20 percent.**" He testified before the Senate Commerce, Science & Transportation subcommittee on oceans, atmosphere, fisheries and the Coast Guard.

Eight NSCs continue to be the official target of the recapitalization program, but if the seventh and eighth NSCs don't soon receive funding, the service would first try to find money to extend the lifespan of some of the 12 legacy High Endurance Cutters the NSCs are meant to replace. **That option is not ideal, Papp, said, since High Endurance Cutters are expensive to maintain; the last such cutter entered service in 1972. If there were no money for life extension, then operations would have to be cut back, Papp added.**

Cutbacks would likely not affect the Coast Guard's presence in the Bearing Sea and Gulf of Alaska, he added, since **"now we're down to almost the bare minimum in terms of our presence" there.**

The Government Accountability Office is correct in stating that recapitalization costs are adding up to more than the \$24.2 billion the service estimated in 2007 it would need to complete the effort, Papp also said. One reason for the increase, he said, is that annual funding falls short of what would be necessary to ensure that the service doesn't incur unnecessary additional costs by stretching the acquisition timeframe out.

"It's a Catch-22 situation. **We come up with what we believe to be a baseline of the project, and while we're doing that...the project gets extended out over time, which increases the cost,**" he said.

Egypt

Egypt economy link

Clearing sea lanes diverts vital shipping traffic from the Suez Canal – threatens Egypt's economy

Astill, 12 - appointed Political Editor and Bagehot columnist in 2012. He joined The Economist as International Security Editor in 2004 (James, "The melting north" 1/16, The Economist,

<http://www.economist.com/node/21556798>

Yet **the melting Arctic will have geostrategic consequences beyond helping a bunch of resource-fattened countries** to get fatter. **An obvious one is the potentially disruptive effect of new trade routes**. Sailing along the coast of Siberia by the north-east passage, or Northern Sea Route (NSR), as Russians and mariners call it, cuts the distance between western Europe and east Asia by roughly a third. The passage is now open for four or five months a year and is getting more traffic. In 2010 only four ships used the NSR; last year 34 did, in both directions, including tankers, refrigerated vessels carrying fish and even a cruise liner.

Asia's big exporters, China, Japan and South Korea, are already investing in ice-capable vessels, or planning to do so. For Russia, which has big plans to develop the sea lane with trans-shipment hubs and other infrastructure, this is a double boon. It will help it get Arctic resources to market faster and also, as the NSR becomes increasingly viable, diversify its hydrocarbon-addicted economy.

There are risks in this, of dispute if not war, which will require management. **What is good for Russia may be bad for Egypt**, **which last year earned over \$5 billion in revenues from the Suez Canal, an alternative east-west shipping route**. So it is good that the regional club, the Arctic Council, is showing promise. Under Scandinavian direction for the past half-decade, it has elicited an impressive amount of Arctic co-operation, including on scientific research, mapping and resource development.

Capitalism

AT: No alt spillover

Achievability and viability are distinct concepts - Fiat should allow us to overlook questions of achievability. Instead we should debate whether our alternative is a viable vision for social change.

Wright, 13 - Vilas Distinguished Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (Erik, "Transforming Capitalism through Real Utopias" American Sociological Review 78.1 (Feb 2013): 1-25, Proquest)//DH

The third task of an emancipatory theory is developing an account of alternatives, both for specific institutions and for macro-structures of society. **Alternatives can be evaluated in terms of their desirability, their viability, and their achievability. If you worry about desirability and ignore viability or achievability, then you are just a plain utopian.** Exploration of real utopias requires understanding these other two dimensions. The **viability problem asks: If we could create this alternative**, would we be able to stay there or **would it have such** unintended consequences and **self-destructive dynamics** that **it would not be sustainable? Achievability asks** of a viable alternative: **How do we move from here to there?**

At this particular moment in history, I think it is especially important to focus on the viability problem. It might seem sensible to begin by establishing whether an alternative is really achievable and only then discuss its viability. Why waste time exploring the viability of unachievable alternatives? It turns out that **the achievability problem is simply too difficult**, at least if we want to understand whether something might be achievable beyond the immediate future. What public policy innovations and institutional transformations might be achievable in, say, 2040? There are too many contingencies to even begin to answer that question in an interesting way. But there is an even more fundamental reason why I think **the question of viability should have priority over the question of achievability: developing credible ideas about viable alternatives is one way of enhancing their achievability. People are more likely to mobilize around alternatives they believe will work than around alternatives they think are pie in the sky.** Moreover, such widely circulated discussions may enhance cultural resonance for actions in line with such viable ideas. **Viability affects achievability**. This reflects an interesting aspect of the notion of the "limits of possibility" in social contexts in contrast to the natural world. Before Einstein demonstrated that nothing can travel faster than the speed of light, it was still true that the speed of light was the absolute limit of possibility. The reality of those limits of possibility did not depend on their discovery. Limits of social possibility are not quite like that because **beliefs about the limits of social possibility are one of the things that affect what in fact becomes possible**. **Evidence for the viability of alternatives has the potential to shape such beliefs.**

Case

Solvency

1nc FL

Alt Causes – Can't build icebreakers until port are developed

Gunnarsson 13 – PhD in geochemistry from Johns Hopkins University, Director of the Centre for High North Logistic, Faculty of Natural Research Sciences at the University of Akureyri (Björn , “The Future of Arctic Marine Operations and Shipping Logistics”)

http://www.chnl.no/publish_files/Ch_2_Gunnarssons_Paper.pdf //Laura T

Adequate port infrastructure and support facilities for commercial shipping such as deep water access, places of refuge, marine salvage, port reception facilities for ship-generated waste, and towing services are rarely available in the Arctic. In recent years, however, **Russian Arctic ports** in the Barents Sea area, including the deep-water port of Murmansk, **have expanded** significantly and are providing increased services due to increased ore, coal and oil production **and** transport. Some other ports in satisfactory condition are located in the Kara Sea, including the port of Dudinka on the Yenisei River, but ports further east – on the shores of the Laptev, the East Siberian, Chukchi, and Bering seas – **are in very poor condition** and only support the basic needs of local settlements. Even **if** Russian Arctic ports did provide better services and facilities, draft limitations make these ports and harbors inaccessible for larger cargo ships sailing on the NSR. **These ships cannot sail into these ports for services, to load or unload cargo, or in case of trouble as they would run aground because the harbors are too shallow.**

This fact should be a reminder that future support facilities for cargo ships and the extraction industries need to include floating units, far removed from the shallow Arctic coastline. Loose infrastructure and mobile assets (vessels that move within the Arctic) need to be considered. Such floating support units give added flexibility since they can be relocated if needed. A floating LNG plant was even considered as one option for gas from Yamal to provide tankers with deep-water access to the plant.

Icebreakers aren't sufficient

O'Rourke 14- specialist in naval affairs for the Congressional Research Service (Ronald, “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service,

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41153.pdf> //WK

Arctic waters do not necessarily have to be ice free to be open to shipping. **Multiyear ice can be over 10 feet thick and problematic even for icebreakers,** but one-year ice is typically 3 feet thick or less. This **thinner ice can be more readily broken up by icebreakers** or ice class ships (cargo ships with reinforced hulls and other features for navigating in ice-infested waters). **However, more open water in the Arctic has resulted in another potential obstacle to shipping: unpredictable ice flows.** In the NWP, **melting ice and the opening of waters** that were once covered with one-year ice **has allowed blocks of multiyear ice from farther north, or icebergs from Greenland, to flow into potential sea lanes.** **The source of this multiyear ice is not predicted to dissipate** in spite of climate change. Moreover, **the flow patterns of these ice blocks are very difficult to predict, and they have floated into potential routes for shipping.** Thus, **the lack of ice in potential sea lanes during the summer months can add even greater unpredictability to Arctic shipping.** This is in addition to the extent of ice versus open water, which is also highly variable from one year to the next and seasonally. **The unpredictability of ice conditions is a**

major hindrance for trans-Arctic shipping in general, but can be more of a concern for some types of ships than it is for others. For instance, it would be less of a concern for cruise ships, which may have the objective of merely visiting the Arctic rather than passing through and could change their route and itinerary depending on ice conditions. On the other hand, unpredictability is of the utmost concern for container ships that carry thousands of containers from hundreds of different customers, all of whom expect to unload or load their cargo upon the ship's arrival at various ports as indicated on the ship's advertised schedule. The presence of even small blocks of ice or icebergs from a melting Greenland ice sheet requires slow sailing and could play havoc with schedules. **Ships** carrying a single commodity in bulk from one port to another for just one customer have more flexibility in terms of delivery windows, but would not likely risk an Arctic passage under prevailing conditions.

Takes decades to solve enough to access their presence impact

Ebinger, 9 – director of the Energy Security Initiative at Brookings Charles, “The geopolitics of Arctic melt” *International Affairs* 85: 6 (2009) 1215–1232//DH

Technology is a key barrier to Arctic access in other ways. Icebreakers, many nuclear powered, are necessary for presence and power projection in the region year-round. The various Arctic nations have widely divergent capabilities. For example, **Russia has 20 icebreakers; Canada has 12, and is working on budgeting for 8 more; the US has,** to all intents and purposes, **just one** functional icebreaker. **These ships take eight to ten years to build, and cost approximately \$1 billion each.** The global economic crisis has, however, put a strain on budgets, and icebreaker fleets are unlikely to expand rapidly in the short term. Nonetheless, **even if the US started building tomorrow it would long remain far behind other Arctic states** such as Russia and Canada, **taking decades** and at least **\$20 billion to catch up.**

Impossible to speed up the timeframe

O'Rourke 14 – Specialist in Naval Affairs

(Ronald, June 5, 2014, Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf>, JZG)

Time Line for Acquiring New Polar Icebreaker **Another potential issue for Congress concerns the time line for acquiring a new polar icebreaker, which appears to have become less certain in the FY2015 budget submission.** In the FY2013 budget submission—the submission that initiated the project to acquire the ship—**DHS stated that it anticipated awarding a construction contract for the ship “within the next five years” and taking delivery on the ship “within a decade.”**⁴⁶ **In the FY2014 budget submission, DHS stated that it anticipated awarding a construction contract for the ship “within the next four years.”**⁴⁷ In the Coast Guard's FY2015 budget-justification book, the entry for the polar icebreaker program does not make a statement as to when a construction contract for the ship might be awarded.⁴⁸ At a March 26, 2014, hearing on the proposed FY2015 budgets for the Coast Guard and maritime transportation programs before the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation subcommittee of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Admiral Robert Papp, the Commandant of the Coast Guard at the time, testified that **“It's going to be tough to fit a billion**

dollar icebreaker in our five-year plan without displacing other things,” that “I can’t afford to pay for an icebreaker in a \$1 billion [per year capital investment plan] because it would just displace other things that I have a higher priority for,” and that “I still believe firmly, we need to build a new one but we don’t have [the] wherewithal right now, but doing the preliminary work should inform decisions that are made three, four, five, maybe 10 years from now.”⁴⁹

EXT: Alt Causes

Alt causes – lack of bases and weather hardened ships

Slattery and Coffey 13 - Brian Slattery is a Research Assistant in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, and Luke Coffey is the Margaret Thatcher Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Davis Institute, at The Heritage Foundation (“Strengthen the Coast Guard’s Presence in the Arctic” 4/2, [//JV](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/strengthen-the-us-coast-guard-in-the-arctic))

More Than Breaking the Ice

The USCG should plan to extend its reach in the Arctic not only with its icebreakers but also with operating bases, aviation assets, and vessels hardened to withstand the harsh conditions of the region. Currently, **the USCG operates only one forward-operating location** (FOL)—in Barrow, Alaska, and then only during the summer season. **This location currently has a helicopter hangar in need of serious repair.**[5] For the USCG to field a more serious presence above the Arctic Circle will require updated facilities.

The USCG has already decided that its new **National Security Cutter** (NSC) **will manage an increase in traffic** and activity in the region.[6] In **the** fiscal year 2013 **presidential budget request, long-lead funding for the seventh and eighth NSCs was removed, which would effectively halt production of these vessels.** The Administration has given no explanation for this reduction, and the USCG has not reduced its required fleet size of eight NSCs.

The NSC platform brings a diverse set of capabilities and can perform a broad range of missions from blue-water patrolling to search and rescue. While these vessels cannot penetrate ice-covered water, **they can deploy helicopters** and unmanned rotary-wing aircraft to perform surveillance and search-and-rescue missions at a distance.[7] **This ability to operate at a distance is imperative, as the USCG’s abilities are severely limited by the location of its assets below the Arctic Circle.**

Current port infrastructure can’t accommodate Coast Guard presence

Le Mièrè and Mazo 13 -- Senior Research Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and IISS Consulting Senior Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy and Consulting Editor, Survival (Christian* and Jeffrey**, “Arctic Opening: Insecurity and Opportunity,” Adelphi Series 53:440, Taylor and Francis Online)BC

There is also little commercial infrastructure that could be used in an emergency. Nome, on the west coast of Alaska (just south of the Arctic Circle), **has a small harbour that can host vessels with a draught of just six metres**, on a 50-metre pier. **This is insufficient in depth to service the USCG’s longendurance cutters** (such as the Hamilton and Legend classes) **and insufficient in length to service the medium-endurance cutters** (such as the

Famous and Reliance classes), although the length restrictions should be less of a problem than the depth. **A pier and loading facility north of the Bering Strait, usually used to support mining operations, can be used, but larger vessels have to anchor offshore;** resupply of a USCG cutter, therefore, would likely involve vertical replenishment through the use of a helicopter while the vessel remained at anchor some 12nm offshore. **Commercial airports** in Nome, Barrow and Prudhoe Bay **can act as resupply and refuelling stations** for USCG equipment, **but not as bases. Only very limited attempts have been made to remedy the situation:** in July 2013, it was announced that the USCG would be opening a forward-operating location north of the Bering Strait in Kotzebue, in northwestern Alaska. However, **the location will only be available seasonally** and will consist only of one MH-60 Jayhawk helicopter flying out of the Alaska Air National Guard Hangar in the city.³ **Given these capability gaps and infrastructural weaknesses, the USCG strategy is explicit in laying out the service's limited objectives in the region over the coming decade: to improve awareness, modernise governance and broaden partnerships. These objectives hint at the difficulties that any one service,** even one of the most powerful coastguards in the world, has when operating in the Arctic; **the goals of improving awareness and broadening partnerships,** which highlight both international cooperation and collaboration with indigenous groups, **are essentially burden sharing to ensure a greater provision of security without a significant investment in facilities or equipment.** The USCG strategy, therefore, highlights the need for a greater constabulary presence and focus in and on the Arctic, while also underlining the insufficient capabilities currently in place to accomplish this goal.

Funding Solvency

Funding uncertainty slashes plan solvency

Caldwell 11 – director of Homeland Security and Justice (December 2011, “Requirements, Icebreakers, and Coordination with Stakeholders,” Transportation Infrastructure U.S. Government Accountability Office, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/586574.pdf>) mj

The Coast Guard faces overall budget uncertainty, and it may be a significant challenge for the Coast Guard to obtain Arctic capable resources, including icebreakers. For more than 10 years, we have noted Coast Guard difficulties in funding major acquisitions, particularly when acquiring multiple assets at the same time. For example, in our 1998 report on the Deepwater program, we noted that the agency could face major obstacles in proceeding with that program because it would consume virtually all of the Coast Guard’s projected capital spending.¹ In our 2008 testimony on the Coast Guard budget, we again noted that affordability of the Deepwater acquisitions would continue to be a major challenge to the Coast Guard given the other demands upon the agency for both capital and operations spending.² In our 2010 testimony on the Coast Guard budget, we noted that maintaining the Deepwater acquisition program was the Coast Guard’s top budget priority, but would come at a cost to operational capabilities.³ This situation, of the Deepwater program crowding out other demands, continued, and in our report of July this year we noted that the Deepwater program of record was not achievable given projected Coast Guard budgets.⁴

1GAO, Coast Guard Acquisition Management: Deepwater Project’s Justification and Affordability Need to be Addressed More Thoroughly, Given the challenges that the Coast Guard already faces in funding its Deepwater acquisition program, it unlikely that the agency’s budget could accommodate the level of additional funding (estimated by the High Latitude Study to range from \$4.14 billion to \$6.9 billion) needed to acquire new icebreakers or reconstruct existing ones.

This means that it is unlikely that the Coast Guard will be able to expand the U.S. icebreaker fleet to meet its statutory requirements as identified by the High Latitude Study. As we reported in 2010, This analysis examined the impact that financing a new polar icebreaker would have on Coast Guard operations and maintenance activities, among others. The report found that given the Coast Guard’s current and projected budgets, as well as its mandatory budget line items, there are insufficient funds in any one year to fully fund one new polar icebreaker. Additionally, though major acquisitions are usually funded over several years, the incremental funding obtained from reducing or delaying existing acquisition projects would have significant adverse impact on all Coast Guard activities.

The Commandant of the Coast Guard has recognized these budgetary challenges, noting that the Coast Guard would need to prioritize resource allocations, while accepting risk in areas where resources would be lacking. Given that it takes 8-10 years to build an icebreaker, and the Coast Guard has not yet begun the formal acquisition process, the Coast Guard has already accepted some level of risk that its statutory mission requirements related to icebreakers will continue to go unmet.

Warming Turn

Icebreaking accelerates the loss of ice sheets – independently triggers climate tipping events

Leitzell 12 – science writer and press officer of communications for the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (April 2012, Katherine, “Are icebreakers changing the climate?” National Snow & Ice Data Center, <http://nsidc.org/icelights/2012/04/12/are-icebreakers-changing-the-climate/>) mj

In summer months, icebreaking ships head north into the Arctic Ocean, tearing through the sea ice and leaving trails of open water in their wakes. Readers occasionally write in to ask us whether the trails left by these ships contribute to the melting of sea ice.

Breaking trail

Arctic sea ice reflects most of the sun’s rays, helping to keep the Arctic and the whole Northern Hemisphere cool. Open water has a lower albedo —or reflectivity—than sea ice, and so it absorbs more heat from the sun. Researchers have found that as Arctic sea ice melts in summer, leaving more areas of open water, the open water absorbs more of the sun’s energy, warming the water and melting more ice. This is one of the positive feedback loops that scientists say could lead to increased warming and sea ice loss in the Arctic. NSIDC scientist Walt Meier said, “Even in the summer, when the ice is melting, sea ice reflects at least 50 percent of the sun’s energy. The ocean only reflects about 10 percent of the sun’s energy, and 90 percent is absorbed, warming the ocean and the atmosphere.”

It makes sense that a strip of open water left by an icebreaker would absorb more heat from the sun, and melt away the sea ice along that trail. Meier said, “It’s certainly true locally, that the open water in the wake of an icebreaker absorbs more of the sun’s energy than the ice around it.” But what is the effect on the ice cover as a whole?

How much ice does an icebreaker break?

Meier decided to crunch some numbers and find out. While his numbers are an estimate, he said, they provide a helpful comparison of just how much icebreakers might contribute to summer ice loss.

Meier said, “In late June, when the sun’s energy is strongest, the total sea ice extent is around 10 million square kilometers or 3.9 million square miles. An icebreaker cruising through the ice for 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) and leaving an ice-free wake of 10 meters (33 feet) would open an area of water 10 square kilometers (3.9 square miles) over the entire cruise.

Biodiversity Turn

Noise from ice-breakers kills marine species

Tedsen et al 14 - Coordinator of Ecologic Institute's Arctic program (Elizabeth, "Arctic Marine Governance Opportunities for Transatlantic Cooperation") Springer.

http://download.springer.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/static/pdf/966/bok%253A978-3-642-38595-7.pdf?auth66=1405449251_9b59954d64eefdf63ad4878c6c347b7c&ext=.pdf// Laura T

The use of ice-breakers can affect ice habitats and also create considerable noise, as can air traffic noise that may occur during transport of logistics supplies to the offshore installations and can frighten animals, **causing displacement and disrupting feeding schedules. Large increases in ocean vessel traffic to support hydrocarbon development will raise the number of bird and animal strikes and disturb wildlife** (Wolf 2007). **Fish and marine mammals both are affected by noise, the effects of which can extend tens of kilometres from the source**, particularly by sounds generated from seismic exploration (NRC 2003). **For instance, in the Alaskan Beaufort Sea, bowhead whales have been observed to change swimming direction in response to noise sources up to 30 kilometres away**. Whale hunters in northern Alaska report that they must travel farther offshore to find whales, a change attributed to the displacement of whales from near-shore areas by industrial noise (AMAP 2007). **Species such as whales, walruses, and seals are sensitive to** man-made sounds and research shows they move away from **industrial noises** (AMAP 2007), even though such avoidance behaviour is often temporary. **Further, since marine mammals rely on hearing to locate prey, seismic activities could drive animals away from important feeding sites** Hydrocarbon-related transportation and other activities create pressures for improving infrastructure, which may cause fragmentation of both maritime and terrestrial habitats. **Many animals have dense seasonal aggregations on breeding grounds, along migratory pathways, or along the ice edges and in open water polynyas in the sea ice, making them temporarily vulnerable to even localised incidents. Rigs, drill ships, and offshore pipelines also tend to impair migration routes. Even without pollution or accidents, oil and gas activities can reduce the wilderness character of a region.**

AT: Environment

Increased Coast Guard presence can't solve the environment – empirics go negative

Smith '14 – writer for Alaskan Media(Matthew, “Coast Guard Says Its Increased Arctic Presence Will Have ‘No Significant’ Environmental Impact” May 7th, <http://www.alaskapublic.org/2014/05/07/coast-guard-says-its-increased-arctic-presence-will-have-no-significant-environmental-impact/>)

The U.S. Coast Guard has operated in the Arctic for more than a century, but as the maritime agency plans for an increased presence in the region, its taking stock of what its environmental impact will be in the Arctic in the years to come.

Mike Dombkowski is on the team drafting the Coast Guard's new environmental assessment for Alaska's District 17, which was released Tuesday. The document looks at what increased training and patrols in the Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort Seas will mean for arctic ecosystems.

“What you might call day-to-day Coast Guard operations, doing patrols, search and rescue, aides to navigation, the other types of missions that we perform, here's what we see ourselves doing and here's what we think the environmental impact of those things are.”

The **assessment looks at the Coast Guard's plans for a broader arctic presence from mid-March through mid-November. Beyond summer training exercises in the Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort Seas—exercises the service has already conducted for several years running—the increased arctic operations call for establishing safety zones around vessels exploring for oil, enforcing laws protecting endangered species and marine mammals, and “poaching prevention” of fish stocks and mineral deposits. The plan also calls for routine patrols of arctic waters with the nation's two active icebreakers.**

The **assessment claims the impact will be minimal, and finds an increased** **Coast Guard presence will have “no significant adverse impacts” on water quality, arctic biology, cultural resources, and public safety.**

It's supported by a companion document, a biological evaluation endorsed by the National Marine Fisheries Service and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, that affirms the Coast Guard's increased arctic presence is “not likely to adversely affect” protected bird, fish, and marine mammal species.

Even if their arctic commitments increase, the bigger question for the Coast Guard may be one of resources.

Andrew Hartsig directs the arctic program at the Ocean Conservancy, a non-profit oceans advocacy group in Anchorage. He says **an increased Coast Guard presence above the Arctic Circle is, on the whole, a good thing, but he questioned if the agency has what it needs to carry out its goals.**

“The limiting factor is clearly funding, and until the Coast Guard gets more funding, specifically to engage in arctic work, they are going to be resource-limited in terms of the personnel and the assets they can bring to bear.”

Despite continued calls from residents and organizations in the arctic for plans and preparation for maritime disasters like an oil spill in arctic waters, Dombkowski said those are all questions for a different assessment to tackle.

“Oil spill response is such a huge, big enough thing that it really deserves its own document,” he said, “and that document and supporting stuff is being done right now.”

For now, the Coast Guard plans to tour its new environmental assessment statewide, with plans to visit Anchorage, Kotzebue, Nome, and Barrow next week for public meetings.

A delegation from the agency will be in Nome Monday, May 12 at the Northwest campus, delivering at the campus conference room from 3 p.m. to 7 p.m.

EXT: Too Long

8 years minimum before the aff does anything

Fairbanks Daily News-Miner 14 ("The race for the arctic oceans: Alaska can't afford delays in evolving shipping lanes off its north coast," 5/21,

http://www.newsminer.com/opinion/editorials/the-race-for-the-arctic-oceans-alaska-can-t-afford/article_e53cd404-e0c1-11e3-b6fb-001a4bcf6878.html)/DH

Even if new icebreakers were funded tomorrow, the timetable for their construction is about eight years, roughly the same as construction of a deepwater port would take if permitting, design and construction proceeded efficiently. **America is well behind in a race that so far it has given little indication it knows it's even running.** With the U.S. slated to take a leadership role as chair of the Arctic Council next year, Alaska — and the rest of the country — can't afford to waste any more time.

Takes at least 10 years to solve

O'Rourke 14 – Specialist in Naval Affairs

(Ronald, June 5, 2014, Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf>, JZG)

New Replacement Ships **The Coast Guard estimated** in February 2008 **that new replacement ships for the Polar Star and Polar Sea might cost between \$800 million** and \$925 million **per ship** in 2008 dollars to procure.³⁴ The **Coast Guard said that this estimate is based on a ship with integrated electric drive, three propellers, and a combined diesel and gas (electric) propulsion plant.** The icebreaking capability would be equivalent to the POLAR Class Icebreakers [i.e., Polar Star and Polar Sea] and research facilities and accommodations equivalent to HEALY. This cost includes all shipyard and government project costs. **Total time to procure a new icebreaker** [including mission analysis, studies, design, contract award, and construction] **is eight to ten years.**³⁵ The Coast Guard further stated that **this** notional **new ship would be designed for a 30-year service life.**

Arctic War

1nc FL

The Coast Guard's non-military status means it couldn't stop conflict

Holmes, 13 – professor of strategy at the Naval War College (James, “America Needs a Coast Guard That Can Fight” Foreign Policy, 3/15,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/15/america_needs_a_coast_guard_that_can_fight)/D
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So how's that going to work? **Polar ventures may require the Coast Guard to square off against a serious military competitor**, not just against lawbreakers and the elements. **But pummeling enemy fleets, projecting power onto foreign shores, warding off ballistic missiles -- business as usual for the Navy/Marine Corps team -- are pursuits remote from the Coast Guard's everyday duties**. It may even behoove the service to restore antisubmarine and surface-warfare capabilities dismantled at the Cold War's end. The Coast Guard fleet need not be a U.S. Navy in miniature, built to rule the waves. But **the long arm of U.S. strategy needs battle capacity -- not just the light gunnery that now festoons American cutters**.

Another task will be to remake the Coast Guard's organizational culture, rediscovering the half-forgotten tradition of fighting for control of the sea. Command of the sea means wresting control from rival fleets or deterring them through overwhelming firepower. Police duty is something nations do after winning command. **Constabulary work like the Coast Guard's thus differs sharply from combat**. Battle demands a different mindset from scouring the sea for drug or weapons traffickers, or from rescuing seafarers in distress following a nor'easter. **For the Coast Guard, spearheading Arctic strategy means relearning combat skills** last practiced during World War II, while retaining the service's unique capabilities.

As the Royal Navy's Fleet Admiral Andrew Browne Cunningham put it 70 years ago, "It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition." **The material challenges -- designing ships and armaments, wringing funding out of lawmakers -- are the easiest. Revising habits of mind among the officer and enlisted corps is central to keeping the service's culture in tune with shifting realities**.

It won't be easy: For the Coast Guard, high-end combat has been an afterthought for decades. The service was subsumed within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2003. Before that it was part of the Department of Transportation, not a natural bureaucratic home for a fighting service. By contrast, the Defense Department has been the Navy's master since 1947, when the National Security Act placed all of the armed services under the jurisdiction of the secretary of defense. These are different cultures despite their common seagoing heritage and missions.

No arctic war –

Trends skew toward cooperation

Ruby '12 - John Gardner Fellow at the U.S. Department of State in the Office of Global Change working on adaptation measures to climate change (Byron, "Conflict or Cooperation? Arctic Geopolitics and Climate Change", Berkeley Undergraduate Journal, 25(1), Peer Reviewed) //J.N.E

This research sought to test the claims made by Borgerson and other realists who speculated a nascent Arctic resource race would erupt into outright conflict. The results of this research suggest that, instead, a clear trend of cooperation has begun to emerge. In only two of the quantitative simulations were the chances for militarized conflict above 10%, and one of those disputes—Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea—has been more or less resolved at the time of this writing, while the other dispute—the U.S. and Canada over the Northwest Passage—is situated within one of the strongest interstate dyads. Moreover, the dyadic analysis suggests that all of the dyads are relatively strong, especially with respect to open trade, levels of democracy, and normalized relations. It should be noted that at no point did any of these countries retract or withdraw diplomatic envoys—a sign of a severe or catastrophic breakdown in diplomacy—during the course of any of the studied territorial disputes. However, this research does reveal a slightly less reassuring trend regarding Canada and, to a lesser extent, Russia. Not only is Canada embroiled in three of the four current Arctic disputes, but it is also part of two of the weakest dyads identified in the dyadic analysis. Indeed, it appears that, when compared to the other Arctic nations, it is the most aggressive nation-state, even more so than the oft-distrusted Russian bear (whose most portentous indicator of conflict—the nearly 20% chance of armed conflict with Norway—has been muted by a recent treaty formally resolving the dispute). Should policymakers be concerned? Does Canada pose a threat to Arctic security and cooperation? I would conclude from this research that **the answer is no**. First, it is important to note the motives behind Canada's bellicose rhetoric and aggressive diplomacy: domestic linkages stemming from notions of Canadian pride. As both historical examples and polling data have demonstrated, Canadians respond vociferously to encroachments on their northern territories, as they perceive the Arctic to be intrinsic to, and formative, of their national identity (EKOS 2011). This renders their direction of aggression towards a defensive posture, rather than an offensive one. If anything, Canada's rugged and deliberate reinforcing of clear-cut borders and sovereignty in its Arctic territory may serve to further stabilize the region by upholding Westphalian conceptions of interstate interactions, thereby directly answering Borgerson's fears of a semi-anarchic polar region. Second, two of the current territorial disputes in which Canada is engaged are with the United States over a maritime border in the Beaufort Sea and control over the Northwest Passage. Given the strength of the U.S.-Canada dyad, it seems unlikely these disputes will be resolved through anything other than diplomacy. Moreover, as the domestic fervor with regards to Hans Island cools off, and with Norway and Russia already in agreement with their border, it appears that these territorial disputes—which could have at one time served as flashpoints for conflict—are quickly becoming artifacts in their respective countries' diplomatic history. Critics may point out that there are minor discrepancies between the predictive probability scores and the dyads, in that one of the highest probability scores for conflict—e.g. the roughly 15% chance of conflict over the Northwest Passage—is associated with what this research identified to be the strongest dyad (e.g. the U.S. and Canada). Could this, then, suggest a flaw with either the findings or the methodology? Again, my answer is no. Such mild discrepancies are not inconsistent results because they operate at different levels; just because a dispute exists between a portentous dyad does not mean that that particular dispute has the requisite conditions to turn it into an explosive militarized conflict, and vice versa. Moreover, since all of the predicted probability scores are relatively low, and the dyadic analysis came to similar conclusions vis-à-vis the dyads (i.e. that each of the dyads are—by and large—stable in absolute terms), the findings of the two approaches are in fact quite harmonious. It is worth mentioning that this research should be understood as the next step, rather than the final one, in Arctic geopolitical research that seeks either to test claims made in the literature by other scholars or to make future projections on the course of Arctic geopolitics. As noted earlier in the methodology section, notable omissions like China have been made in this research, omissions which should be addressed in due time given the growing size and stature of East Asian economies and militaries—not to mention their relatively close geophysical proximity. Enhanced dyadic analysis of East Asian countries with respect to the Arctic states may prove invaluable, as the question shifts from the possibility of internal conflict among Arctic states to external conflict with outsiders. On a final note, I wish to situate this research in relation to the broad based literature on environmental-related conflicts. While the individual causes for particular conflicts in the Arctic could be myriad, the heart of this research—in terms of both

why it is important and why the question of conflict has arisen in the first place—relates to the exogenous shock of climate change entering into the biophysical and geopolitical realm of the Arctic. In this respect, then, this research speaks to the issue of environment-driven conflict. While several theorists have argued that the presence of environmental goods and natural resources cause conflict, insofar as it provides the impetus and financial rationale to engage in costly acts of war, the case of the Arctic as it is so far—and how it is projected—suggests that one must qualify the “honey-pot” hypothesis that views resources as a curse rather than a blessing (see de Soysa 2002). Policymakers have demonstrated that they share the same anxieties towards the prospect of a new abundance of resources opening up in the Arctic in places like the Barents Sea, Beaufort Sea, and elsewhere. Indeed, as mentioned earlier in this paper, the Arctic states have essentially come to the table with steel fists hidden in velvet gloves. And yet, despite the media hype of the Russian flag stunt or the intrusion of U.S. naval vessels in alleged Canadian waters, the gloves have stayed on—cooperation, not conflict, has been the predominant modus operandi in Arctic geopolitics. And, with any luck, it will remain that way in the coming decades.

Cooperation solves Arctic war in the short term - **conflict is only inevitable in the world of US-Arctic hard power**

Misje '12 – Geography Department, Fullerton (“RUSSIAN HEGEMONY IN THE ARCTIC SPACE? CONTESTING THE POPULAR GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSES”, April 16th, Thesis Presented to the Faculty of California State University, Fullerton) //J.N.E

Russian Hegemony in the Arctic Space?

In the near future, **will Russia become the hegemonic power in the Arctic space?** Based on the examination of the UNCLOS articles, four arguments can be made that answer this question: (1) the analysis in Chapter Five supports the view that the cyclical power struggle perpetuated by the Arctic states will prolong the advancement of Russian power; (2) an assessment of the articles reveals how the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf can also delay the rise of Russian power by continually asking that Russia submit additional scientific evidence to prove that the seabed is in fact part of the Russian continental shelf; (3) the UNCLOS provides the Arctic states with enough muscle to reduce and slow the advancement of Russian power, but they cannot completely stop Russia from gaining some economic and political influence in the region; (4) all of the Arctic states have the opportunity to extend their sovereign rights into the claimable zone and this subsequently increases their individual power in the region. However, Russia's claimable zone would be considerably greater with potentially vaster amounts of resources at the Kremlin's fingertips. Thus, it can be concluded that in the near future Russia will maintain its geopolitical clout in the Arctic, but not to the extent that it would be considered the hegemonic power in the region. Nevertheless, this maintains the idea that Russia is a distinct dominant power in the Arctic state triad.

The Potential for Hard Power?

Russia's position in the Arctic system could still change if or when the United States ratifies the UNCLOS. If the United States were to ratify the treaty, in ten years it could submit claims that conflict with Russia's submission. If this were to occur, the United States could potentially be the biggest obstacle to Russian power. What then would Russia do if the United States deliberately created an Arctic stalemate to block Russia from gaining sovereign rights? Here is where hard power could come into play.

The possibility of Borgerson's "armed mad dash for the Arctic's resources" cannot be disregarded (Borgerson 2008, 72). But, the Arctic states have shown that they are willing to invest a considerable amount of time in settling disputes through the UNCLOS. The US is equally capable of approaching the settlement of Arctic disputes within the same soft power mechanism. If the United States were desperate to access resources 93 beyond their EEZ, why would they not seek to quickly settle disputes with Russia in order to initiate development of such resources?

Some may argue that the United States will simply disregard the UNCLOS if the country is in urgent need of Arctic resources. This would then destabilize the very foundations of Arctic cooperation which has been established through international maritime law. However, the United States is undoubtedly aware that energy companies will want to feel reasonably sure of the legal status and jurisdictional boundaries of Arctic waters before they seek to invest. If access to and extraction of natural resources are the basis for Arctic claims, then the US will attempt to gain sovereign rights in a manner that maximizes investments. Therefore there is no real threat of hard power in the foreseeable future of the Arctic. The coastal states will independently ensure that territorial claims are recognized by both the CLCS and the other coastal states in order to access untapped resources. The likelihood of a militarized Arctic with physical clashes is minor; this scenario would only be conceivable if and when the world's oil and gas supplies diminish. This is an extreme situation because governments, as well as oil and gas companies are regularly investing in alternative energy sources to maintain a profit. Therefore, the odds of the abovementioned scenario are minimal.

Both countries are decreasing military presence and working to cooperate

Bailes 12-16-13 -- Visiting Professor at the University of Iceland (Alyson, "Arctic: new conflict theatre between Russia and the West, or model of peace?," The European Leadership Network, http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/arctic-new-conflict-theatre-between-russia-and-the-west-or-model-of-peace_1099.html)BC

First, all Arctic states except Russia are cutting military expenditure generally and their Arctic plans are modest, involving mainly higher-tech replacements for old assets and a small growth in numbers. Russia's plans in the Arctic are not more grandiose than elsewhere and actual construction has made a slow start. New bases like Denmark's in East Greenland, and Russia's being built in the New Siberian Islands (far to the East), are designed mainly to get closer to the High Northern seas for purposes of patrolling and policing, climate monitoring, and response to accidents. A study in 2012 by the respected pro-peace institute SIPRI concluded: "Conventional military forces specially adapted to the harsh Arctic environment are projected to remain small scale, especially given the size of the Arctic region, and will remain in some cases considerably below cold war levels."^[i] One must also remember that Russia and the West remain in a state of uneasy strategic balance overall, despite all the progress made since the Cold War. Russia's northern coast is now its only real major 'break-out' area, and its forces there are also supposed to offset US and Western power in general. But recalling this also highlights something many analysts miss. The nuclear and naval stand-off between the USA and the Soviet Union or Russia has always taken place over the North Pole. Albeit by a deadly and costly logic, it has kept the peace since the 1950s. Why should either side think they could use military force against the other, in this very area, without the terrible dangers of escalation? Can one really imagine Russia fighting any of the other countries around the Arctic, all full NATO members,

without fear of NATO retaliation? So long as Moscow's own Arctic assets are secure and the key sea route firmly under its grip, why would it take that risk here more than anywhere else? Arguably, in fact, the Arctic interaction of Russia and the West is less tense, less subject to out-of-control incidents, than anywhere else their strategic peripheries touch. Since Cold-War times both sides have cooperated on Arctic exploration and environmental management. Since 1996 the Arctic Council has formalized and extended this cooperation, inter alia reaching two legally binding agreements (among the five Nordics, Russia, USA and Canada) on cooperation in Search and Rescue, and major oil-spill response, respectively. Under these agreements all sides have pledged to use their naval and air assets and other security expertise to help each other when something goes wrong. Add the way that Russia has opened up for Western investment in its own Arctic resource exploitation, and there seems rather less to worry about here than in the Caucasus or even the Eastern Baltic. Of course, governments are not the only potential conflict players, as seen in the recent clash between the Russian authorities and Greenpeace. But that example also suggested how high the odds are against other states getting drawn in by a non-state incident in this region. The Arctic does not have 'weak states' or civil conflicts, and the most violent non-state actors likely to surface there - smugglers and opportunistic terrorists - would be the enemies of all. The real threats of a changing Arctic are the non-military ones of violent nature, accidents, infrastructure failure, pollution, business miscalculations, destabilizing migration, other social disruption and new disease - all things that states can profit most from tackling together. And if some commentators are still worried about a random military clash, why are they not deluging us with proposals for arms control and confidence-building measures to help avert it? Interestingly, the only considered and specific ideas of that kind so far have come from a Russian think-tank...[ii]

Discourse is purely political – militarization is to protect economic-interests and sovereignty, not superpower confrontation

Valdai '13 - leading Russian and international experts in the history, politics, economics and international relations, laureates of the Valdai Club Foundation Grant Program (this article was written by a research group funded by Valdai) ("New Russian Arctic Doctrine: From Idealism to Realism?" July 7th, http://valdaiclub.com/russia_and_the_world/60220.html) //J.N.E

However, **Russia's "readiness for war" is an essential part of the political discourse**. On February 27, 2013 (a week after the adoption of Strategy-2013) Vladimir Putin, while giving a speech on a summary meeting of the Defense Ministry Board, put the situation in the Arctic region on a par with some of the "classic" threats to Russia's national security. He said: "... methodical efforts to undermine the strategic balance are being made. **The second phase of a global missile defense system by the United States has de facto been launched; the possibilities for the further expansion of NATO to the East are being explored; and there is a danger of the militarization of the Arctic**" (A summary meeting of the Defense Ministry Board, <http://www.kremlin.ru/news/17588>).

From time to time, such statements are made by the political and military elite of the Arctic countries, thus becoming arguments in favor of a military build-up in the Arctic. This trend has found its way into both the Arctic Strategy of 2008 and Strategy-2013. One of the declared objectives is an effort "to avoid military pressure and aggression against Russia and its allies, to ensure the sovereign rights of Russia's Arctic zone and its ability to implement without hindrance all of its activities in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf "(Article 18-b of the Strategy-2013).

However, it should be noted that, **in contrast with the Cold war era, the aim of the current military efforts being made by the Arctic countries is the protection of their economic interests and**

establishment of their national sovereignty over the maritime zones and trade routes rather than global confrontation between two superpowers or military blocs.

Thus, the question naturally arises “Why has this important document, as far as national security is concerned, attracted so little attention in the media”. The document’s analyses, as well as the prospects for the implementation of the ideas contained within it, will help to answer this question.

US-Russia war is fundamentally impossible

Peck ’14 – writer for forbes (Michael, “7 Reasons Why America Will Never Go To War Over Ukraine”, March 5th, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/2014/03/05/7-reasons-why-america-will-never-go-to-war-over-ukraine/>) //J.N.E

America is the mightiest military power in the world. And that fact means absolutely nothing for the Ukraine crisis. Regardless of whether Russia continues to occupy the Crimea region of Ukraine, or decides to occupy all of Ukraine, **the U.S. is not going to get into a shooting war with Russia.** This has nothing to do with whether Obama is strong or weak. Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan would face the same constraints. **The U.S. may threaten to impose economic sanctions, but here is why America will never smack Russia with a big stick: Russia is a nuclear superpower.** Russia has an estimated 4,500 active nuclear warheads, according to the Federation of American Scientists. Unlike North Korea or perhaps Iran, whose nuclear arsenals couldn’t inflict substantial damage, **Russia could totally devastate the U.S. as well as the rest of the planet.** U.S. missile defenses, assuming they even work, are not designed to stop a massive Russian strike. For the 46 years of **the Cold War, America and Russia were deadly rivals. But they never fought.** Their proxies fought: Koreans, Vietnamese, Central Americans, Israelis and Arabs. The one time that U.S. and Soviet forces almost went to war was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Neither Obama nor Putin is crazy enough to want to repeat that. U.S. Marine Corps vehicle during amphibious assault exercise. U.S. Marine Corps vehicle during amphibious assault exercise. **Russia has a powerful army.** While the Russian military is a shadow of its Soviet glory days, **it is still a formidable force.** The Russian army has about 300,000 men and 2,500 tanks (with another 18,000 tanks in storage), according to the “Military Balance 2014” from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Its air force has almost 1,400 aircraft, and its navy 171 ships, including 25 in the Black Sea Fleet off Ukraine’s coast. U.S. forces are more capable than Russian forces, which did not perform impressively during the 2008 Russo-Georgia War. American troops would enjoy better training, communications, drones, sensors and possibly better weapons (though the latest Russian fighter jets, such as the T-50, could be trouble for U.S. pilots). However, **better is not good enough. The Russian military is not composed of lightly armed insurgents like the Taliban, or a hapless army like the Iraqis in 2003.** With advanced weapons like T-80 tanks, supersonic AT-15 Springer anti-tank missiles, BM-30 Smerch multiple rocket launchers and S-400 Growler anti-aircraft missiles, Russian forces pack enough firepower to inflict significant American losses. Ukraine is closer to Russia. The distance between Kiev and Moscow is 500 miles. The distance between Kiev and New York is 5,000 miles. It’s much easier for Russia to send troops and supplies by land than for the U.S. to send them by sea or air. The U.S. military is tired. After nearly 13 years of war, America’s armed forces need a breather. Equipment is worn out from long service in Iraq and Afghanistan, personnel are worn out from repeated deployments overseas,

and there are still about 40,000 troops still fighting in Afghanistan. The U.S. doesn't have many troops to send. The U.S. could easily dispatch air power to Ukraine if its NATO allies allow use of their airbases, and the aircraft carrier George H. W. Bush and its hundred aircraft are patrolling the Mediterranean. But for a ground war to liberate Crimea or defend Ukraine, there is just the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy, the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit sailing off Spain, the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment in Germany and the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. While the paratroopers could drop into the combat zone, the Marines would have sail past Russian defenses in the Black Sea, and the Stryker brigade would probably have to travel overland through Poland into Ukraine. Otherwise, bringing in mechanized combat brigades from the U.S. would be logistically difficult, and more important, could take months to organize. **The American people are tired.** **Pity the poor politician who tries to sell the**

American public on yet another war, especially some complex conflict in a distant Eastern Europe nation. Neville Chamberlain's words during the 1938 Czechoslovakia crisis come to mind: "How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing." **America's allies are tired.**

NATO sent troops to support the American campaign in Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. **Britain sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and has little to show for it.** **It is almost inconceivable to imagine the Western European public marching in the streets to demand the liberation of Crimea, especially considering the region's sputtering economy, which might be snuffed out should Russia stop exporting natural gas.** As for military capabilities, the **Europeans couldn't evict Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi without American help.** **And Germans fighting Russians again?**

AT: Antarctic Treaty

The treaty doesn't address territory claims—territorial claims are inevitable

Yin 6-19-12 (Wenquin Yin, Chinese Journal of International Law, Moratorium in International Law, June 29th, 2012, <http://chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/04/18/chinesejil.jms032.full>)

The intent and purpose of the moratorium on performance or furtherance of conflicting claims are not to make any judgment on the claims, or to settle dispute resulting from the conflicting claims, but to freeze, shelve or set aside dispute and postpone the final settlement of dispute. The Antarctic Treaty is a case in point. According to Article IV(1) of the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty will have neither positive nor negative effects on the asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica as well as on positions of any contracting party as regards its recognition or non-recognition of such asserted rights or claims. Under Article IV(2), the status quo relating to claims is frozen, "acts or activities taking place" while the Treaty is in force have nothing to do with claims, and no new claims and enlargement of existing claims are permissible. In negotiating the Antarctic Treaty, "claimants do not generally favour any solutions that involve a renunciation of their claims",³³ and at the same time, they had no idea of settling their respective claims. In achieving the fundamental objectives of the peaceful uses of the continent and the promotion of scientific research and co-operation, negotiating parties tended to "sidestep particularly contentious issues relating to territorial jurisdiction."³⁴ As it stands today, the Antarctic Treaty successfully suspends disputes of claims and counterclaims on Antarctica. The Antarctic Treaty has been generally considered a precedent for co-existence, and provided the framework for international activities and a basis for stability in Antarctica.³⁵ "The key to reaching this desirable result was Article IV in the Antarctic Treaty."³⁶ However, the territory claims are far from dead. The seven claimants have maintained their positions.³⁷ For example, the United Kingdom, as a claimant, claimed that "appurtenant to Antarctica there exist areas of continental shelf the extent of which has yet to be defined", and reserved the right to submit information to the Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf thereof, when it submitted information relating to the continental shelf of Ascension Island on 9 May 2008.³⁸ Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty "just postpones the question of settlement of territorial sovereignty but does not exclude in principle the application of the concept of territorial sovereignty in Antarctica."³⁹ In case the Antarctic Treaty system collapses, the issue of territorial claim disputes will definitely arise again.

ATS strong now—cooperation over NZ proposals

FW 9/6 [Fuseworks Media News, New Zealand, "NZ seeks to protect Antarctica's Ross Sea region", <http://www.voxy.co.nz/politics/nz-seeks-protect-antarcticas-ross-sea-region/5/133999>, 2012]

The New Zealand proposal protects ecologically important features and habitats, including winter ice free areas (known as polynyas), the entire Victoria Coast from McMurdo Sound to Cape Adare, the Balleny Islands, and almost the entire Ross Sea continental shelf. Mr McCully says New Zealand discussed the feasibility of a joint proposal with the United States, but each country will offer a separate proposal for CCAMLR's consideration. "New Zealand and the United States have a close relationship in the Antarctic Treaty System. The proposals that we are putting forward share many common features, and I have made a commitment to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that we will continue to work closely with the United States to achieve optimal outcomes from the CCAMLR process." To achieve a protected area, every CCAMLR member country must agree. "The Ross Sea region is among the most pristine natural regions in the world and of tremendous conservation and scientific value to current and future generations," Mr McCully says. In designing New Zealand's MPA proposal, the government listened to the views of domestic stakeholders, including environmental NGOs, the fishing industry, members of the science community, and also to other CCAMLR members.

Treaty fails – no one abides by its regulations

Voxy 9-18 (Ross Sea needs to be policed to stop illegal fishing – expert, 2012, <http://www.voxy.co.nz/national/ross-sea-needs-be-policed-stop-illegal-fishing-expert/5/135122>)

Antarctic Treaty countries need to stop illegal and unregulated fishing in the Ross Sea, University of Canterbury expert, Professor Bryan Storey said today. He was reacting to comments by a Philippa Ross, a descendent of the man who discovered the Ross Sea. She said **the New Zealand Government was destroying her legacy by failing to protect one of the last intact marine ecosystems in the world.** British naval officer and polar explorer Sir James Clarke Ross discovered the sea in 1841. But Ross's great-great-great-granddaughter Philippa Ross said today **the Ross Sea environment was being threatened by government policies.** Earlier this month **the Government rejected a proposal from the United States for a marine reserve that would have offered greater protection than New Zealand wanted for the Antarctic toothfish in the Ross Sea. New Zealand companies take a large proportion of the annual Ross Sea toothfish catch** - last year they landed 730 tonnes with an export value of \$20 million.

AT: South China Sea

Arctic treaties fail to address trade, sovereignty, and environmental issues - means no SCS solvency

Kao 14 – Shih-Ming, Post-doctoral Fellow at The Center for Marine Policy Studies, National Sun Yat-sen Univ., Kaohsiung, Taiwan – dissertation at University of Delaware , “Regional Cooperation in the Mediterranean and the Caribbean Seas: Lessons Learned and Possible Alternatives to the South China Sea Disputes” proquest // JV

In addition, the Arctic Council has no authority to adopt legally-binding resolutions for shipping in the region. This competency rests primarily with IMO. **It also does not address fishing, a serious threat to marine environment and biodiversity; and it has neither compliance nor enforcement mechanisms.**⁶⁷⁴ Furthermore, **the Arctic Council has no mandate to address sovereignty issues related to the extended continental shelf claims** recently raised for the oil and gas reserves underlying the region. **These restrictions make the Arctic Council a relatively toothless forum for the discussion of select policy issues,** a **mechanism lacking authority to make decisions, and likewise lacking the resources** needed to initiate and carry out projects of its own.⁶⁷⁵ **Therefore, the question of whether the Arctic Council is sufficient to address the huge pressures being raised by climate change is worthy of consideration.**

AT: Cooperation

LOST is a huge alt cause to ocean cooperation

Patrick 14 – senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (Stewart, “The Unruled World,” Council on Foreign Relations Foreign Affairs Article, [http://www.cfr.org/global-governance/unruled-world/p32502\)BC](http://www.cfr.org/global-governance/unruled-world/p32502)BC)

The single most important step the United States could take to strengthen ocean governance, including in the Arctic, would be to finally accede to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, as recommended by the last four U.S. presidents, U.S. military leaders, industry, and environmental groups. Beyond defining states' rights and responsibilities in territorial seas and exclusive economic zones and clarifying the rules for transit through international straits, **UNCLOS provides a forum for dispute resolution on ocean-related issues, including claims to extended continental shelves. As a nonmember, the United States forfeits its chance to participate in the last great partitioning of sovereign space on earth, which would grant it jurisdiction over vast areas along its Arctic, Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts.** Nor can it serve on the International Seabed Authority, where it would enjoy a permanent seat with an effective veto. **By remaining apart, the United States not only undercuts its national interests but also undermines its perceived commitment to a rule-based international order and emboldens revisionist regional powers. Both China in East Asia and Russia in the Arctic have taken advantage of the United States' absence to advance outrageous sovereignty claims.**

AT: Resources

No resource grab – too difficult to extract

Mayer 12/12/13—CBC News writer (Andre, "Race to claim High Arctic's oil resources may be a fool's mission", CBC News, www.cbc.ca/news/canada/race-to-claim-high-arctic-s-oil-resources-may-be-a-fool-s-mission-1.2461910)//emchen

When asked earlier this week about extending Canada's territorial claims in the Arctic, Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird was clear about the rationale.

"We are determined to ensure that all Canadians benefit from the tremendous resources that are to be found in Canada's Far North," he said.

But while the federal government is eager to establish its claims to the polar seabed, some Arctic experts believe that Ottawa is putting too much stock in trying to reap the potential riches of such **a harsh domain.**

"The central Arctic Ocean is exceedingly **remote**, thousands of kilometres from any port, from any community, it is subject to extremely **hostile weather**, complete **darkness for** several **months** each winter.

"I could go on. But it is probably the most expensive place in the entire world to drill for oil," says Michael Byers, author of *Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North*.

Because of all those hurdles, Byers adds, the economic argument for staking Arctic claims "is not a real argument."

Byers is by no means alone in this view, though it is not universal. Other prominent Arctic researchers, such as Rob Huebert at the University of Calgary, say that while we don't have the technology today to extract much energy from the High Arctic, who knows what will be the case a few decades from now.

And it is that longer term view that seems to be propelling Canada in its newly stated intention to lay claim to the North Pole — also being sought by Russia and Denmark — by making a submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.

Baird also said that Canada is delaying a larger bid for seabed rights in order to collect more data to strengthen this territorial claim.

More than Santa Claus

While the North Pole has an emotional resonance for many Canadians, the UN submission is "not about Santa Claus," says Shelagh Grant, author of *The Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America*.

"It's not the North Pole that's important," she says. "It's the area around it."

Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird has said that the Canadian government is "determined to ensure that all Canadians benefit from the tremendous resources that are to be found in Canada's Far North."
(Adrian Wyld/Canadian Press)

The area she is referring to is the Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater structure of continental crust that spans about 1,800 kilometres across the Arctic Ocean from Russia's New Siberian Islands to Canada's Ellesmere Island.

Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, a country has special rights to the resources that lie on the sea floor within 200 nautical miles of its coast. UNCLOS also says a country can secure control beyond the 200-mile limit if it can demonstrate the seabed is an extension of its continental shelf.

Russia claims the Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of the Asian continental shelf, while Canada claims it's an extension of the North American one.

What makes the Lomonosov Ridge so desirable is that it's relatively shallow, says Grant.

"The ability to mine something on a ridge that's shallower would be more feasible, probably, than some of the depths around there," she says.

Exaggerated treasure chest?

The Arctic is believed to contain as much as one-quarter of the world's undiscovered energy resources. It is thought to include not only oil and gas, but significant deposits of gold, diamond and tin, as well as other minerals.

The reason Canada and the other circumpolar countries — Russia, Denmark, Norway and the U.S. — are submitting scientific data to the UN commission is to win rights to these Arctic sea floor assets.

But there is a significant contingent of researchers who believe **the quest for resources is too optimistic.**

"Everybody's looking down the road, but I think there are some sober second thoughts about how much we're going to be able to extract from the Arctic," says Grant.

In an essay entitled "The Questionable Arctic Bonanza," Kathrin Keil of the Arctic Institute in Washington, D.C., laments "the never-ending glut of stories about the Arctic 'treasure chamber.'"

In her view, "the picture of an Arctic as 'prime real estate' of global significance is exaggerated."

Citing evidence from the U.S. Geological Survey, Keil writes that the biggest known oil deposit in the Arctic is thought to contain between 1.3 and 6.6 billion barrels, which is significantly smaller than the Prudhoe Bay oil field off Alaska.

She also notes that **due to delays, inadequate equipment and bad weather**, Shell had to stop offshore exploration and drilling in the Chukchi Sea in 2013.

All of it points to the fact that the Arctic Ocean is an extremely inhospitable place to extract anything, says Byers, who is also a Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia and ran for the federal NDP in 2008.

"If we're talking about the Beaufort Sea or we're talking about the Barents Sea, in terms of oil and gas, then we're having a serious conversation," he says. But resource extraction in the central Arctic Ocean is fraught with "logistical challenges."

'Tremendous breakthroughs'

Those challenges aside, Rob Huebert, an associate professor at the University of Calgary, questions the prognostications of those who believe that the Arctic's resource bounty will prove to be more trouble than it's worth.

"My response to those people," he says, "is 'Boy, can I invest in your crystal ball?'"

"To those people I would say, you may be right, but there are all sorts of tremendous breakthroughs that occur."

Huebert acknowledges that "we have no economic means of actually being able to exploit [Arctic resources] in the current state of technology and world prices."

But he says there have been a number of recent technological innovations that have allowed us to extract fossil fuel deposits that would have once been thought unattainable.

He cites hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, which has been used to access massive shale oil and gas reserves in certain U.S. states in particular.

"I mean, who would have thought that North Dakota would emerge as the largest energy-producing state in the U.S., and that by 2020 the country would be energy self-sufficient?" he asks.

For his part, however, Byers says that the sheer length of **time needed** to get any resources out of the Arctic seabed **makes it a long shot.**

Settling the claim on the Lomonozov Ridge, for example, could take several decades alone.

Then factor in the time needed for exploration and development, and it could take many decades before any company can pull fossil fuels from the Arctic floor, he says. "And who knows if we'll still be using oil and gas in a hundred years' time."

No resource tensions

Mahony 3/13 – Citing expert studies by Arctic Researches (Honor, "Fears of Arctic conflict are 'overblown,' March 19, 2013, <http://euobserver.com/foreign/119479>) zabd

The Arctic has become a new frontier in international relations, but fear of potential **conflict** in the resource-rich region **is overblown**, say experts. For long **a mystery because of its general impenetrability, melting ice caps are revealing more** and more of the Arctic region to scientists, researchers and industry. Climate change experts can take a more precise look at what global warming is doing to the planet, shipping trade routes once considered unthinkable are now possible, and **governments and businesses are in thrall to the potential exploitation of coal, iron, rare earths and oil**. The interest is reflected in the growing list of those wanting to have a foot in the Arctic council, a forum of eight countries with territory in the polar region. While the US, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Russia and Canada form the council, the EU commission, China, India, South Korea and Japan have all expressed an interest in having a permanent observer status. "The Arctic has become a new meeting place for America, Europe and the Asia Pacific," says Damien Degeorges, founder of the Arctic Policy and Economic Forum. During a recent conference on Arctic shipping routes in the European Parliament, Degeorges noted that "China has been the most active by far in the last years." He points to its red-carpet treatment of politicians from Greenland, a territory that recently got full control over its wealth of natural resources. Beijing also cosied up to

Iceland after the island's financial meltdown. The two undertook a joint expedition to the North Pole and the Chinese have the largest foreign embassy in Reykjavik. Meanwhile, South Korea's president visited Greenland last year and shipping hubs like Singapore are holding Arctic conferences. **The interest is being spurred by melting icebergs.** Last year saw a record low of multi-year ice - permanent ice - in the polar sea. **This means greater shipping and mineral exploitation potential.** There were 37 transits of the North East Passage (NEP), running from the Atlantic to the Pacific along the top of Russia, in 2011. This rose to 47 in 2012. For a ship travelling from the Netherlands to China, the route around 40 percent shorter than using the traditional Suez Canal. A huge saving for China, where 50 percent of its GDP is connected to shipping. Russia is also keen to exploit the route as the rise in temperatures is melting the permafrost in its northern territory, playing havoc with its roads and railways. According to Jan Fritz Hansen, deputy director of the Danish shipowners' association, the real breakthrough will come when there is a cross polar route. At the moment there are two options - the North East Passage for which Russia asks high fees for transiting ships - or the much-less developed North West Passage along Canada. His chief concern is that "trade up there is free. We don't want protectionism. Everyone should be allowed to compete up there." And he believes the biggest story of the Arctic is not how it is traversed but what will be taken out of it. According to the US Geological Survey (2009), the Arctic holds 13 percent of undiscovered oil and 30 percent of undiscovered gas supplies. **Greenland is already at the centre of political tussle between the EU and China over future exploitation of its rare earths** - used in a range of technologies such as hybrid cars or smart phones. "The biggest adventure will be the Arctic destination. There is a lot of valuable goods that should be taken out of nature up there," he said. **This resource potential** - although tempered by the fact that much of it is not economically viable to exploit - **has led to fears that the Arctic region is ripe for conflict. But this is nonsense**, says Nil Wang, a former Danish admiral and Arctic expert. **Most resources have an owner** "There is a general public perception that the Arctic region holds great potential for conflict because it is an ungoverned region where all these resources are waiting to be picked up by the one who gets there first. That is completely false," he said. He notes that **it is an "extremely well-regulated region," with international rules saying that coastal states have territorial jurisdiction up to 12 nautical miles off their coast. On top of that is a further 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic zone "where you own every value in the water and under the seabed."** "Up to **97 percent of energy resources is actually belonging to someone already,**" says Wang.

Even if Russia exploits resources – they'll do it while adhering to multilateral treaties and laws

Keil '13 – Europe Director for the Arctic Institute, Project Scientist at the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS) in Potsdam, Germany, in the Sustainable Interaction with the Atmosphere (SIWA) cluster, PhD at the Berlin Graduate School, Fellow at the NVP-Nansen interdisciplinary PhD and Post-doc Summer School ("The Arctic: A new region of conflict? The case of oil and gas", June 6th, SagePub) //J.N.E

As repeatedly expressed by high-ranking politicians, **Russia is determined to boost its presence in the Arctic to protect its national interest and security, while at the same time the country adheres to principles of international law and cooperation as outlined in the official strategy.** Also, **the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation from 2008 states that '[s]hould our partners be unprepared for joint efforts, Russia, in order to protect its national interests, will have to act unilaterally but always on the basis of international law'** (President of Russia, 2008, own emphasis). **This creates a conflict that Elana Wilson Rowe (2009: 1–2) describes as the tension between the 'open' and the 'closed' North, meaning that Russian 'northern policies often encompass both more outward oriented inclinations, exemplified by cross-border cooperation, as well as a tendency towards increasing securitization of northern issues and northern territory and defence of "national northern interests"'**. This tension becomes most obvious in the oil and gas sector. Russia is confronted here with the challenge of having to balance market and strategic concerns. While the development of petroleum resources on the Russian continental shelf will be difficult or even impossible to realize in the near future without the involvement of foreign expertise and capital, offshore oil and gas are at the same

time defined as strategic natural resources, and thus fall under the evolving legislation and politics on strategic resources, which explicitly limit non-Russian involvement (Moe and Rowe, 2009: 107). For example, investments in certain strategic fields, including the entire offshore sector, is limited to companies with a minimum of 51% Russian ownership, mostly represented by the state-controlled Gazprom and Rosneft (Rowe, 2009: 9). **The generally difficult legal and political situation for foreign investment and business cooperation between foreign and Russian (state) companies contributes to the tension between the 'open' and 'closed' Russian economy.**

The Arctic's inhospitable conditions and obstacles makes any progress in development impossible—despite thawing

Kemp and Boersma, 1/4/12—*fellow and program officer at the Transatlantic Academy **fellow ("The Great White Hype: Is Geopolitical Competition over the Arctic Exaggerated?", The German Marshall Fund of the United States, blog.gmfus.org/2012/01/04/the-great-white-hype-is-geopolitical-competition-over-the-arctic-exaggerated/)/emchen

WASHINGTON—Slowly but surely, climate change is opening up the Arctic. Greenland's glaciers and ice fields are melting, sea ice around the North Pole is decreasing each year, and the huge permafrost areas of Russia and Canada are beginning to thaw. This has led to widespread speculation of a Great Game-style scramble for the region's abundant resources. Many studies, including those by the private sector and the U.S. Geological Survey, confirm that there are vast treasure-troves of oil, gas, and minerals in the Arctic. Yet, with the exception of iron ore in Greenland, these resources have not yet been exploited. In fact, despite rising temperatures, the impediments to extracting and transporting most resources from the Arctic **will remain formidable for the foreseeable future.**

One factor facing developers is that, despite global warming, the **Arctic remains largely inhospitable,** **and there are innumerable obstacles** to cashing in on its riches. Oil rigs require airstrips, roads, electricity generation, and pipelines; mining operations require port facilities and technology to withstand the bitterest winters; and all resource extraction requires a specialized labor force. For the private sector to develop any part of the Arctic, enormous investments of capital and labor would be necessary.

While there is a possibility that the Arctic seaways – running through Canada and along the northern Russian coast – will become open to transportation for most of the year, large container ships are unlikely to use these routes. The Arctic will remain a dangerous trade route for commercial shipping, and neither Canadian nor Russian authorities can offer much in the way of support and rescue facilities in the event of emergencies along their northern borders. The dangers are further evidenced by recent investments in traditional sea routes and facilities, such as the Panama Canal. By contrast, the port of Reykjavik in Iceland, which would be ideally positioned to serve as a future hub for northern sea routes, has seen no such investment.

In the long run, permafrost thawing may prove to be the greatest obstacle to Arctic developers. It has made the construction of roadways and airfields much more difficult, and in some cases has caused extractive projects to be abandoned. This process has already caused enormous problems in Russia, where large cities such as Yakutsk and several large river ports, pipelines, conventional hydro electricity

plants, and even a nuclear power station lie in permafrost areas. Yakutsk in particular has seen severe damage to its infrastructure and the closure of a runway of its airport as a result of the land below melting.

Theres no race in the artic for resources – too expensive and no tech

Ruel 11 – Public Relations and Communications for Canadian Government (Geneviève, “The (Arctic) show must go on: natural resource craze and national identity in Arctic politics”) International Journal. http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?action=interpret&id=GALE%7CA279137180&v=2.1&u=lom_umichanna&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w&authCount=1 //Laura T

In 2000, the Canadian government released a policy paper on the "northern dimension of Canada's foreign policy." Among the objectives pursued by the policy was "to enhance the security and prosperity of Canadians." After stressing the sense of northernness as a central aspect of Canadian identity, the policy asserts that "[Canadian] future security and prosperity are closely linked with our ability to manage complex northern issues." (2)

In July 2009, Chris Nelder asked in Business Insider, "**How much oil is in the Arctic?**" (3) Numbers have been put before investors, politicians, and academics, often accompanied by a waterfall of words referring to a hypothetical yet impressive amount of natural resources lying beneath the seabed. The amount and quality of resources is highly uncertain and the numbers change from year to year. **The amount of natural resources remains hypothetical, although it is enthusiastically propounded in speeches.**

In 2009, a study conducted by the **United States Geological Survey confirmed that the Arctic holds an important natural resource potential. The Arctic is estimated to hold 30 percent of the world's undiscovered natural gas and 13 percent of the world's undiscovered oil.** Geological Survey scientists explain that these estimates were arrived at using a probabilistic geology based methodology. The Arctic continental shelves are assessed as "one of the world's largest remaining prospective areas." The authors of the study insist that undiscovered "natural gas is largely concentrated in Russia" and hence does not fall within a contested region. (4) **Though the numbers are impressive, the authors doubt that a major shift in oil and gas production is likely to occur.** Frederic Lasserre argues that no more than five percent of the natural resources are to be found outside of the exclusive economic zones already under the control of one or another Arctic state. (5) **The recognition of these aspects should reduce the craze about natural resources.**

Apart from oil and gas, the Arctic abounds in other mineral resources, including diamonds, gold, silver, tin, iron ore, zinc, uranium, and nickel. (6) In addition, Canada has now become the world's third-largest producer of diamonds, with mines operating in Nunavut and the Northwest Territories. (7) The government of Canada has highlighted diamonds, oil and gas, and mining and exploration as the three priority economic sectors in northern Canada. (8)

Aside from conflict, many headlines also focus on an alleged race in the north. **If indeed there is a race among Arctic nations, presumably it is not a race for natural resources**. It is rather one of handling climate change and adapting politically, socially, and legally to the physical and political manifestations

of rapid warming. At present, it is a sprint to terminate the mapping of their continental shelves extension, as the United Nations convention on the law of the sea (UNCLOS) imposes a deadline on its parties for the submission of their scientific data and claims. The convention stipulates that states have 10 years following their ratification of the text to submit their claims over the extended seabed to the UN commission on the limits of the continental shelf. It is in effect a race to develop and acquire maritime technology as the north faces the arrival of newcomers. It is not, however, a race with a sole--wealthy--winner at the finish line.

Although mining activities already take place in the Arctic, there is no doubt that the economic activities related to oil and gas production will be very expensive. "To exploit [Arctic oil and gas] will require technologies that don't yet exist, enormous amounts of capital, and a high tolerance for risk. In other words, the price of oil will have to be high, and stay high, to make the effort worthwhile." (9) If some believe the world's energy resources have reached this expected high value, the current economic conjuncture posed an interlude to the prospecting activities. (10)

AT: Russia Expansion

Russia is increasing military in the Arctic but it is slow and modest

Le Mière and Mazo 13 -- Senior Research Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and IISS Consulting Senior Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy and Consulting Editor, *Survival* (Christian* and Jeffrey**, "Arctic Opening: Insecurity and Opportunity," *Adelphi Series* 53:440, Taylor and Francis Online)BC

Russian activity in the Arctic has also increased. In August 2007, Moscow renewed long-range aviation patrols to the Atlantic and the Pacific, and over the Arctic, oceans. Strategic bomber flights along the Norwegian coast increased from just 14 in 2006 to 97 in 2008; although the number declined in subsequent years, it rose to over 55 in 2012.¹⁶ **In March 2013, two Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers and four Su-27 multi-role aircraft flew within 20 miles of Sweden's borders**; the failure of the Swedish Air Force to scramble in response to the night-time exercises led to searing media criticism.¹⁷ **Surface naval patrols also returned** Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 13:51 07 July 2014 The Arctic as a theatre of military operations | 87 **to Arctic waters for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union in 2008.**¹⁸ **The Russian military has therefore recovered somewhat from the dire circumstances of the post-Cold War environment,** but it is equally struggling to deal with the legacy of a lack of investment in its equipment. The recapitalisation of its fleet is on the surface a concern for neighbouring states, but it is occurring from a very low base of capability. Equally, the focus on smaller vessels will, for the foreseeable future, benefit organisations beyond the Northern Fleet. In line with this military rejuvenation, **Moscow has touted the need to increase its military presence in the Arctic,** but the force posture announced thus far is modest. **The primary change in the next few years will be a renovation of the SSBN fleet, a factor that underlines the strategic importance of the Arctic** but does not suggest state-based military competition in the region on a significant scale. **It seems, therefore, presumptive to call the Russian defence modernisation a militarisation of the Arctic, particularly as current activity remains a shadow of that seen in the Cold-War era.**

AT: SCS

SQ solves South China Sea conflict – cooperation now

Lutfia 7/1/12 (Ismira Lutfia, staff writer, Jakarta Globe, “China Dispute Over South China Sea on Asean Agenda,” <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/china-dispute-over-south-china-sea-on-asean-agenda/527712>)

The Association of Southeast Aisian Nations and China have formulated a draft code of conduct regarding the potentially resource-rich area. Competing claims over the sea are expected to be the source of heated debate at the July 9-13 Asean foreign ministerial meeting in Cambodia. “From early on, Indonesia thinks that this is a polemic that should have never occurred,” Marty said. “The COC is designed to be a conflict-prevention instrument. Indonesia will test whether this COC is authoritative enough. ... We need to test this to ensure the COC is feasible and clearly defines steps taken in the event of an incident and its report mechanism.”

EXT: Can't Solve Conflict

Coast Guard cant deter conflict

Hughes 12 – ASA Branch Chief @ US Coast Guard (Timothy, “Deterrence and the US Coast Guard”)

Google Scholar.

http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Steven_Hall6/publication/235955764_Deterrence_and_the_United_States_Coast_Guard_Enhancing_Current_Practice_with_Performance_Measures/file/e0b49514b9af853454.pdf//Laura T

Deterrence displaces or delays unwanted behavior. More ambitiously, **deterrence aims to permanently discourage an individual or individuals from such behavior. It operates through the prospect of pain or pleasure.** Fear of future pain and hope of future pleasure influence choices, habits, and predilections. Individuals seek to avoid pain and maximize pleasure. Expectations of pain and pleasure will vary, but given an individual's or group's specific sensibilities a pattern of pain-minimization and pleasure-maximization persists.¶ An effective deterrence strategy rewards “good behavior” and punishes “bad behavior.”¶ Interviews with personnel from each of the six core Coast Guard programs and the Maritime Awareness function were conducted for this study. The interviews found an absence of any consistent Coast Guard definition of deterrence. Yet this study observed that the Coast Guard is often an effective practitioner of deterrence, regularly using the prospect of pain and pleasure to achieve its mission.¶ Its effectiveness is anchored in a multifaceted approach to safety, stewardship, and security in maritime communities. The Coast Guard is also effective in customizing its approach to particular communities or sub-groups within a community to deter unwanted behavior.¶ **But the Coast Guard has not adopted an explicit data-informed strategy of deterrence. As a result Coast Guard practice and outcomes are uneven, measurement is not possible, and continual improvement is accordingly difficult. The effectiveness of Coast Guard practice is limited by the absence of an organizing theory, systematic process, and measures of performance.**

EXT: Conflict Turn

Increasing US access causes influx of corporate interest – the US will militarize and raise tension - This causes great power war

Backus 12 - Principal member of technical staff at Sandia National Laboratories and uses behavioral and physical simulation methods to assess security risks associated with climate change (George Backus "Arctic 2030: What are the consequences of climate change? The US response," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists July/August 2012 vol. 68 no. 4 9-16) zabd

Because no entity, other than perhaps the Russian government, has the military bases and means to accommodate area-wide protection and enforcement needs, the United States will necessarily have to maintain strong cooperative arrangements with nations and corporations for the coordinated, safe, and secure use of Arctic resources. Although the Arctic nations themselves may strive for cooperation, entanglement with corporations and other foreign entities will assuredly produce tensions that are outside the domain of the US Coast Guard.

Right now, the US military position in the Arctic is problematic. Both the Northern Command and the European Command have responsibility for what, in a cooperative multinational environment, is a single area (Carafano et al., 2011; Carmen et al., 2010). Some analysts argue that NATO should play the coordinating role in the Arctic (Conley, 2012), but such a path would create new tensions among the national players, and it does not resolve the specific position of the United States in the Arctic (Wezeman, 2012).

The United States asserts that it has power projection and strategic deterrence capabilities in the Arctic because of its submarine, missile, and airborne assets (Defense Department, 2011). But security events in the Arctic may be largely associated with expensive commercial assets populated by civilians and monitored or escorted by foreign government representatives. Fighter jets and torpedoes have no role to play in such confrontations. A naval presence is required, with personnel who can board and secure the facility, as necessary. In general, the US Defense Department lacks the naval resources to maintain sea control for these situations. If non-Arctic countries set a precedent—even simply through prospecting surveys or shipping activity—their case for limiting the unresolved sovereignty rights of the Arctic nations is strengthened. Corporations necessarily engage in such activities, and it is natural for commercial ventures to test the boundaries of their franchises. But in a more negative sense, there is also the fear that access to a relatively unmonitored Arctic may offer an alternative location for companies to dispose of toxic waste.

In assessing US security needs in the Arctic, the question to ask is not "What are the security risks when the Arctic opens?" but rather "How will security risks evolve as the geopolitical and economic expansion play out?" The physical speed with which the Arctic changes will determine the gap between reality and expectations. For example, the more Russia, China, or South Korea experience significant benefit from Arctic activities—to the point where they expect and depend on the growth from those activities—the more likely that a period where the Arctic again becomes environmentally inhospitable, or that the rules of sovereignty change to limit access, or that commercialization of the region will **cause political strains** from lost revenue or prestige.

Abrupt changes in expectations and in a nation's ability to cope with changing circumstances appear to be factors that can trigger conflict (Agency for International Development, 2009). If the early international relations dynamics in the Arctic move fairly slowly, all parties could co-evolve toward balanced positions with relatively little conflict. Rapid dynamics could raise tensions. If all nations sustain approximately equal positive or negative repercussions from changes in Arctic regulations or climatic conditions, or they all believe they could limit the pace and extent of negative impacts through negotiation, routine diplomatic processes could mollify tensions. Climate change will, however, produce an ever-shifting playing field that heightens tensions among countries more concerned with relative rather than absolute advantage in the area.

Will events in the Arctic require US military responses before 2030? The consideration of uncertainty is part of climate and economic forecasting (Hendry and Ericsson, 2001; Meehl et al., 2007), and uncertainty is a mainstay of military planning: The adversary seldom announces battle plans prior to engagement. Military preparedness hinges not on best estimates, but on uncertainties that reflect risks the nation wants managed. From the vantage point of the present, the best estimate is that the Arctic of the near future will be free of military conflict. Risk, however, is the combination of probability (uncertainty) and consequence. Lower-probability, high-consequence events generally

contribute more to risk than the best estimate. They are consequently much more relevant to national security planning than high-probability, routine-consequence conditions.

Perceived economic accessibility to the Arctic and commercial success in the Arctic change the conditional probabilities; they increase the odds that a sequence of events that leads to conflict will materialize. It would be foolhardy to disregard the risks that low-probability, high-consequence events imply. An unexpected confluence of vessels and aircraft being in the wrong place, when Arctic weather conditions prevent adequate communications, could lead to tense situations, unless national security forces have the ability to readily manage the situation.

EXT: Cooperation Solves

Coop now

Newsweek, 14 ("As the World Warms, Navy Strategists Plan for an Arctic Rush" 5/9, proquest)//DH

But even if there are challenges, there are also tailwinds making the Navy's life easier. **The Arctic remains one of the few areas where international cooperation is the norm rather than the exception.** The region is governed through the Arctic Council, a forum in which Arctic states and interested observers iron out issues involving the region, from environmental protection to border disputes. When Russia planted a flag on the North Pole in 2007, many commentators speculated that it would launch a series of land grabs in the world's least hospitable region. It never came to pass.

Military-military cooperation abounds, too. U.S. naval officers engage in training exercises with Russian and Norwegian counterparts. The navies of Arctic countries share information and expertise on science and cartography. Even as tensions have flared between Russia and the United States in recent weeks over Ukraine, relations remain good on Arctic issues. "Russia does want to be a partner with the other Arctic states," says Rear Admiral Jonathan White. **"We're not seeing anything to be concerned about."**

The reason, according to White and independent Arctic analysts, comes back to money. "All the Arctic nations have things to gain, with additional access to resources, trade routes, fishing and tourism," White says. "I'm optimistic that we can do it together. But just like any other ocean in the world, we have to be ready."

Existing dispute resolution solves

Brigham, 10 - Distinguished Professor of Geography & Arctic Policy at the University of Alaska Fairbanks (Lawson, "THINK AGAIN: THE ARCTIC" Foreign Policy, SEPT. / OCT. 2010,

<http://generalpaperpress.wordpress.com/2012/02/06/313/>

Maybe not, but many countries are looking at the Arctic today with fresh eyes. Because of climate change, the Arctic Ocean's summer ice cover is now half of what it was 50 years ago. In recent years, Russian and Canadian armed forces have staged Cold War-style exercises in the far north, and in the summer of 2009 a pair of German merchant ships conducted voyages across the relatively ice-free waters of the Northeast Passage, the long-dreamed-of trade route from Europe to Asia. And maybe the only thing heating up faster than the Arctic Ocean is the hyperbole over what's under it. "Without U.S. leadership to help develop diplomatic solutions to competing claims and potential conflicts," scholar Scott G. Borgerson wrote in Foreign Affairs in 2008, **"the region could erupt in an armed mad dash for its resources."**

It could — but it won't. Anarchy does not reign at the top of the world; in fact, it's governed in a manner not unlike the rest of the planet. The region's land borders — shared by Canada, Denmark (which controls Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States — **are all set and uncontested. Several maritime boundaries do remain under dispute**, most notably those between Canada and the United States in the Beaufort Sea and between Canada and Denmark in Baffin Bay. **But progress has been made recently in resolving even the thorniest disagreements**: In April, after 40 years of negotiating, **Norway and Russia were able to forge an equitable deal for a new boundary in the Barents Sea**, a continental-shelf area rich in fisheries and oil and gas reserves.

What about the part of the Arctic where sovereignty remains unresolved: the seafloor that Chilingarov tried to claim? Despite being covered with ice for much of the year, the Arctic Ocean is governed much like the rest of the world's oceans — by a maritime treaty that has been ratified by all the Arctic countries except the United States, which generally abides by its terms anyway.

Chilingarov's flag gambit was a clever bid for attention, but not much more than that. Although the resources of the Arctic seabed are likely to be partitioned among the five countries that could plausibly claim them, it won't be on a first-come-first-served basis. **The world has learned a lot since the resource and land grabs of earlier centuries; for the most part, the only scuffles over borders and oil fields today are in regions that are badly destabilized already.**

Economic interests and existing coop prevent war

Brigham, 10 - Distinguished Professor of Geography & Arctic Policy at the University of Alaska Fairbanks (Lawson, "THINK AGAIN: THE ARCTIC" Foreign Policy, SEPT. / OCT. 2010,

<http://generalpaperpress.wordpress.com/2012/02/06/313/>

"Conflict Is Inevitable in the Arctic."

No, it isn't. The Arctic has been a geopolitical flashpoint before: During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union faced off directly in the region. But that was then. **Today's Arctic is governed by eight developed states that** arguably **cooperate more than they have at any other period in history.** **International collaboration in scientific research**, for instance, **is at record levels in the Arctic today.**

The looming Arctic resource boom doesn't threaten this stability — it reinforces it. States such as Norway and Russia have much to lose economically from Arctic conflict, as do the many non-Arctic countries and multinational corporations that will be among the eventual investors in, and consumers of, future Arctic ventures. **No one is contesting anyone else's sovereignty in the region**; in fact, the Arctic might one day play host to the emergence of a new sovereign state, Greenland, with the support and encouragement of Denmark, its long-time colonial ruler.

This isn't to say that saber rattling hasn't happened and won't happen again in the future. Canada, Norway, and Russia have conducted military and naval operations in the region to showcase their capabilities and demonstrate their sovereignty. (The United States has been more modest in this regard, though the U.S. Navy last fall did release a "roadmap" for the Arctic, emphasizing the need for military readiness in the far north.) NATO's role in the Arctic is uncertain and unfocused — five Arctic states are

members, but three (Sweden, Finland, Russia) are not — and the organization could go a long way toward reducing tension and building trust in the Arctic by promoting cooperation on matters of military security, law enforcement, and counterterrorism there.

But none of this friction is beyond the realm of diplomacy. Even Chilingarov, the flag-wielding champion of Russian northern expansionism, understands the virtues of negotiation. When he met Chuck Strahl, Canada's minister of northern affairs, in June, the first thing he reportedly did was invite his would-be adversary to a conference-called "The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue" — scheduled for this September in Moscow. The two countries' representatives have since trumpeted their thawing relations in the Arctic, meeting regularly and even discussing plans to work together on mapping the seafloor where Chilingarov planted the Russian standard. The lesson is clear enough: The world has plenty of regions where serious conflict is a way of life already. Let's worry about them first.

Cooperation is far more likely in the Arctic – combat is too difficult

Stavridis, 13 - Former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO; US retired Admiral (James, "High North or High Tension?" Foreign Policy, 10/21,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/21/high_north_or_high_tension_arctic_competition)
//DH

Canadian General Walt Natynczyk, **the former chief of Canada's armed forces**, was once asked what his response would be if the Canadian Arctic was ever invaded. With a very slight twinkle in his eye he **said, "If someone was foolish enough to attack us in the High North, my first duty would be search and rescue."**

Good humor aside, the general's point is reasonably well taken. **The likelihood of a conventional offensive military operation in the Arctic is very low, despite some commentators' overheated rhetoric. While there are many diplomatic and ecological challenges, the odds are good that the international community will eventually find its way to a true zone of cooperation around the Arctic Circle** and manage to avoid turning the region -- the last frontier on Earth -- into a zone of needless conflict. But there are issues that must be addressed as competition rises in the High North if we are to avoid high tension.

Cooperation is inevitable – disputes will be settled and the council is effective

Petroleum Economist '14 – journal on energy and power ("The Arctic land grab", April 2014, ProQuest) //J.N.E

Icy Cooperation

Yet in the Arctic, **cooperation is winning the day. Rather than fuelling conflict, the region's riches have pulled the Arctic nations together. When Russia sent a pair of submarines to plant its flag on the**

seabed at the North Pole in August 2007, a potential provocation that could have escalated tension, the move was widely dismissed by other Arctic nations.

"This isn't the 15th century," Peter MacKay, Canada's foreign minister at the time, said. "You can't go around the world and just plant flags and say, 'We're claiming this territory'."

The eight Arctic nations - Russia, Canada, the US, Denmark (via Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Norway, Iceland, Sweden and Finland - have come together under several international organisations that provide a legal framework for cooperation.

The most contentious issue in the Arctic is how to draw up the region's borders. To do so, the Arctic countries have largely committed to using the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) treaty to settle its conflicting territorial claims.

Under Unclos, **each country has exclusive economic rights, including the right to drill for oil and gas, in waters up to 200 nautical miles from its coastline. These borders are largely settled, though there are disputed island claims that complicate matters.**

However, a country can extend its territorial claim further afield, up to 350 nautical miles, by showing that its continental shelf stretches beyond 200 nautical miles.

Most Arctic nations have claimed such extensions. But figuring out precisely where certain geological structures end and begin can be a tricky business. Compounding the problem is the region's sketchy cartography.

The result is that Unclos has been left with a dizzying array of overlapping territorial claims to disentangle. The Lomonosov Ridge, which is thought to hold significant oil deposits, comes with the most controversy.

A section of the 1,700 km long underwater ridge that sits atop the North Pole is claimed as sovereign continental shelf by Russia, Canada and Greenland. The US, on the other hand, has argued that Lomonosov is an independent geological feature beyond the sovereign claim of any nation.

Unclos will rely on soil samples, mapping and other data from the area submitted by the countries themselves to try to determine the rightful claim.

The Russian government says the point of its trip to the North Pole seabed was not to stake a claim to territory but to gather soil samples and other geological data to bolster its case under Unclos.

Staking claims

Contested areas of the Arctic are scattered around the region. Canada and the US have a long-standing border dispute over a large section of the Beaufort Sea. Canada and Denmark have never settled their disputed claims to the tiny Hans Island, a barren and unpopulated rock in the Kennedy Channel, which separates Ellesmere Island in Canada's north and Greenland.

The **countries have engaged in tit-for-tat flag plantings on the rocky outcropping for years.** Norway has put forward claims to exclusive economic zone and continental shelf territory six times the size of the Norwegian mainland, including overlapping claims with Iceland, Denmark and Russia. Every Arctic nation has some sort of competing territorial claim with Russia.

For now those disputes are being sorted out not by generals armed with battle plans, but lawyers brandishing geological surveys and soil samples.

It will take many years for the process to run its course, though. In the meantime, **many disputes could be settled in bilateral negotiations, particularly in those areas where countries are keen to start oil and gas exploration. Russia and Norway finally reached a deal over their disputed maritime border - and the seabed - in the Barents Sea in 2010.**

The Arctic Council, an inter-governmental body, has proved to be another effective forum for cooperation on Arctic issues.

It was founded in 1996 and has become an increasingly robust international bureaucracy, developing joint initiatives on a range of environmental, social and commercial activities, from protecting indigenous communities to oil-spill response.

Cooperation, though, has its limits. An agreement similar to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty is not in the cards. Before that treaty, a number of countries had made overlapping claims to parts of Antarctica, similar to today's situation in the Arctic. But the treaty set aside those claims and established a shared governance structure for the region, while also discouraging military and industrial activity in favour of scientific research. In the North, countries are pursuing strategies clearly aimed at maximising their slice of the Arctic.

Russia, more than any other country, has pinned its fortunes on developing the Arctic and sees itself as an Arctic power. "For Russia, the Arctic is our home and our future; we are by far the largest Arctic nation and for this reason alone we bear a special responsibility for the state of affairs in the Arctic," Anton Vasiliev, Russia's most senior Arctic official, said recently.

Energy is at the centre of Russia's Arctic strategy. Nearly half the Arctic's oil and gas resources are thought to lie in Russian territory. National oil companies Rosneft and Gazprom have signed joint exploration deals with ExxonMobil, Statoil and BP. The government is also keen to push ahead with gas development in the Arctic.

The government has broken Gazprom's long-standing gas export monopoly to allow Novatek and France's Total to move ahead with the Yamal liquefied natural gas (LNG) project.

Built on the Yamal peninsula's permafrost and under constant threat from ice floes, it is one of the most technically complex LNG projects in the world. Newly passable Arctic sea routes are crucial to getting that gas to lucrative Asian markets.

Canada takes the reins

Under prime minister Stephen Harper, Canada has taken a far more aggressive line on its sovereignty over the Arctic.

In December 2013, the Harper government made Canada's claim to the North Pole official in claiming the Lomonosov Ridge at UNCLOS. "Canada has a choice when it comes to defending our sovereignty over the Arctic: either we use it or we lose it," Harper said early in his term. "And make no mistake, this government intends to use it."

[Click here to view map](#)

Despite Harper's hard talk, action has been slow to follow. After pledging when he took office to build three large icebreakers to help Canada operate more effectively in the Arctic, ambitions have been scaled back.

Just one vessel has been ordered and it is still years from delivery. Harper also pledged to build a naval base at Canada's only Arctic deep-water port in Nanisivik. Nearly seven years after the announcement little has come of the plan. Nor has the country moved aggressively to explore its Arctic oil and gas resources. Chevron, Statoil and Repsol have carried out some initial exploration activity in the Beaufort Sea, but no drilling has been planned.

The US is an outlier in the Arctic. While other nations have moved aggressively to claim territory and bolster their capabilities in the Arctic, the US has been left behind. That is at least partly because staunch opposition from conservative congressional Republicans to Unclos has prevented the US from signing onto the treaty.

Agreeing to the treaty, they argue, would be an unacceptable sacrifice of US sovereignty - along the lines implied by former president Ronald Reagan, who called it a "dramatic step towards world government".

In practice, successive US administrations have seemed to largely accept the Unclos framework for settling territorial disputes in the Arctic. The government has spent millions of dollars to prove that its continental shelf extends north of Alaska beyond the 200-mile exclusive economic zone.

And as other countries have stepped up activity to strengthen their Arctic claims with Unclos, opposition in Congress has softened. But if the US does not sign on to the treaty it risks being left out of the process as the Arctic's borders are drawn up. The US has a long history of Arctic oil and gas activity. Alaska's North Slope has been a prolific oil province for decades and a major supplier to the lower-48 states.

The government has also handed out a number of exploration licences in the Arctic Beaufort and Chukchi seas. Shell's difficult experience in the Arctic, though, has slowed momentum.

Outside actors are also shaping the future of the Arctic. China, not wanting to be left out of the action, has signed a major oil exploration deal with Iceland and is keen to play a role in new Arctic shipping routes. Non-Arctic countries are also keen to get a foot in the door at the Arctic Council. China, along with a number of others such as India, France, Germany, the UK, South Korea and Japan have joined as observers.

Non-governmental organisations are also getting involved in the region. The global environmental movement has sought to prevent oil and gas development and other industrial activities in the Arctic, arguing that the risks to the environment are too high.

None has been as provocative as Greenpeace. The group has hounded Shell over its Arctic exploration plans and taken direct action against drilling activities in Greenland and Russia.

In Russia, 30 Greenpeace activists were arrested and held for weeks after attempting to occupy the Gazprom-operated Prirazlomnaya platform in the Kara Sea. JJ

What is Unclos?

THE United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) is an international treaty governing the world's oceans and its resources.

Unclos was opened for signing in 1982 and came into force in 1994. It has been ratified by more than 160 UN member states and is the pre-eminent international rulemaking body for issues related to the sea and maritime borders. It covers a wide range of economic, environmental, scientific and commercial activities related to the sea. The UN secretary general oversees Unclos.

Key terms of the treaty include: Coastal states may exercise complete sovereignty over seas extending 12 nautical miles from its shores; Coastal states have the right to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extending 200 nautical miles from its shores, where it can develop natural resources, carry out economic activity and regulate scientific research and environment protection; Coastal states have similar economic rights over their continental shelf. The continental shelf can extend as far as 350 nautical miles from its shore if it is determined to be a natural prolongation of the state's sovereign territory; The rules for EEZs and continental shelf also apply to islands, but not rocks that could not sustain human habitation or economic life of their own; and Disputes can be submitted to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Court of Justice or to arbitration.

What is the Arctic Council?

The Arctic Council is a high-level inter-governmental forum established by the 1996 Ottawa Declaration to promote cooperation and coordination among Arctic states.

It is a voluntary organisation and its decrees do not carry the weight of international law, but it has become a key body for joint decision-making on issues related to the Arctic.

The Arctic Council is comprised of member states, permanent participants and observers. Member states are the founding Arctic nations: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the US; Permanent participants include indigenous groups such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Arctic Athabaskan Council and the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North; and Observers do not take part in decision-making, but they participate in Arctic council meetings. They include non-Arctic countries such as China, India, Germany, Japan and the UK, as well as other international non-governmental groups such as the UN Development Programme and WWF.

The Arctic Council's chairmanship rotates among member states every two years. Canada is the current chair, and the US will take over in 2015. Meetings with senior Arctic officials from member countries are held every six months and are hosted in the chair's country.

Initially focused on scientific and environmental issues, the **Arctic Council has increasingly taken on security, geopolitical and economic matters.**

It has carried out detailed studies on oil and gas and shipping activities in the Arctic and developed some guidelines and rules to regulate these activities.

Cooperation checks arctic conflict

Economist 12 – Cites Danish federal estimates (6-16-2012; “Too much to fight over”

<http://www.economist.com/node/21556797>) zabd

Yet **the risks of Arctic conflict have been exaggerated**. **Most of the Arctic is clearly assigned to individual countries.** According to a Danish estimate, **95% of Arctic mineral resources are within agreed national boundaries.**

The biggest of the half-dozen remaining territorial disputes is between the United States and Canada, over whether the north-west passage is in international or Canadian waters, hardly a casus belli. Far from violent, the development of the Arctic is likely to be uncommonly harmonious, for three related reasons. One is the profit motive. The five Arctic littoral countries, Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark and Norway, would sooner develop the resources they have than argue over those they do not have. A sign of this was an agreement between Russia and Norway last year to fix their maritime border in the Barents Sea, ending a decades-long dispute. The border area is probably rich in oil; **both countries are now racing to get exploration started. Another spur to Arctic co-operation is the high cost of operating in the region. This is behind the Arctic Council's first binding agreement, signed last year, to co-ordinate search-and-rescue efforts. Rival oil companies are also working together, on scientific research and mapping as well as on formal joint ventures. The third reason for peace is equally important: a strong reluctance among Arctic countries to give outsiders any excuse to intervene in the region's affairs. An illustration is the stated willingness of all concerned to settle their biggest potential dispute, over their maritime frontiers, according to the international Law of the Sea (LOS). Even the United States accepts this, despite its dislike for treaties—though it has still not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, an anomaly many of its leaders are keen to end.**

Despite minor disputes, cooperation is occurring now and will continue to do so
Käpylä and Mikkola '13 – Finnish Institute of International Affairs (Juha, Harri, “The Global Arctic”, August, FIIA BRIE FING PAPER 133) //J.N.E

New prospects are also attracting the attention of new players that are keen to tap into the economic potential and have a say in the way the region is accessed, exploited and governed, including China and the EU. The net effect of these – and other – developments is that the Arctic today is a global Arctic: it can no longer be perceived as a spatially or administratively confined region, but is instead taking on a new form and dynamics in the midst of contemporary global politics. While there are unresolved and contentious issues in the global Arctic (e.g. the status of maritime passages and extension of continental shelves) that may spark diplomatic disputes or even conflicts, the region is characterized by multilateral cooperation and governance. That said, there are divergent political interests to endorse Arctic multilateralism. **Russia, for example, utilizes multilateralism to create a stable investment environment, whereas China relies on it to legitimately access Arctic affairs as a non-aggressive rising power and extra-Arctic state. While a traditionally reluctant Arctic player, the US currently sees Arctic multilateralism as the most prominent tool to establish its presence and promote its interests in the region within the framework of its general smart power strategy. The EU endorses multilateralism in its external policy – in general and in the Arctic – to present itself as a relevant global actor and a normative power in a situation where its global relevance is decreasing.**

The globalization of the Arctic and the new focus on the economy will have various consequences in the region. Firstly, the focus on sustainable development in Arctic governance is likely to suffer from a sharper focus on the economy that favours environmentally challenging but globally interesting hydrocarbon extraction and maritime transport industries. Secondly, the indigenous people in the Arctic will most likely lose influence with the introduction of new major players into the Arctic governance. At the very least, it is unlikely that China, for example, would contribute to the enhancement of indigenous influence in Arctic affairs given its economic emphasis, interest in domestic stability, as well as its history with Chinese minorities.

Thirdly, new actors, interests and dynamics are bound to affect the traditional Arctic states. In general, the emergence of new major players will reduce, albeit with exceptions, the influence of traditional and especially small Arctic states. Yet, for some, the appearance of new major players may in fact be a boon. Iceland, for example, may stand to gain from increasing Chinese interest in the region by receiving direct foreign investments after its economic crisis. And lastly, Arctic governance is likely to turn more complex and complicated as the economic and political stakes are raised with the introduction of new global players in the region.

Arctic coop is high now

Grätz 12 - Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (Jonas Grätz, "The Arctic: Thaw With Conflict Potential," International Relations and Security Network, July 2012, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?lng=en&id=157901&contextid774=157901&contextid775=157922&tabid=1453469894>)
zabd

Prospects for cooperation Against the background of the changes in the Arctic, this region is occasionally identified as a potential area of future conflict. However, it is important first to point out that there is much scope for cooperation. This is particularly apparent when considering "soft" security concerns such as environmental pollution resulting from the extraction of raw materials. The threats that arise for humans from the exceptional climatic situations are pushing actors towards cooperative approaches, too. Many of these issues are taken on by the Arctic Council. Founded in 1996, the Council is a forum to promote coordination among the eight Arctic countries. Representatives of indigenous peoples have a consultative role. One concrete result of the Arctic Council is a binding agreement on maritime search and rescue activities. For 2013, an agreement on standards for oil spill preparedness and response is expected, which will reinforce the current non-binding offshore oil and gas guidelines. Cooperation among the littoral states is also advancing in the sensitive area of national sovereign rights. The 2010 border treaty between Russia and Norway indicates that bilateral agreements are possible – even though the power asymmetry between the two countries is reflected in a deal advantageous to Russia. International maritime law and the pressure of non-Arctic countries are also fostering multilateral cooperation, at least in areas where all parties can still gain further sovereign rights. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) allows for the extension of the continental shelf towards the North Pole, which would extend the mining privileges of the coastal states at the expense of the interests of non-Arctic states. The water column and the animals living in it, by contrast, would continue to enjoy international status. In the Ilulissat Declaration adopted in 2008, the coastal states declared their intention to settle any territorial conflicts within the framework of UNCLOS. By signing the declaration, the US – which has not ratified UNCLOS – has signalled its willingness to observe it within the Arctic. What is more, the coastal states have been collaborating for a long time in the exploration of the sea bed. Provided that there are no major conflicts among these countries, non-Arctic players will hardly be able to assert themselves in this context. Potential for conflict The scope of sovereign rights in the maritime area around the Svalbard archipelago, believed to be rich in oil and gas, is a question that is not easy to resolve. On the one hand, the archipelago and the surrounding 200-mile zone are an undisputed part of Norwegian territory. On the other hand, Norwegian sovereignty over the archipelago is substantially limited by the Svalbard Treaty of 1920. All 40 signatory countries have the right to exploit natural resources and to conduct research. The treaty also states that the archipelago must not be used for offensive military purposes. Likewise, the right to levy taxes is limited to the administrative requirements of Svalbard. It was only later under UNCLOS that the EEZ emerged as an institution. Hence, it remains unclear whether the Svalbard Treaty also applies to this zone. Countries such as Russia, Iceland, and the UK assume this to be the case. Norway takes the opposite view. Nevertheless, Oslo has not declared a full EEZ in this area, but established a fisheries protection zone instead. It concedes fishing privileges to Russia, Iceland, and other nations. This has never been explicitly acknowledged by these countries, but is usually accepted in practice. The modus vivendi has so far provided stability as it has served Russian interests too, with the fisheries protection zone granting privileges to Russian fishing interests over other signatory states. Moreover, Russia has sufficient oil and gas reserves at its disposal on its own territory. Norway, by contrast, has a strong interest in opening up the area for oil and gas exploration. Such an opening, however, would undermine the current fragile balance and encourage other signatory states to question openly the scope of the Treaty. Even if Norway were to take no action, other nations could try to push for an opening of the area for exploration with reference to the Treaty. Due to the variety of the players concerned and the absence of international rules, the issue can ultimately only be resolved at a political level.

Interests and positions diverge concerning the issue of sovereignty over the new sea routes as well. Again, even the Arctic coastal states do not agree on the legal status: Russia and Canada regard the routes as internal waterways in what is a very broad interpretation of UNCLOS. This implies that ships flying foreign flags must request permission for transit. Other coastal nations, such as the US, and non-Arctic players like the EU and presumably China, however, consider these to be international waterways for which no authorisation for transit is necessary.

For the time being, **no escalation of this conflict is to be expected, since the commercial navigation routes are competing with non-Arctic sea routes and the use of these routes will correlate with the extent of their opening and the stability of the agreed arrangements.** In addition, **Russia and Canada depend on the cooperation of foreign non-state and state-owned players in order to attract investments in their inadequate coastal infrastructures.** Also, **the International Maritime Organisation is working on a binding Polar Code, which will establish clear rules for polar navigation.** This will weaken the case for additional national regulations and approval procedures.

No Arctic Conflict—status quo cooperation solves

Kraska and Baker 2014 -- Mary Derrickson McCurdy visiting scholar at Duke University Marine Laboratory and senior fellow at the Center for Oceans Law and Policy, University of Virginia School of Law and associate professor of law and senior fellow for Oceans and Energy at the Institute for Energy and the Environment at Vermont Law School (James* and Betsy**, “Emerging Arctic Security Challenges,” Center for a New American Security Strategy, http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_EmergingArcticSecurityChallenges_policybrief.pdf)BC

Security It would be easy to become pessimistic about Arctic military stability; we are not. International conflict in the region is unlikely because the Arctic nations are committed to a rules-based approach to security. Worries about the potential for conflict over seabed rights in the Arctic are misplaced.⁶ War is far less likely above the Arctic Circle than in nearly any other part of the world.⁷ Cooperation is breaking out everywhere in the region; international law is followed; there is no political vacuum.⁸ While elsewhere Russia is exhibiting its propensity toward military displays, in the Arctic, Russia is playing a constructive role in maintaining regional stability. Russia is intently focused on regional security in part because it sees in the Arctic an opportunity to recapture the former influence and superpower standing that it enjoyed during the Cold War. Russia strategically and successfully takes advantage of its dominant geographic position surrounding 170 degrees of the Arctic Circle, and its energy and economic presence in the region dwarfs that of all other Arctic states combined. The United States and Russia enjoy a pragmatic working relationship in managing the security of the Bering Strait.⁹ The U.S. Coast Guard and Russian Border Patrol have cooperated for nearly two decades under a bilateral treaty to manage safety and security in the 53-mile-wide strait.¹⁰ The neighbors also jointly led negotiations among all eight Arctic states to adopt binding agreements on search and rescue and oil spill preparedness and response. Now the United States and Russia are leading efforts to adopt agreements on marine pollution prevention and marine scientific research in the region. The remoteness and physical isolation of the Arctic region also reduces military risk. Arctic states find comfort in their exclusive and shared geography. the region that might erode, let alone upend, the contemporary order. The one thing all Arctic states have in common is a rather circumspect view of states from outside the region that seek to play a greater role in the Arctic. Furthermore, all Arctic states are invested in a rules-based approach to stability and security, based principally on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).¹¹ The consensus among Arctic states that UNCLOS is the framework for distribution of rights and duties in the region minimizes risk of conflict over maritime boundaries. Every Arctic nation is a party to the treaty except the United States,

which, since 1983, has made a commitment to adhere to most provisions of the treaty.¹² Finally, the likelihood of conflict breaking out over the region's vast offshore resources is also remote since Arctic states are pursuing their maritime claims through the multilateral Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), an independent international technical body established by UNCLOS. Every Arctic coastal state except the United States has submitted at least partial information for consideration of a claim to sovereign rights over seabed riches of oil, gas and minerals. To the extent that overlapping maritime claims exist, the four other Arctic Ocean coastal states, including Russia, are proceeding with deliberate professionalism in appropriate bilateral forums and with the CLCS to resolve them.¹³ In 2010, Russia and Norway, for example, signed a treaty to resolve their 40-year disagreement over maritime resource boundaries in the Barents Sea. More recently, Denmark and Canada established maritime delimitation in the Lincoln Sea, northwest of Greenland. Similarly, Canada and the United States are exploring a way ahead to resolve a benign disagreement over a single boundary line in the Beaufort Sea.

Arctic disputes are being resolved peacefully in the status quo

Borgerson August 2013 -- International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, CEO at CargoMetrics and Co-founder, Arctic Circle (Scott, "The Coming Arctic Boom: As the Ice Melts, the Region Heats Up," Foreign Affairs through ProQuest, <http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1411622848?pq-origsite=summon>)BC

MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING Just a half decade ago, the scramble for the Arctic looked as if it would play out quite differently. In 2007, Russia planted its flag on the North Pole's sea floor, and in the years that followed, other states also jockeyed for position, ramping up their naval patrols and staking out ambitious sovereignty claims. Many observers-including me-predicted that without some sort of comprehensive set of regulations, the race for resources would inevitably end in conflict. "The Arctic powers are fast approaching diplomatic gridlock," I wrote in these pages in 2008, "and that could eventually lead to . . . armed brinkmanship." But a funny thing happened on the way to Arctic anarchy. Rather than harden positions, the possibility of increased tensions has spurred the countries concerned to work out their differences peacefully. A shared interest in profit has trumped the instinct to compete over territory. Proving the pessimists wrong, the Arctic countries have given up on saber rattling and engaged in various impressive feats of cooperation. States have used the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)-even though the United States never ratified it-as a legal basis for settling maritime boundary disputes and enacting safety standards for commercial shipping. And in 2008, the five states with Arctic coasts-Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States-issued the Ilulissat Declaration, in which they promised to settle their overlapping claims in an orderly manner and expressed their support for UNCLOS and the Arctic Council, the two international institutions most relevant to the region. The Arctic powers have kept that promise. In 2010, Russia and Norway settled their long-running maritime boundary disagreement near the Svalbard Islands, and Canada and Denmark are now exploring a proposal to split Hans Island, an uninhabited rock they disputed for decades. In 2011, the Arctic countries signed a search-and-rescue agreement brokered under the auspices of the Arctic Council; this past April, they began working on an agreement to regulate commercial fishing; and this summer, they are finalizing plans for jointly responding to oil spills. Some Arctic countries are even sharing one another's icebreakers to map the seabed as part of a process, established under UNCLOS, to demarcate their extended continental shelves. Although some sticking points remain-Ottawa and Washington, for instance, have yet to agree on whether the Northwest Passage constitutes a series of international straits or Canadian internal waters and where exactly their maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea lies-the thorniest differences have been settled, and most that remain involve areas far offshore and concern the least economically relevant parts of the Arctic. None of this cooperation required a single new overarching legal framework. Instead, states have created a patchwork of bilateral and multilateral agreements, emanating

from the Arctic Council and anchored firmly in unclos. By reaching an enduring modus vivendi, the Arctic powers have set the stage for a long-lasting regional boom.

Cooperation is prevalent in the Arctic

Le Mièrre and Mazo 1-13 -14 -- Senior Research Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and IISS Consulting Senior Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy and Consulting Editor, *Survival* (Christian* and Jeffrey**, "Arctic Opening: Insecurity and Opportunity," Taylor and Francis Online)BC

The various militaries of the Arctic have, in fact, been more focused on cooperating and building nascent military–military relations than engaging in competitive procurement or gunboat diplomacy. Formal Arctic military cooperation in the post-Cold War era dates back to 1996, when the US, Russia and Norway signed an agreement on Arctic military environmental cooperation, which sought to prevent environmental harm to the region through military (and, in particular, nuclear) activities. Since 2010, Norway has held joint exercises with Russia, through the bilateral Pomor series, reflecting Oslo's desire to build a more collaborative military–military relationship with Moscow even as it purchases high-end platforms and weapons. Exercise Northern Eagle has been an annual bilateral Russia–US exercise since 2004, but in 2008 it was expanded to include Norway. The second chiefs-of-defence meeting was held in Greenland in June 2013, bringing together the heads of the militaries or coastguards of all eight Arctic nations. The meeting was preceded by a message from Danish Chief of Defence General Peter Bartram, chair of the gathering, who noted that 'we do not want to militarise the Arctic. Quite the opposite.'²⁹ The meeting led to an agreement to expand maritime surveillance cooperation and joint military exercises. The US-sponsored, annual Arctic Security Forces roundtables also act as a form of confidence building in a region with little security architecture, a fact noted by the US DoD Arctic strategy, which focused heavily on international cooperation and burden sharing to enable objectives to be met with little cost or possibility of deterioration in relations. Putin himself, often seen as a belligerent voice of Russian nationalism, has highlighted the importance of cooperation in the Arctic and the fact that the region should not be seen as one of competition. Speaking in 2010, Putin suggested that the Arctic should be a 'zone of peace and cooperation', and that 'all the problems existing in the Arctic ... can be resolved through an atmosphere of partnership'.³⁰ Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 13:51 07 July 2014 The Arctic as a theatre of military operations | 97 Given the potential riches to be gained from the opening of the Arctic, Moscow is indeed eager to ensure a stable High North that would allow for the continuous and safe economic exploitation of the Arctic. As Yevgeny Lukyanov, a deputy secretary of the Russian Security Council, noted in January 2013, 'Russia needs to cooperate with other Arctic states in strengthening and defending its Arctic borders and in monitoring transportation routes'.³¹ As such, Russia has been encouraged to seek collaborative solutions to problems in the region, such as the 2010 Barents Sea agreement between Russia and Norway that was the result of 40 years of negotiation over maritime delimitation of potentially hydrocarbon- rich waters. Russia's desire to utilise the Arctic for commercial purposes means that Moscow is more likely to perceive collaboration as in its interests. The monitoring of traffic through different EEZs along the NEP, for example, would necessitate coordination among constabulary agencies and information sharing. The fact that NATO has strenuously avoided competition with Russia in the Arctic also reflects this dynamic (as well as the desire of NATO members such as Canada to avoid internationalisation of the region). Although Oslo has encouraged a greater NATO presence there through the Cold Response invitational exercises it has hosted since 2006, the organisation has explicitly stated that it will not maintain a permanent presence in the High North. After announcing that NATO would not have a direct presence in the Arctic in May 2013, Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen noted that 'the Arctic is a hard environment. It rewards cooperation, not confrontation, and I trust we will continue to see cooperation'.³²

There is Arctic cooperation in the status quo

Borgerson et al 3-25-14 – International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, CEO at CargoMetrics and Cofounder, Arctic Circle (Scott, Lawson Brigham-- Distinguished Professor of Geography and Arctic Policy, University of Alaska Fairbanks, Michael Byers -- Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law, University of British Columbia, Heather Conley -- Senior Fellow and Director of the Europe Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Marlene Laruelle -- Research Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University, "The Emerging Arctic," The Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/arctic/emerging-arctic/p32620#!/#Diplomacy%20and%20Security>

Diplomacy and Security)BC

Less than a decade ago, many geopolitical analysts warned that the Arctic had all of the makings for great-power rivalry reminiscent of the Cold War. However, the movement has gone quite the other way. Despite a few remaining territorial disputes, the overwhelming majority of Arctic resources fall within accepted national boundaries and all Arctic governments have committed to settling disagreements peaceably. Notably, Russia and Norway resolved a decades-old maritime border dispute in 2010, equally dividing some 67,600 square miles of water in the Barents Sea, and partnering in the region on energy development. The historic deal is often cited as a model for future Arctic diplomacy. The Arctic Council, the leading international forum for cooperation in the region, was established by the eight Arctic states in 1996 with participation from indigenous peoples like the Inuit and Saami, and all member states except the United States and Norway have appointed ambassador-level diplomats to represent their interests in the region. With a secretariat in Tromsø, Norway, the council is a forum that sponsors major assessments and studies, and develops policies and guidelines that focus on environmental protection and sustainable development. Chairmanship of the council rotates every two years. But Arctic cooperation takes place in a variety of other forums. Nordic nations—Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Iceland—also partner on sustainability and issues related to Arctic indigenous peoples via the Nordic Council. Nineteen countries are party to the International Arctic Science Committee, a nongovernmental organization dedicated to research. The nonprofit Arctic Circle, formed in 2013 by Icelandic president Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, aims to provide a setting for political and business groups, as well as other organizations from around the world, to discuss Arctic issues. Still, steady diplomacy has not precluded nations from maneuvering to protect their interests in the region. Each of the eight Arctic nations has updated their strategy for the region in the last several years, including the United States (see interactive diagram below). Russia, the only non-NATO littoral Arctic state, has made a military buildup in the Arctic a strategic priority, restoring Soviet-era airfields and ports and marshaling naval assets. In late 2013, President Vladimir Putin instructed his military leadership to pay particular attention to the Arctic, saying Russia needed "every lever for the protection of its security and national interests there." He also ordered the creation of a new strategic military command in the Russian Arctic by the end of 2014. Economic powers further afield are also angling for a larger role in the Arctic. India, Italy, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and China became Arctic Council observer states in 2013. Analysts say Beijing is particularly attracted to the region given its mounting energy demands and reliance on maritime trade. Chinese officials now characterize their country as a "near-Arctic state," and Beijing has recently increased its investment in polar research, spending some \$60 million annually, and ordered a second, \$300 million ice-breaking research ship. China strengthened its toehold in the Arctic by signing a free trade agreement with Iceland, its first with a European country, and building an embassy that is Reykjavik's largest

Arctic exploration is inevitable and doesn't cause conflict

Economist '12 ("The melting north" June 16th, <http://www.economist.com/node/21556798>) //J.N.E

Yet **this special report will suggest that warnings about Arctic conflict are, like the climate, overcooked. The Arctic is no terra nullius. Unlike Antarctica, which is governed by an international treaty, most of it is demarcated.** Of half a dozen territorial disputes in the region, the biggest is probably between the United States and Canada, over the status of the north-west passage. Those two countries will not go to war. And **the majority of Arctic countries are members of NATO.** Yet the melting Arctic will have geostrategic consequences beyond helping a bunch of resource-fattened countries to get fatter. An obvious one is the potentially disruptive effect of new trade routes. Sailing along the coast of Siberia by the north-east passage, or Northern Sea Route (NSR), as Russians and mariners call it, cuts the distance between western Europe and east Asia by roughly a third. The passage is now open for four or five months a year and is getting more traffic. In 2010 only four ships used the NSR; last year 34 did, in both directions, including tankers, refrigerated vessels carrying fish and even a cruise liner. Asia's big exporters, China, Japan and South Korea, are already investing in ice-capable vessels, or planning to do so. For **Russia, which has big plans to develop the sea lane with trans-shipment hubs and other infrastructure, this is a double boon. It will help it get Arctic resources to market faster and also, as the NSR becomes increasingly viable, diversify its hydrocarbon-addicted economy. There are risks in this, of dispute if not war, which will require management. What is good for Russia may be bad for Egypt, which last year earned over \$5 billion in revenues from the Suez Canal, an alternative east-west shipping route. So it is good that the regional club, the Arctic Council, is showing promise.** Under Scandinavian direction for the past half-decade, it has elicited an impressive amount of Arctic co-operation, including on scientific research, mapping and resource development.

Alt causes to Arctic Conflict

Conley and Kraut 2010 -- senior fellow and director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a research assistant in the CSIS Europe Program, where she conducts research and coordinates program activities on U.S.-European political, security, and economic relations and

the ongoing process of European political and economic integration (Heather* and Jamie,** "U.S. Strategic Interests

in the Arctic," The Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://csis.org/files/publication/100426_Conley_USStrategicInterests_Web.pdf)BC

However, **the disputed sovereign claims** over these passages **have complicated both commercial and military use of these transit corridors.** Russia, for instance, **requires by regulation that all vessels intending to enter the Northeast Passage give advance notice to Russian authorities** and submit an application for guiding, which implies paying a fee for using the route. **Navigating these treacherous waterways requires advanced icebreaker capabilities to break through the multilayer and multiyear ice, even during the summer months.** The **Arctic five** (or A-5), in addition to China, Finland, Germany, Japan, and Sweden, **maintain icebreaker fleets at varying levels of modernity and capability.** But before the Northwest and Northeast Passages can be used extensively, the international

community must address these territorial disputes and environmental concerns over increased pollution, as well as determine responsibility for patrolling these shipping routes and for responding to emergencies requiring search-and-rescue capabilities and oil spill cleanup. **“Who owns, controls, and manages these waterways? The answer could be of strategic interest to America’s trading partners and competitors.”**¹⁶ **The most significant security threats involve nonstate actors, “such as drug smugglers, gunrunners, illegal immigrants and even terrorists who might take advantage of ice-free Arctic waters to move contraband or people between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans or into North America or Europe.”**¹⁷ **Increased commercial, tourist, and military traffic has already outpaced the development of emergency response infrastructure,** such as search-and-rescue capacity, setting the stage for potentially fatal scenarios in the Arctic.

EXT: No Arctic War

No arctic war – climate diplomacy and economic pragmatism

Donald, 14 – Ros Donald is a deputy editor for Carbon Brief, a climate journal – she holds an MA in International Studies and Diplomacy (February 11, 2014. "America in the Arctic: Melting ice and soft security" <http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2014/02/arctic-melting-ice-and-soft-security/>) zabd

If you want an indication that US ambition in the Arctic has been limited, you could turn to the size of its icebreaker fleet. Russia, which sees exploiting the Arctic as vital to its national interest, has 20 icebreakers. At present, America has just three. To the frustration of many, the US has never placed the region near the top of its list of priorities. But with the Arctic sea ice in long term retreat, and new economic possibilities opening in the region, that mindset may now be changing. Soft security **Retreating sea ice creates new possibilities for resource extraction, tourism and fishing in the Arctic,** as well as the prospect of a new trade route between the Atlantic and Pacific. "[A] secure and stable region where US national interests are safeguarded, the US homeland is protected, and nations work cooperatively to address challenges". **Highlighting international cooperation, environmental stewardship and joint attempts to research and understand this fast-changing region,** the strategy reveals a softer attitude toward security in the Arctic. **The range of approaches outlined include building international cooperation through shared scientific missions, and working with other militaries and the US coastguard to respond to emergencies such as shipping accidents and oil spills.** Christian le Mière, a senior fellow for naval forces and maritime security at the International Institute of Strategic Studies explains the strategy reflects a wider, less confrontational, attitude toward security in the region: **"The Arctic is a relatively low-risk environment from the security point of view. Disputes are few in number and most economic claims are spoken for. In fact, trends in the region have been positive in terms of diplomacy. The lack of a security architecture means such positive trends may not be embedded in the longer term."** Last year, the US Department of Defense published its Arctic Strategy, followed just recently by an implementation plan. It marks a new level of US ambition in the region - the newly-published document defines US aims for the region thus: Changing relations Relations between Arctic nations didn't always seem so congenial. Commentators describe a clear divide between countries on the Arctic Council, the intergovernmental forum for Arctic states. On one side sit countries such as Norway and the US, which emphasise stewardship of the environment and a measured approach to economic development, at least for the time being. And on the other, Russia and Canada have a more immediate interest in their own regional sovereignty and access to the Arctic's resources. Glada Lahn, a senior research fellow on energy, environment and resources at Chatham House explains: "Russia has the most obvious economic need for Arctic resources and there is interest in the greater autonomy that oil might bring Greenlanders. But compared with many governments facing choices over extractives investment in ecologically sensitive areas, Arctic states can afford not to rush. In rich democracies, risk weighs more heavily than opportunity - public scrutiny and tougher safety and environmental rules will simply make many Arctic oil and gas operations unprofitable. "Look at Shell's drilling programme in offshore Alaska - the mounting cost of lawsuits, regulation and the burden of inadequate infrastructure mean that Shell has pulled back for now." **In 2007, a Russian delegation of scientists and legislators caused widespread consternation by planting the national flag on the seafloor below the Arctic ice** - a move Russia said strengthened its claim to nearly half the Arctic seabed. Some commentators were almost begging the US to step in before control of the region was

wrested from it by more aggressive parties such as Russia and Canada - both of whom see the Arctic as a vital source of new resources. Yet, there appears to have been a shift in relations. As Arctic expert Scott Borgerson wrote in Foreign Affairs, **"a funny thing happened on the way to Arctic anarchy. [...] A shared interest in profit has trumped the instinct to compete over territory".** **Even Russia's prized**

northern naval fleet is receiving less funding than it used to, signalling that the country no longer sees

America and the Nato countries as the threats it once did. **Potential territorial disputes have been**

defused through agreements such as the ilulissat Declaration, which requires nations with Arctic coasts to resolve claims peacefully. Meanwhile the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, though never ratified by the US, has provided the template for settling maritime boundary arguments. **The Arctic Council and its more secretive security counterpart, the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, have found new relevance as the forums for negotiation and cooperation in the region. Economic pragmatism and climate diplomacy** Such actions help illustrate the atmosphere of pragmatism in relations between

Arctic nations. Despite playing to their respective domestic audiences with stirring rhetoric and grand gestures - including Russia's unexpectedly harsh treatment of Greenpeace protesters last year - both Canada and Russia depend on cooperation from others to allow them to exploit the potential resources available. Duncan Depledge, research analyst on environment and security at the Royal United Services Institute says: "Russia needs international cooperation - such as investment from Asia and technology from Europe and North America - if it's going to exploit its Arctic resources. And every country needs the help of others when it comes to cleaning up transboundary environmental threats like oil spills or conducting search and rescue missions." The Arctic strategy also offers the US an opportunity to craft its image beyond Arctic relations. Secretary of State John Kerry sees America's stint at the head of the Arctic Council, starting next year, as an opportunity to showcase the country's commitment to tackling climate change - both in the Arctic and on the international stage. In contrast to the current chair Canada, which strongly emphasises economic development in the region, Kerry has vowed to make climate change the priority - a move that reflects his desire to lead on reaching an internationally binding agreement on greenhouse gas emissions reduction at negotiations next year. The US military's softer security stance complements Kerry's intentions. The US Arctic strategy outlines possible roles for military diplomacy such as working with other nations to monitor ice loss, map the region and support sustainable economic activity. Even activities like supporting civil transport and boosting infrastructure are expressed with an eye to promoting sustainability. National interest But while there is great emphasis on international sharing and caring, the plan is fundamentally geared toward the US national interest. **This ranges from uncontroversial concepts such as increasing telecommunications infrastructure, to more contested principles. An important part of the strategy involves ensuring the freedom of the seas** - an old doctrine designed to allow access to the high seas for merchant vessels.

The new document shows the military sees that preserving this right is of national interest to the US. It is also ready to "challenge excessive maritime claims" from other Arctic nations. Future tensions may indeed arise if maritime traffic increases. For instance while Canada sees the northwest passage off its coast as its sovereign territory, the US has other ideas. Soft security, blurred roles The Arctic has become a place where preconceived notions and roles are challenged. **Despite diplomatic deadlock on many other issues in international politics, Arctic nations manage to coexist relatively harmoniously** - at least for the moment. **The US military's future role in the Arctic looks set to be more fluid, mixing diplomacy with support for development and stewardship.** It has also emerged as a key actor in America's climate policy in the region, deeply involved with the practical aspects of responding to the Arctic's fast-changing climate. **America's strategy currently appears reflect the wider, more**

conciliatory, tone of Arctic relations. As the country is gears up to take a greater leadership role in the region, this state of affairs suggests it won't encounter the degree of opposition it might have just a few years ago. But without a formal security framework, that could change. More countries are flocking to stake their claim in the region. China is the latest country to gain observer status on the Arctic Council, while Norway's depleting oil stocks could force it to reassess its own priorities when it comes to stewardship over economic development. As the ice melts, and the balance of power and priorities shifts in the region, the US may have to work hard to assert its soft security approach.

Zero chance of arctic conflict-countries are co-operative-indicts all their authors

Fries 12- Communications manager for the Arctic Council's Permanent Secretariat in Tromsø, Norway (Thomas, "Perspective Correction: How We Misinterpret Arctic Conflict", The Arctic Institute, <http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/04/perspective-correction-how-we.html>)/WK

*We do not endorse gendered language

War and conflict sell papers -- the prospect of war, current wars, remembrance of wars past. Accordingly, **a growing cottage industry devotes itself to writing about the prospect of conflict among the Arctic nations** and between those nations and non-Arctic states, which is mostly code for "China." As a follower of Arctic news, I see this every day, all the time: **eight articles last week, five more already this week** from the Moscow Times, Scientific American or what-have-you. Sometimes this future conflict is portrayed as a political battle, sometimes military, but **the portrayals of the states involved are cartoonish**, Cold-War-ish...it's all good guys and bad guys. I'm convinced that **this is nonsense**, and I feel vindicated when I see the extent to which **these countries' militaries collaborate in the high North**. From last week's meeting of all eight Arctic nations' military top brass (excepting only the US; we were represented by General Charles Jacoby, head of NORAD and USNORTHCOM) to **Russia-Norway collaboration on search & rescue; from US-Canada joint military exercises to US-Russia shared research in the Barents**...no matter where you look, **the arc of this relationship bends towards cooperation**. But **there's a bigger misconception that underlies the predictions of future Arctic conflict that we read every week**. This is **the (usually) unspoken assumption that the governments of these states are capable of acting quickly, unilaterally and secretly to pursue their interests in the Arctic**. **False**. This idea that some state might manage a political or military smash-and-grab while the rest of us are busy clipping our fingernails or walking the dog is ridiculous. **The overwhelming weight of evidence suggests that the governments of the Arctic states are, like most massive organizations, bureaucratic messes**. Infighting between federal agencies is rampant all around, as are political shoving matches between federal and state/provincial/regional governments. **Money is still scarce, and chatter about military activism isn't backed up by much**: Canada is engaged in a sad debate over the downgrading of the proposed Nanisivik port; the United States' icebreaker fleet is barely worth mentioning and shows little sign of new life in the near-term future; US Air Force assets are being moved 300+ miles south from Fairbanks to Anchorage; and **Russia's talk about a greater Arctic presence has been greatly inflated for the sake of the recent elections**. In a more general sense, **we have viciously polarized governments in the US and, to a lesser extent, Canada**, as well as numerous "hotter" wars elsewhere that will take the lion's share of our blood and treasure before the Arctic gets a drop of either. **The smaller states might be able to act more nimbly, but Norway and Denmark** are successful Scandinavian social-market

economies with modestly-sized militaries who aren't likely to put military adventurism in the Arctic at the top of their to-do lists. They're also patient decision-makers who are making apparently sincere (if not always successful) efforts to incorporate their resident indigenous communities into national politics. This makes fast, unilateral, secret action unlikely. And then there is Russia. From the outside, it can often seem as though the Russian government rules by fiat. This reasonably leads to the concern that someone might take it into his head to assert Russia's military might or otherwise extend the country's sovereignty in the Arctic. But it is fairly clear that Russia's success is currently, and for the near-term future, dependent on its position within the constellation of global hydrocarbon suppliers. To continue to develop its supply base, Russia needs the assistance of the oil majors of neighboring states, and indeed it is showing signs of warming up to foreign engagement with its Arctic hydrocarbons in significant ways. Its political relationships with its regular customers are also critical to its future success. Russia isn't likely to wantonly sour those relationships by acting aggressively against all four of its wealthy, well-networked littoral brothers [states] in Europe and North America. It's not only the handcuffs of many colors worn by the Arctic states that will keep them from getting aggressive, it is also the good precedents that exist for cooperation here. Russia and Norway recently resolved a forty year-old dispute over territory in the Barents. There are regular examples of military cooperation among the four littoral NATO states and between Norway and Russia. Even the US and Russia are finding opportunities to work together. Meanwhile, the need to develop search-and-rescue capabilities is making cross-border cooperation a necessity for all Arctic actors. There are numerous international research and private-sector ventures, even in areas other than hydrocarbons. These will only grow in importance with time. In fact, it would seem that for many of these countries, the Arctic is a welcome relief - a site where international collaboration is comparatively amicable.

Interest driven approaches don't preclude cooperation

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The evidence shows that talk of a new Cold War in the Arctic is overblown Closer analysis of the actual importance of Arctic oil and gas to the countries concerned, as well as the consideration of the uncertainty and spatial distribution of Arctic hydrocarbons, offers a much more differentiated picture. The USA and Canada are unlikely to join a potential rush for Russia's Arctic resources given their own vast resource bases. Norway and Denmark both concentrate on their own hydrocarbon potential, because it is needed for economic and autonomy reasons, respectively.

Activities concerning the most promising resources, Arctic offshore oil and gas, are currently of rather secondary importance in a global perspective. In the near- to medium-term future, however, increased activity can be expected. Given the empirical findings, it is safe to conclude that this will not lead to major inter-state confrontations, but if any conflict about Arctic natural resources were to arise, it will most likely concern complicated business relationships between the Russian state and foreign oil and gas companies wanting to get a share of Russia's vast hydrocarbon base to satisfy especially high European demand. In this respect, Russia is confronted with a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, it aims to protect its resources by declaring them strategic and thus strongly limiting non-Russian involvement in any development activities. On the other hand, Russia's economy is highly dependent on the continued expansion of its oil and gas production, which will be impossible to achieve in the future without foreign expertise and capital. This precarious situation is exacerbated by the overall risky and unpredictable Russian investment climate. It remains to be seen how joint exploration and exploitation agreements between Russian

(state) firms and foreign companies will work out. After the failed Rosneft–BP agreement, the new deal between Rosneft and Exxon to explore and exploit fields in the Kara Sea offers a new chance of observing the development of such a joint venture (Kramer, 2011b; Washington, 2011; Werdigier, 2011).

The empirical conclusions suggest, first and foremost, that it is of utmost importance to start the analysis of the political state of a region by critically examining the actual stakes and interests involved, rather than arriving at premature conclusions based on underlying assumptions. Closer empirical scrutiny indicates that neorealist expectations of a geopolitical rush for Arctic resources are unrealistic, while the addition of constructivist variables in empirical analysis can supplement rational materialist accounts of actors' interests. While the overall interest-based approach is useful to unpack the black box of 'Arctic interests', the constitution of these interests cannot be solely understood in rationalist terms but has to include identity, cultural and historical considerations of the importance of the Arctic region to the respective countries.

Finally, these conclusions also help to clarify institutionalist arguments about the necessary institutional adjustments for Arctic affairs. **The lack of an imminent confrontation over Arctic commodities renders new institutional mechanisms to deal with such confrontations premature, if not redundant.** In particular, **UNCLOS appears to be a suitable and detailed rule collection to govern possible contentious issues such as extended jurisdiction over countries' continental shelves. The Arctic Council is an expedient forum for scientific knowledge accumulation, and steps have been taken to involve interested, non-Arctic states (Senior Arctic Officials (SAO), 2011: 50).**

Neorealism is wrong – your evidence doesn't have empirical backing which proves there will be no war

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While neorealists have made grandiloquent statements about the likelihood of conflict in the Arctic, and neoliberal institutionalists have made judgements about the necessary reform of the institutional system governing Arctic issues, both arguments have been based on only limited empirical support. To overcome this lacuna, this study outlines the actual stakes involved.

The argument here draws on both rational–institutionalist and constructivist concepts to explain the political state of the Arctic. It is assumed that the state of international politics in the Arctic is explained by the distribution of interests of the five coastal Arctic states, the presence of international institutions adequate to these countries' interests and the strength of the respective country's Arctic identity. This approach emphasizes actors' interests, based on cost–benefit analysis, as the major determinants of cooperation and conflict (e.g. Keohane, 1989; Koremenos et al., 2001; Moravcsik, 1997); however, **the constructivist focus on identity and culture are taken as important factors in the formation of states' interests (Adler, 2002; Fearon and Wendt, 2002; Jepperson et al., 1996; Wendt, 1992, 1999).** In this study, therefore, rational–institutionalist and constructivist variables are analytically separated but assumed to be mutually determined, which helps to overcome some of the weaknesses of previous Arctic research.

To make Arctic interests explicit, this article uses the issue area of Arctic oil and gas as the most pre-eminent and allegedly conflict-prone issue area. Arctic hydrocarbon resources have been on the forefront of rising political interest, given the rising importance of energy security on countries' agendas, the relative political stability of the Arctic region, technological advances, increasing global energy demand, fewer available alternatives and high energy prices. **Arctic hydrocarbons can therefore be considered 'most likely' to lead to rising stakes among the Arctic states and thus to an increased likelihood of competitive or conflictive behaviour between these states (George and Bennett, 2005: 120–124). This article therefore examines the Arctic oil and gas interests of the five Arctic littoral states (herein also called the Arctic five), in order to establish how important they are for the respective countries' policies. The key explanatory factors for the Arctic five's interests are overall standing of the Arctic in countries' policies, market relevance of Arctic oil and gas, and the identity, cultural and historical relevance of the Arctic to each country.**

The **empirical analysis shows that the five littoral states have radically different levels of interests towards the High North. The USA dedicates rather low importance to the Arctic in general and to the region's hydrocarbons in particular, whereas for Russia, in contrast, the Arctic is of tremendous importance because of a combination of security, economic and identity reasons.** Canada, Norway and Denmark/Greenland all show high interest but for very different reasons. While for Canada, the Arctic and its hydrocarbon resources are important predominantly for sovereignty reasons, Greenland's main interest in Arctic oil and gas is owing to the inhabitants' ambitions for political autonomy. Norway, in contrast, has very high economic stakes in its northern resources. This has important implications for the international politics of the Arctic region and for the theoretical understanding of Arctic affairs. Firstly, **neorealist expectations of a geopolitical rush for Arctic resources are unlikely to eventuate. Further, while finding that institutional adjustments are necessary, this article refines the general institutionalist call for institutional reform to environmental issues. Lastly, rational materialist and ideological constructivist notions have to be combined in order to satisfactorily assess actors' interests in the Arctic region.**

Russia is pragmatic – won't attack

Käpylä and Mikkola '13 – Finnish Institute of International Affairs (Juha, Harri, "The Global Arctic", August, FIIA BRIE FING PAPER 133) //J.N.E

Russia also has strategic military forces in the Arctic, most notably the Northern Fleet and its ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). These mobile forces are of increasing strategic importance due to the challenges that Russian land-based intercontinental ballistic-missile capability faces today.⁸ However, **developments in Russian hard power in the Arctic have been relatively modest, especially if compared to the Cold War era, and there is widespread agreement that instead of re-militarization or the potential for a hot conflict, Russia is seeking to govern its increasingly busy northern front and secure its interests therein.**⁹

While Russia seeks to modernize and project hard power in the Arctic, **it is a pragmatic player that has relied on international cooperation to maintain stability conducive to economic activity in the region. It has resolved long-standing border disputes through bilateral negotiations and endorsed multilateral governance in the Arctic. It has also endorsed the Arctic Council as the legitimate institutional governance framework, including its recent Kiruna developments. Even if Russia is likely to harbour concerns about the growing role of China in the region and its governance, on the whole, Russia seems to have little to lose in the AC co-operation as the forum cannot produce independent and binding resolutions without Russia's consent.**

Russia has also supported the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the legitimate multilateral legal framework for governing the Arctic Ocean, including the resolution of maritime boundary issues, resource disputes on the continental shelves, and maritime navigation disagreements. The key question that remains, however, is how committed pragmatic Russia is to supporting multilateral governance in the Arctic, for example in the event of a potentially unfavourable CLCS decision regarding Russia's claim to extend her continental shelf.

Russia's attempt to increase presence is slow and modest

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Russian activity in the Arctic has also increased. In August 2007, Moscow renewed long-range aviation patrols to the Atlantic and the Pacific, and over the Arctic, oceans. Strategic bomber flights along the Norwegian coast increased from just 14 in 2006 to 97 in 2008; although the number declined in subsequent years, it rose to over 55 in 2012.¹⁶ **In March 2013, two Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers and four Su-27 multi-role aircraft flew within 20 miles of Sweden's borders;** the failure of the Swedish Air Force to scramble in response to the night-time exercises led to searing media criticism.¹⁷ **Surface naval patrols also returned** Downloaded by [141.213.236.110] at 13:51 07 July 2014 The Arctic as a theatre of military operations | 87 **to Arctic waters for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union in 2008.**¹⁸ **The Russian military has therefore recovered somewhat from the dire circumstances of the post-Cold War environment,** but it is equally struggling to deal with the legacy of a lack of investment in its equipment. The recapitalisation of its fleet is on the surface a concern for neighbouring states, but it is occurring from a very low base of capability. Equally, the focus on smaller vessels will, for the foreseeable future, benefit organisations beyond the Northern Fleet. In line with this military rejuvenation, **Moscow has touted the need to increase its military presence in the Arctic,** but the force posture announced thus far is modest. **The primary change in the next few years will be a renovation of the SSBN fleet, a factor that underlines the strategic importance of the Arctic** but does not suggest state-based military competition in the region on a significant scale. **It seems, therefore, presumptive to call the Russian defence modernisation a militarisation of the Arctic, particularly as current activity remains a shadow of that seen in the Cold-War era.**

The Arctic isn't Ukraine – Russia knows it can't attack and will adhere to multilateralism

Byers '14 – professor at the University of British Columbia, and expert on international law, won the Donner Prize for best Canadian public-policy book (Michael, "The Arctic is not Ukraine", May 1st, *ProQuest*) //J.N.E

Moscow in winter is like the bar scene in *Star Wars*. Blue-eyed women in long fur coats ride the subway alongside Asian labourers in snowmobile suits. This December, I will return to Moscow to launch the Russian translation of my book. **I am not naive about Russian President Vladimir Putin, whom I have met and do not like. The former KGB agent acts like one in his dealings with opponents, from Alexander Litvinenko to Pussy Riot. In the 1990s, Mr. Putin's**

forces killed tens of thousands of civilians in Chechnya. A decade later, he blasted his way into Georgia, prying away two Russian-speaking enclaves. Mr. Putin enabled Bashar al-Assad to commit mass murder in Syria and is now dissecting the sovereign country of Ukraine. Much tougher economic sanctions are needed, perhaps even a North Atlantic Treaty Organization-wide embargo of Russian natural gas. A gas embargo would require costly measures to protect European citizens and businesses against shortages. But meaningful sanctions are painful for both sides - and a gas embargo would squeeze Mr. Putin hard. At the same time, diplomatic contacts are more important than ever. Cutting back on diplomacy is cheap, easy and counterproductive. In the short term, it cost Canada nothing to boycott an Arctic Council meeting on "black carbon" a couple of weeks ago. The long-term costs are more difficult to calculate. Arctic countries are making progress on reducing the soot produced by diesel engines and coal-fired plants - soot that, when it lands on ice and snow, absorbs solar energy and accelerates melting. Reducing black carbon may be the most effective, readily available measure for slowing climate change. Arctic countries have been co-operating on environmental protection since 1973, when, at the height of the Cold War, they signed the Polar Bear Treaty. The treaty saved an iconic species by prohibiting big-game hunters from shooting bears from ships and helicopters. In 1982, Canada chaired the committee that drafted the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. **Russia has abided by the convention, negotiating fisheries management regimes and maritime boundaries with the United States and Norway, and mapping the central Arctic Ocean in preparation for a science-based claim to areas of seabed beyond its existing, legally recognized 200-mile exclusive economic zone. Mr. Putin is a thug, but not a fool.** In 2010, I watched him say: **"If you stand alone, you cannot survive in the Arctic."** **Russia needs foreign capital, technology and markets to develop its Arctic oil and gas, which already account for 20 per cent of its gross domestic product. Investment, technology transfer and trade depend, in turn, on political and legal stability.** **Mr. Putin understands the scale of Russia's Arctic, which stretches across seven time zones, and the region's punishing weather and ice conditions. He knows that Russia cannot afford the vast sums it would take to prepare for state-to-state conflict there.** Recently, **Russia's military spending in the Arctic has focused on the challenges that come with increased civilian access, whether by foreign cargo ships, smugglers or Greenpeace. In the Arctic, Russia is not that different from Canada.** **Both countries' leaders want to develop the natural resources of vast uncontested territories and continental shelves.** Along the fringes of those shelves, **they seek the maximum extent of their country's rights under international law.** In Ukraine, Mr. Putin is behaving abhorrently. He should be punished - and hopefully redirected - through much tougher economic sanctions. **The Arctic has a different constellation of relationships and interests. If Russia and the West cannot co-operate in the Arctic, they cannot co-operate anywhere.** When I return to Moscow in December, I will be following the course recommended by Winston Churchill: "To jaw-jaw is always better than to war-war."

Conflict is unlikely in the Arctic

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Whether the sensitivities of the Arctic littoral states to cooperation with the three non-littoral states, or mutual mistrust between Russia and the other states, will prevent such an architecture from being formed is the main unknown in Arctic security. For the time being, however, while there remains suspicion among some Arctic states – and occasional bouts of belligerent rhetoric and the procurement of some equipment, which suggests state-based rivalry – the reality is that the Arctic is not witnessing an uncontrolled or substantially competitive militarisation. It is a region that has inherent strategic value, given the patrols of ballistic-missile submarines, but it is also one in which operations are hampered by weather and geography. While Russian defence spending has increased rapidly, it is from a remarkably low base and investments are currently just rejuvenating an entirely dilapidated fleet. Most Nordic budgets are constrained by austerity, US defence priorities lie elsewhere and Canada's primary Arctic-focused procurement is of vessels devoted to

maritime security. There may be more military activity in the Arctic in the future, but it is currently far from being a battleground for rival states.

The Arctic is governed by multipolarity and soft power – makes Arctic conflict impossible

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On the other hand, **balanced multipolar systems are structures without a potential hegemon. As a result, there is less of a security threat than in an unbalanced system.** The **Arctic powers that have ratified the UNCLOS are more or less equal in power. Therefore, the Arctic region can be considered a balanced multipolar system.** However, the Arctic does have a hegemonic power that has been waiting on the sidelines of the game, the US. Furthermore, Russia could be seen as having greater power in the Arctic as its use of the UNCLOS provisions has given the state an upper-hand in the fight for sovereign rights. However, the other Arctic states can also use the UNCLOS to claim sovereign rights, though being the first to submit a sizeable claim has given Russia considerably more power. **Multipolarity in the Arctic needs to be defined as a system of two or more powers with one hegemonic power (United States), a potential dominant power (Russia) and several great powers (Canada, Denmark and Norway).** Furthermore, **illustrating the polarity of the Arctic states as a triad configuration helps to explain the forthcoming idea that perhaps the great powers are counter-balancers to Russian power in the Arctic space.** Counterbalancing can be defined as an influence that balances or offsets another's power in the international system. Brooks and Wohlforth argue that counter-balancers repress excessive amounts of power by either enhancing the power of another ally in order for that state to develop into a "peer rival to the hegemon" or by combining capabilities through an alliance that roughly equals the capabilities of the hegemon (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008,25). In this sense, **counterbalancing is tailored to systems that surround a hegemonic power. However, counterbalancing can also be defined as the attempt to "build up real resources and capabilities to match, check, or block another state's use of such capabilities to advance its security interests"** (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008,25). By using this definition of counterbalancing, the action can be securely fitted to the Arctic triad structure of power.

The **three great powers of the triad (Canada, Denmark and Norway) can be defined as counter-balancers that match, check, or block Russia's soft power, by also utilizing the provisions of the UNCLOS.** Furthermore, Brooks and Wohlforth state that **"balancing is a great power phenomenon, because only great powers can prevent one among them from attaining geopolitical predominance"** (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008, 26). By deconstructing this sentence, one can argue that **Russia, the potential dominant 45 power among the states, could also counterbalance the three great powers.** If the great powers successfully impede Russia from gaining power, then does it not give the great powers the upper hand? Additionally, this could then be seen by Russia as an act of aggression and an attempt to establish geopolitical dominance. In essence, the great powers' attempts to thwart Russian power could place these states in a higher position of influence, making Russia a great power again. This would then lessen Russian power in the Arctic system. Moreover, Russia could then be persuaded to counterbalance the capabilities of Norway, Canada and Denmark.

Overall, this section has helped to develop the argument of this thesis by first defining power as it pertains to current Arctic geopolitics. Furthermore, by breaking down the types of opposing structures, it is possible to establish the degree of power that each Arctic state holds at a given time. Accordingly, some of the theoretical thinkers of power and politics have helped to argue that in the contemporary world, much is needed to provoke a great power to go to war with another great power; thus solidifying this 46 paper's argument that soft power instruments will be the preferred tool for the Arctic states. Ultimately, the clarifications under this section assist in further explaining the structural design of the Arctic space within the international system.

Data proves – both countries are too interdependent to fight each other

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In this section, I will present the data collected concerning the ten dyads for the five Arctic littoral states. This data looks to the number and frequency of bilateral agreements as an indicator of successful interstate diplomacy, export levels to gauge the degree of economic interdependence between states, Freedom House scores to discern the degree of democratic institutions, and Correlate of War data on diplomatic exchanges to determine if diplomatic relations are normalized and if war has occurred between any of the five Arctic states in the past twenty years. I will first discuss the rationale behind studying these facets of the Arctic dyads' relationships before presenting the data and providing an analysis of it. First, studying dyads' recent history of conflict sheds insight on the propensity for future conflict since past conflict statistically begets future conflict. Paul Hensel, studying interstate conflicts from 1816-1992, found that adversaries "are more likely to become involved in recurrent conflict" (Hensel 1996, 43). Regardless of the issues involved, 61.2% of all militarized disputes studied in the population were followed by another dispute between the same adversaries "within fifteen years" (Hensel 1996, 62). Possible causal explanations are that there exist structural sources of misalignment between the two adversaries or, that once the leaders of at least one nation have demonstrated willingness to go to war, it makes it easier to go to war again. The inverse of the latter explanation has some empirical grounding, as Mark Crescenzi found studying dyads from 1817 to 2000 that a country's reputation for hostility "increases" the likelihood of intra-dyadic conflict "markedly" (Crescenzi 2006, 25). Certainly, arguments abound that once war has been conducted, especially over territory, intangibles like national identity and honor Conflict or Cooperation? Arctic Geopolitics and Climate Change Byron Ruby Berkeley Undergraduate Journal: Volume 25, Issue 1 95 lead to a "sore loser syndrome" that can incur future backlash and domestic incentives to push for military confrontation (Hensel 1996, 45-47). Second, knowing whether or not two countries mutually recognize each other in diplomatic channels is a strong proxy for how tense the dyadic relationship is. Not only is the withdrawal of diplomats and emissaries a symbolic act of disapproval, but it also forces communication— if any—into back channels or third-parties (LaFeber 2008). A powerful example is that of the United States and the People's Republic of China after the fall of the Kuomintang. For several decades, the United States refused to recognize Chinese leadership on the mainland, leading to heightened perceptions (or, perhaps, misperceptions) on both sides that the other nation was a greater threat than it actually was (LaFeber 2008, 261-263). As theorists like Jervis have noted, such misperceptions can feed into and fuel the security dilemma further, leading to volatile political situations (Jervis 1976). Third, investigating levels of bilateral trade sheds light on levels of economic and political interdependence between nations. Although the lack of trade between nations should not be viewed as a trigger for war, the converse—a high degree of bilateral trade—is often a significant damper on war and conflict. With its roots in classical liberals like Kant and Montesquieu, this perspective has gained empirical traction in recent years, the rationale being that trade reduces incentives to fight since conflict interrupts and interferes with trade, while potentially leaving the warring countries vulnerable if they are dependent on their adversary for certain raw materials, commodities, or services (Gartzke & Quan 2003; Hegre et al 2010). Empirical studies of interstate dyads have

confirmed that increased bilateral trade is “associated with lower incidences of militarized interstate disputes and war, even controlling for potentially confounding, theoretically interesting influences: geographic contiguity, the balance of power, alliance bonds, and economic growth rates” (Oneal & Russett 1997, 288). Therefore, it is important to take stock of levels of bilateral trade between dyads in the Arctic, as high levels of trade may be an indicator of heightened cooperation in future relations. Fourth, a similar facet of dyadic relationships is bilateral agreement making. Bilateral agreements encompass a wide range of issues, ranging from military alliances, trade treaties, and joint scientific ventures. The prevailing wisdom is that treaties and alliances merely represent “expediency” and “nothing deeper than a temporary need of two or more states to coordinate their actions” (Bremer 1992, 315). Nonetheless, a preponderance of bilateral treaty creation and maintenance over a prolonged period of time may reflect, then, an alignment of durable (and potentially long-term) structural interests, be they economic, military, or otherwise. And fifth, drawing from literature on DPT, a final indicator worth investigating is the institutionalized levels of democracy within each Arctic nation. In the case of DPT, the empirical findings are more or less undisputed—democratic dyads rarely go to war, although mixed dyads of democracies and autocracies are still prone to the outbreak of conflict (Oneal & Russett 1997). The theoretical underpinnings for explaining why democracies resist going to war with each other, however, are less unequivocal. Explanations range from Kant’s institutionalism to notions of a democratic “culture” that impedes fighting ‘like-minded’ nations (Russett 1993). Regardless of the causal link—if we are to presuppose there even is one—that reduces militarized conflict between democracies to recherché historical anomalies, the empirical trend leans strongly in favor of democratic dyads, suggesting that the degree of democratic institutions should at least for now be left as an important indicator of the likelihood of future conflict.

Their conception of a conflict is too reductive to be useful – scholars inflate definitions

Ruby ’12 - John Gardner Fellow at the U.S. Department of State in the Office of Global Change working on adaptation measures to climate change (Byron, “Conflict or Cooperation? Arctic Geopolitics and Climate Change”, Berkeley Undergraduate Journal, 25(1), Peer Reviewed) //J.N.E

Prior to delving into the results of the research, it important to define the parameters of the research, namely in terms of the definition of "conflict," the scope of the research, and the merits of a "methodologically eclectic" approach. Within the existing literature on Arctic geopolitics and climate change, few authors explicitly define what they mean by "conflict." In fact, the term is often thrown around loosely, sometimes referring to a state of armed warfare or at other times to conflict of the political or diplomatic kind. While these uses are certainly legitimate and within the established meaning of the word, it makes for fuzzy boundaries and ambiguous projections: the chance or likelihood of future diplomatic "conflict," whatever that is intended to mean, most certainly differs—and probably differs starkly—from the chances of total war between two Arctic nations. Thus, for the purposes of this research, unless otherwise specified, conflict is defined as a militarized confrontation between at least two countries. No shots need be fired, nor do casualties need to be suffered. A formal declaration of war would also be too high of a standard for "conflict," as that would exclude such prominent wars like those in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf on the basis of what has become in many respects a dispensable procedural formality. Rather, the mere formal invocation of some form of coercive force is sufficient to qualify an event as a form of conflict (e.g. ordering a ship to fire across the bow of another ship belonging to another nation). A baseline example of what would constitute a conflict, then, is the Turbot War of 1995 between Canada and Spain, where the Canadian Navy boarded a Spanish fishing vessel and arrested its crew for fishing in Canada’s Exclusive Economic Zone off the coast of Newfoundland (Nordås & Gleditsch 2007, 631). In this respect, this definition of conflict differs slightly from the typical notion of "war," which tends to connote much greater military mobilization and the number of casualties being greater than zero (Bremer 1992, 310). The logic for narrowing the scope of conflict in this respect is twofold. First, while there has certainly been a history of diplomatic dispute in the Arctic, there has yet to be any form of armed brinksmanship or militarized conflict to date—at least not since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. This leaves such

future-facing projections on armed conflict—such as this research— still a relevant exercise. Second, it creates a clear distinction between what does constitute "conflict" and what does not. Definitions of conflict seeking to make qualitative judgments on the degree, size, or escalation of conflict inevitably invite criticism in terms of the arbitrariness of the line that renders some conflicts authentic and others as something else altogether. That said, the methodology used further narrows and limits the scope of the question and the explanatory output it produces, since the extent and explanatory power of the projection cannot be separated from the method used. This recognizes that different methods have both strengths and merits in forecasting future trends. Hence, I will be combining a qualitative and quantitative method, pursuing a strategy known as “methodological eclecticism,” so as to hedge against the weaknesses of a purely quantitative or qualitative research approach (Yanchar & Williams 2006, 3). This eclectic approach—comprised jointly by a historic dyadic analysis and a statistical simulation—is examined in the following sections

Diplomacy solves escalation

Lackenbauer 10 - Assistant Professor of Modern Canadian History, PhD and an MA in history from the University of Calgary, and a BA from the University of Waterloo. (Whitney, “ An Arctic conflict is unlikely”, Lexis) zabd

Climate change, the receding ice cap, potentially feasible transportation routes, and newly accessible resources have prompted unprecedented interest in the Arctic. Some commentators perpetuate the idea that a "showdown" is looming between Canada and Russia over Arctic resources, playing on the political rhetoric of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev promising to protect Russia's Arctic resources. I agree that Medvedev's comments are not helpful, and his vague references to other countries' attempts to deny Russians access to their mineral resources are peculiar. They are also unsurprising, and do not forecast an inevitable "clash" over the Arctic. Russian foreign policy is notoriously difficult to interpret. Winston Churchill once called it "a puzzle inside a riddle wrapped in an enigma, and the key is Russian nationalism." As much as Canada proclaims itself to be an "Arctic superpower," the Russians really are. They derive roughly 20 per cent of their GDP and 22 per cent of their exports north of the Arctic circle. Up to 90 per cent of Russian hydrocarbon reserves on the continental shelf are in the Arctic, as well as strategic reserves of metals and minerals such as copper, cobalt, nickel, gold, and diamonds. The stakes are high for the Russians, and they have a proven track record of actually exploiting these resources, and their economy is deplorably dependent on energy extraction. It is understandable that they are concerned about the process of defining the limits of their continental shelf. Canada, of course, also talks of its Arctic resource frontier. In contrast to the Russians, however, we have a poor record of actually investing in resource development in the region. We cannot claim to derive even one per cent of our GDP from the region. But as quick as we and our Western allies are to point accusatory fingers at Russian politicians who resolve to protect what is theirs, we are just as guilty of hyperbolic rhetoric and political chest-pounding. Prime Minister Stephen Harper's messages of "use it or lose it," "stand up for Canada," and talk of Canada as an "Arctic superpower" might be designed for domestic audience, but they also register outside of Canada. The irony, of course, is that Canada's behaviour mirrors that of Russia. We have broadcast to the world our intentions to beef up our military presence as if this will somehow bolster our sovereignty position. As my new book with Peter Kikkert suggests, this logic is problematic. Our legal sovereignty over the territory, waters, and continental shelf in our Arctic is well-established. Our rights are protected by international law, and will not be strengthened by a stronger military presence. There is no risk of the Russians stealing away Ellesmere Island, or the Danes using Hans Island as a stepping stone to claim other parts of our archipelago. We have not even submitted our claim to the extended continental shelf, which will be based upon ongoing scientific research. When we do, our rights are clearly established. **There is no "scramble"** for territory, and "use it or lose it" is a misnomer. We already have the sovereignty that we need. The Russians stand to benefit most of all if Arctic boundaries are sorted out according to international law. Indeed, beside every provocative Russian statement about its resolve to defend its claims is another that reiterates Russia's commitment to legal processes.

Defer negative – their impacts are all hype – resource protection disincentivizes conflict

Mahoney, 13 – reporter for the EUObserver (Honor, EUObserver, "Fears of Arctic conflict are 'overblown'", March 19th, <http://euobserver.com/foreign/119479>) //J.N.E

BRUSSELS - The Arctic has become a new frontier in international relations, but fear of potential conflict in the resource-rich region is overblown, say experts. For long a mystery because of its general impenetrability, melting ice caps are revealing more and more of the Arctic region to scientists, researchers and industry. Climate change experts can take a more precise look at what global warming is doing to the planet, shipping trade routes once considered unthinkable are now possible, and governments and businesses are in thrall to the potential exploitation of coal, iron, rare earths and oil. The interest is reflected in the growing list of those wanting to have a foot in the Arctic council, a forum of eight countries with territory in the polar region. While the US, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Russia and Canada form the council, the EU commission, China, India, South Korea and Japan have all expressed an interest in having a permanent observer status. "The Arctic has become a new meeting place for America, Europe and the Asia Pacific," says Damien Degeorges, founder of the Arctic Policy and Economic Forum. During a recent conference on Arctic shipping routes in the European Parliament, Degeorges noted that "China has been the most active by far in the last years." He points to its red-carpet treatment of politicians from Greenland, a territory that recently got full control over its wealth of natural resources. Beijing also cosied up to Iceland after the island's financial meltdown. The two undertook a joint expedition to the North Pole and the Chinese have the largest foreign embassy in Reykjavik. Meanwhile, South Korea's president visited Greenland last year and shipping hubs like Singapore are holding Arctic conferences. The interest is being spurred by melting icebergs. Last year saw a record low of multi-year ice - permanent ice - in the polar sea. This means greater shipping and mineral exploitation potential. There were 37 transits of the North East Passage (NEP), running from the Atlantic to the Pacific along the top of Russia, in 2011. This rose to 47 in 2012. For a ship travelling from the Netherlands to China, the route around 40 percent shorter than using the traditional Suez Canal. A huge saving for China, where 50 percent of its GDP is connected to shipping. Russia is also keen to exploit the route as the rise in temperatures is melting the permafrost in its northern territory, playing havoc with its roads and railways. According to Jan Fritz Hansen, deputy director of the Danish shipowners' association, the real breakthrough will come when there is a cross polar route. At the moment there are two options - the North East Passage for which Russia asks high fees for transiting ships - or the much-less developed North West Passage along Canada. His chief concern is that "trade up there is free. We don't want protectionism. Everyone should be allowed to compete up there." And he believes the biggest story of the Arctic is not how it is traversed but what will be taken out of it. According to the US Geological Survey (2009), the Arctic holds 13 percent of undiscovered oil and 30 percent of undiscovered gas supplies. Greenland is already at the centre of political tussle between the EU and China over future exploitation of its rare earths - used in a range of technologies such as hybrid cars or smart phones. "The biggest adventure will be the Arctic destination. There is a lot of valuable goods that should be taken out of nature up there," he said. This resource potential - although tempered by the fact that much of it is not economically viable to exploit - has led to fears that the Arctic region is ripe for conflict. But this is nonsense, says Nil Wang, a former Danish admiral and Arctic expert. Most resources have an owner "There is a general public perception that the Arctic region holds great potential for conflict because it is an ungoverned region where all these resources are waiting to be picked up by the one who gets there first. That is completely false," he said. He notes that it is an "extremely well-regulated region," with international rules saying that coastal states have territorial jurisdiction up to 12 nautical miles off their coast. On top of that is a further 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic zone "where you own every value in the water and under the seabed." "Up to 97 percent of energy resources is actually belonging to someone already," says Wang. He suggest the actors in the region all want to create a business environment, which requires stable politics and security. But he concedes there are "risk factors." These include "ambiguous communication" (so that there is an impression of a security conflict), and possible fishing wars as fish stocks move further north because of rising temperatures into areas with no fishing rules. A fall-out in relations between the China and the US could also impact the Arctic region but the "Arctic itself will not create conflict." As for the EU, it has been seeking to gain a foothold in the region. It spends millions of euros each year on research, environmental and social programmes in the Arctic area. A European Commission strategy paper last year noted that giving the commission permanent observer status - it applied in 2008 - in the Arctic Council would allow the EU "to gain detailed understanding of the concerns of

Arctic partners." But Wang reckons it has little chance for now. "Russia is the biggest boy in the school yard. And in this case you don't normally invite anyone from a neighbouring school yard that is bigger than you. And Canada is more or less of the same opinion," he noted.

Science Leadership

SQ Solves Science

Climate change research in the Antarctic happening now

Stars and Stripes 12 (Seth Robson, “Antarctic research could change lives around the world”, 2/5/12, <http://www.stripes.com/news/antarctic-research-could-change-lives-around-the-world-1.167784>)

MCMURDO STATION, Antarctica — Climate change research that the U.S. military is supporting in Antarctica will likely impact the lives of billions and might even affect servicemembers’ careers. About 125 U.S. military personnel are on the ice this summer providing logistical support to scientists investigating subjects as diverse as astronomy, physics, biology, geology, oceanography and glaciology. In terms of global impact, few fields of research are as important as efforts to understand climate change and what’s learned about the phenomenon in Antarctica will help policy makers determine U.S. energy and foreign policy for decades. If pundits are right, and conflicts arise over resources made scarce by a warming earth, the research could have a bearing on future deployments. National Science Foundation representative in Antarctica George Blaisdell said: “The vast majority of research that goes on down here is answering components of the questions: Is climate change happening? How is it happening and on what kind of timetable?”

Antarctica has a central role to play in the climate of the planet, said Chuck Kennicutt, president of the multi-national Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research. “It is a very exciting time for research in the polar regions,” he said. “It is things people read about in newspapers every day.” Ninety percent of the world’s fresh water is bound up in Antarctic ice sheets, Kennicutt said. “The polar ice is the planet’s thermostat,” he said. “There is a lot of interest in trying to understand if the ice sheets are stable and whether they are increasing or decreasing in mass and how that will play out over the next century.” One of the biggest research programs going on in Antarctica is a study of the Pine Island Glacier, which drains a major part of West Antarctica and is moving at 10 feet a day. Glaciers in other part of the world move a few inches per year, Blaisdell said. Members of the 109th Airlift Wing have been flying long missions to the isolated glacier in support of the research, which has been slowed by poor weather this season, he said. Scientists are drilling miles beneath the Antarctic ice sheets to obtain samples of ancient ice that they can examine to find out about past climate change, according to Jeff Severinghaus, 52, a professor from the Scripps Institute of Oceanography in San Diego, who has been helping collect ice core samples in West Antarctica this season. “The ice down there is 62,000 years old,” he said. “A lot of snow falls each year there so the yearly layers at that depth are 2 cm thick and we can see climate events that happen each year. What we are hoping to learn from this ice core is how the natural system will respond in coming centuries to human caused global warming.”

SQ solves – we just charter foreign icebreakers to get to research bases

O’Rourke 6/14

Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service, Quote from July 2010 Coast Guard High Latitude Study, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress,” <http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc85474/>

Although Coast Guard polar icebreakers in the past have performed the annual McMurdo break-in mission, the NSF in recent years has chartered Russian and Swedish contractor-operated icebreakers to perform the mission (with a Coast Guard polar icebreaker standing ready to assist if needed). The NSF has also noted that Healy, though very capable in supporting Arctic research, operates at sea for about 200 days a year, as opposed to about 300 days a year for foreign contractor-operated polar icebreakers.

Can't Solve

Alt cause - Recent budgets terminally destroyed science leadership

Orbach, 11 – Energy Institute at The University of Texas at Austin and served as Under Secretary for Science in the United States DOE [Raymond L. Orbach, Director, Energy Institute at The University of Texas at Austin, “Research Vital to Economic Growth”,
http://www.energy.utexas.edu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=100:research-vital-to-economic-growth&catid=32:editorials&Itemid=47, SM]

It was with a mixture of astonishment and dismay that I watched as the U.S. House of Representatives approved H.R. 1, a bill to fund the federal government for the rest of the 2011 fiscal year. Left intact, the massive cuts in research contained in the bill passed on 19 February would effectively end America's legendary status as the leader of the worldwide scientific community, putting the United States at a distinct disadvantage when competing with other nations in the global marketplace. Other countries, such as China and India, are increasing their funding of scientific research because they understand its critical role in spurring technological advances and other innovations. If the United States is to compete in the global economy, it too must continue to invest in research programs. As the Under Secretary for Science at the Department of Energy (DOE) in the administration of George W. Bush, I can personally attest that funding for scientific research is not a partisan issue—or at least it shouldn't be. The cuts proposed in H.R. 1 would reverse a bipartisan commitment to double the science research budgets of the National Science Foundation, the DOE Office of Science, and the National Institute for Science and Technology over 10 years. These are national goals supported by both Presidents Bush and Obama, and they were affirmed as recently as last December in the America COMPETES Act. The spending cuts included in the bill would have a devastating effect on an array of critical scientific research. For example, H.R. 1 removes \$900 million from the budget for the Office of Science, the basic research arm of the DOE—a reduction of some 20%. The bill specifically targets the Office of Biology and Environmental Research, slicing its budget by 50%; reductions that would all but eliminate funding for the office's three Biological Research Centers, the hope for developing transportation fuels derived from plant cellulose. The hugely successful Energy Frontier Research Centers, which support activities based at 28 universities and 16 national laboratories, would be cut in midstream. The university centers support 1300 students working on the conversion of sunlight and heat into electricity, improved efficiency of photosynthesis in plants for the production of fuels, and enhanced combustion efficiency to increase mileage for automobiles. The work now at risk at the national laboratories includes projects to improve solid-state lighting and the conversion of coal into chemicals and fuels. This research is vitally important if the United States is to be a leader in transforming how humans get and use energy globally, in a way that maintains societal and economic viability. To make matters worse, the bill would also destabilize the large-scale scientific facilities operated by the DOE's Office of Science. These research projects include the country's work with powerful light sources (which other countries are copying en masse), so vitally important to the U.S. biological, medical, and materials communities. Also included are the nation's remaining accelerators, responsible for advances in the high-energy and nuclear science communities; its spallation neutron source and nanotechnology centers, critically important to both university and industrial communities; and the quest for environmentally benign unlimited energy through investment in the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor. The budget deficit is serious. But escaping from its clutches requires economic growth as well as budget reductions. Well over half of U.S. economic growth in the past century can be traced to investments in science and technology. To compete in the global economy, the United States must remain a leader in science and technology. For that to happen, the Senate must restore funding for science in the fiscal year 2011 budget. Failure to do so would relegate the United States to second-class status in the scientific community and threaten economic growth and prosperity for future generations of Americans.

Oil Spills

SQ Solves Oil Spills

Traumatic oil spills aren't inevitable. U.S. oil drilling in the arctic is heavily regulated and companies will not be able to drill until the Coast Guard is confident a spill could be effectively cleaned up.

National Geographic 12 (Joe Eaton, "Shell Scales Back 2012 Arctic Drilling Goals", <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/shell-2012-arctic-drilling-goals/>, 7/27/12)

Faced with iced-in Arctic waters and failure to secure U.S. Coast Guard approval of its oil-spill barge, Royal Dutch Shell* is ratcheting down its plan to drill as many as five exploratory wells this summer in the seas north of Alaska. The company planned to sink the wells in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas during a brief window between July and October, when the waters were expected to be clear of severe ice. But Pete Slaiby, Shell's vice president for Alaska operations, said it's unlikely the company will be able to meet that goal due to regulatory challenges and stubborn ice. "We are still hopeful that we will get some wells drilled," Slaiby said. "Considering what we've been through . . . I think doing any kind of drilling will be a success." With global oil demand expected to rise in the long term, and conventional production in decline, international and national fuel companies have turned increasingly to more challenging exploration and production. The Arctic has become a prized frontier, holding 13 percent of the world's untapped oil and 30 percent of undiscovered natural gas, according to the U.S. Geological Survey. Russia and Norway also have been forging into Arctic seas for oil, but no development has been more closely watched than Shell's plan for drilling off Alaska's coast. Yet Shell's diminished Arctic expectations show that even before rigs enter this uncharted territory in search for oil, the challenges for drilling are formidable.

The Coast Guard has the capabilities to oversee Shell drilling

Businessweek 12 (Carol Wolf and Kasia Klimasinska, "As the Arctic Opens for Oil, the Coast Guard Scrambles", <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-07-26/as-the-arctic-opens-for-oil-the-coast-guard-scrambles>, 7/26/12)

To oversee the Shell drilling, the Coast Guard plans to send two helicopters and two cutters to the Arctic, including one of its three flagship National Security Cutters, which can navigate the high seas, serve as a sophisticated communications center, and operate its own helicopter pad. The Coast Guard opened a temporary base in Barrow, Alaska, on July 16. It will practice oil spill responses and other maneuvers to test equipment and personnel readiness, says Vice Admiral Peter Neffenger, deputy commandant for operations. "Our goal is to have a presence up there that can adequately address the activity for this summer and then to think about what it means for the future," says Neffenger. Shell is deploying 33 vessels and 600 workers for its Arctic venture, says Steve Phelps, Shell's manager of exploration for Alaska. "We know the region is very remote and very dangerous," Phelps says. "We realize if we need it, we have to bring it."

Spills Turn

Turn: using icebreakers to increase trade results in more spills

Mahony 11 (Honor, EU Observer, "Arctic shipping routes unlikely to be 'Suez of the north'")

Environment And then there is the environmental impact of increased shipping. More traffic means there is a greater risk of oil spill. The ships will introduce alien species through their hull water and are likely to interrupt the migratory patterns of marine mammals. Carbon emissions could accelerate ice melting even further, and this in a region where the average temperature has risen almost twice as fast as the rest of the world's. Other ship emissions, such as SOx and NOx, may also have unforeseen consequences on the Arctic environment. Norwegian explorer Borge Ousland says it is vital not to forget that changes in the Polar regions could have global effects. "It is easy to look at the Polar regions as an isolated area but any change in temperature has an effect on the rest of the world," he said recently. "I am very worried about what I have seen in the last 20 years. When I went up to the North Pole for the first time in 1990, the ice was three to four metres thick. In 2007 we measured the ice for the Norwegian Polar Institute and the coverage of ice was now 1.7 metres thick."

Alt causes

Alt causes to oil spills - Pollution

Ocean Link '5 "Marine Pollution: Causes and Effects 2-18,

[http://oceanlink.island.net/oceanmatters/marine%20 pollution.html](http://oceanlink.island.net/oceanmatters/marine%20pollution.html)

Pollution of the world's oceans is quickly becoming a major problem on Earth. We know very little about the effect that pollution has on the oceans but we continue to dispose of chemicals, sewage and garbage into it. Most people likely do not even know what types of pollutants reach the oceans. There may be billions of people who do not believe ocean pollution is a problem. In the following pages, I will look at the various ocean pollutants and the potential impacts they have on the ocean animals. Toxic Ocean Pollutants

Toxic pollutants in the ocean ecosystem have massive impacts on the plants and animals. Heavy metal

poisoning (such as lead and mercury) from industrial fallout collect in the tissues of top predators such as

whales and sharks. Sometimes this type of poisoning can cause birth defects and nervous system damage. **Dioxins from the pulp and**

paper bleaching process can cause genetic chromosomal problems in marine animals and may even cause cancer in

humans. **PCB's** (polychlorinated biphenyls) **typically cause reproduction problems in most marine organisms.**

PCB's usually **come from older electrical equipment.** Poly-aromatic hydrocarbons (**PAH's**) are another source of marine toxic

pollution and typically **come from oil pollution and burning wood and coal. These PAH's are responsible for**

causing genetic chromosomal aberrations in many marine animals. Lastly, low level radiation poisoning is also possible in the ocean environment. Scientists know very little about how radiation affects marine organisms but it cannot be a good thing. Some marine species such as a population of Beluga whales living in the Saint Lawrence River area in Eastern Canada are in serious trouble because of marine toxic pollution. These Beluga whales are the victims of ocean pollution ranging from PCB's to heavy metals as well as other pollutants. However toxic pollution is only the tip of the iceberg in terms of total ocean pollution. The following images indicate various types of toxic pollutants.

Antarctic Treaty System

ATS fails

The Antarctic treaty lacks the jurisdictional authority to be effective – tourism proves
Christensen et al 11 – Aurora, Daniel Faber, Jessie Herbert, and Tim Jones – all writing for the
University of Canterbury in New Zealand (“Tourism in Antarctica: a numbers game,”
http://www.anta.canterbury.ac.nz/documents/PCAS_13/ANTA601TourismSyndicateReport.pdf)BC

Currently effective control over tourist and non-governmental expeditions to the Antarctic has not been established. It has been suggested that this stems from the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties’ hortatory approach and its limited ability to apply sanctions. When tourism issues extend beyond the scope of the Protocol, for example when dealing with issues such as liability, insurance, jurisdiction, third party activities, and enforcement, a vacuum of space in regulation is observed. **There is a continuing failure to resolve the matter²⁵. There is no agreed approach between the Consultative Parties as to the exercise of jurisdiction over tourism.** However there has been progress with regard to providing guidelines for tour operators and tourists since Recommendation XVIII-1 was adopted in 1994. Nevertheless because of the non-mandatory nature and the unique political and jurisdictional basis, there are significant difficulties in achieving effective regulation. As a result, **the administrative capacity of the Antarctic Treaty System with regard to tourism management continues to be seriously challenged²⁶. Enforcement Currently the enforcement regime of the Antarctic Treaty is considered weak, as it lacks punitive measures in cases of infringement.** For example, in the Protocol, **the Environmental Protection Committee has been criticized as lacking real authority to enforce compliance. It has been suggested that this weakness in the ATS is due to the lack of clear jurisdictional authority. After all who is in charge and responsible in Antarctica, when the guidelines and rules are broken?** For laws to be successful in achieving their intended objectives a clearly defined enforcement mechanism must be established; **it must be able to do what it is intended to do and have the requisite legal power to actually enforce sanctions.** It is the same with respect to the Antarctic Treaty System. In CCAMLR and the Protocol, the **mechanism of sanction is that of ‘observation and inspection’ with no uniform ability to sanction worldwide for breaches found resulting from any observations and inspections²⁷.** It seems essential that a solution on this matter is reached. **A robust liability regime for infringements needs to be introduced to the Antarctic Treaty System. Liability regimes have been discussed and talked about for nearly twenty years at Antarctic Treaty meetings. And to date there has been no agreement on how and when this should take place, or in fact what sanctions might be applied²⁸.**

The ATS fails – whaling, territory claims, and Antarctic security

Triggs 6 – President of the Australian Human Rights Commission (Gillian, “The Antarctic Treaty System: A Model of Legal Creativity and Cooperation,” Sydney Law School at the University of Sydney,
<http://www.atsummit50.org/media/book-8.pdf>)BC

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CHALLENGES TO THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM Successful though the ATS has been over its 50 year evolution, the twenty-first century poses some new, sensitive, and complex challenges to the authority of the regime. Collaboration with Other International Organisations The Japanese Whaling case exposes the imperative that the ATS should interact collaboratively with other international organisations that have interests in the Southern Ocean and Antarctica. **The Antarctic Treaty itself does not deal with whales, the rationale being that the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), established 10 years earlier in 1949, was the international institution specifically empowered to regulate whales. The International Whaling Commission has not, however, been able to take effective action**

against Japan for its “scientific whaling” in the Southern Ocean. **This failure has arguably stimulated litigation by the Humane Society International to enforce national legislation, with all the attendant risks discussed above. It may now be time to reconsider the traditional position taken within the ATS that it should not attempt to regulate whaling in the Southern Ocean.** The Madrid Protocol is, for example, sufficiently widely drafted to include marine mammals. Article 2 provides that parties are committed to protect the “dependent and associated ecosystems” of the Antarctic.³³ Such language appears to include migratory whales. It is also relevant that the environmental principles of the protocol extend to activities in the Antarctic Treaty area, including whaling by ships. Article 3 of the protocol requires that all activities in the area are “planned and conducted so as to avoid . . . further jeopardy to endangered or threatened species.”³⁴ **It is not easy, however, to harmonise obligations under the protocol with other, apparently contrary, provisions within the ATS.** Article VI of CCAMLR, for example, provides that the convention is not to “derogate from the rights and obligations . . . under the ICRW.” Reports commissioned by the Paris, Sydney, and Canberra Working Groups on Whaling have attempted to resolve such treaty conflicts through traditional legal techniques of interpretation. **These technical legal arguments are not entirely convincing in their efforts to harmonise international agreements** that grew like Topsy to provide solutions to contemporary issues. **The agreements within the ATS and other treaties with interests in the Southern Ocean are jostling for space with each other as activities there increase.** Rationalisation and good faith collaboration are now required. **Beyond the specific issue of whaling in the Southern Ocean is the wider question of overlapping mandates under other international agreements and institutions with growing interests in Antarctica. The parties to the Madrid Protocol are obliged to “consult and cooperate” with parties to other international institutions.**³⁵ Such bodies could include the UN International Seabed Authority, the International Maritime Organisation, the International Whaling Commission, the UN Continental Shelf Commission, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, the World Health Organisation, the UN Environment Programme, the International Hydrographic Organisation, the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, the International Union for Conservation of Nature, the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators, and regional fisheries organisations. **All these bodies may be invited to ATCM** and meetings of CCAMLR. There is evidence of some commendable collaboration emerging, including that among the East Antarctic coastal states (South Africa, France, New Zealand, and Australia) in response to unreported fishing of Patagonian tooth fish and the South Indian Ocean fishing arrangement. It is hoped that greater efforts to act through strategic alliances and to develop thematic regional cooperation will develop in the future. Antarctic Continental Shelf Delimitation **For the claimant states, their Antarctic territory automatically brings with it sovereign rights to the resources of the continental shelf under the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention.** The importance of the continental shelf lies in its significant oil resources. **The U.S. Energy Information Administration reported in 2000 that the Weddell and Ross seas hold 50 billion barrels of oil, similar to Alaska’s known reserves.**³⁶ Before long, **it might be expected that the UN Continental Shelf Commission will be asked to consider the limits of an Antarctic continental shelf claim. Any such request will, in turn, beg the question of the validity of the relevant claim to territorial sovereignty.** A request for recognition of an Antarctic continental shelf will, moreover, pose yet another unanswered question of interpretation of Article IV, paragraph 2, prohibiting any “new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.” **It is strongly arguable that delineation of the limits of the continental shelf is not a new “claim” for the purposes of Article IV, paragraph 2,** because delineation is merely an assertion of sovereign rights that derive from the existing territorial claim. **The commission is more likely to challenge the validity of the territorial claim itself,** rather than the rights that arise from that claim. Although Australia has submitted the delimitation of its Antarctic continental shelf to the commission, it has asked that the commission refrain from making any ruling on the issue at present. In this way, the legal question of interpretation has been avoided for the time being. It might be observed, however, that not all states have adopted the Australian approach. New Zealand and the United Kingdom have, for example, relied on a more “minimalist” approach by making a partial submission only, reserving their right to submit their delineations for an extended continental shelf at some time in the future, if they decide to do so. **Threats to Security within the Antarctic Region As Antarctica and the Southern Ocean are vulnerable** to increasing threats from terrorism and conflict, we may need to view **the effectiveness of the ATS through the prism of wider concerns for security. There have** been, for example, several **maritime incidents that may be a harbinger of future threats to the Antarctic area.** Whereas in the past it might validly be claimed that the Antarctic Treaty system was effective in confining the Falklands conflict to the subantarctic region, **the terrorist attack on the Rainbow Warrior in New Zealand, the fire on the Nissin Maru of the Japanese fleet in February 2007, and recent activities by the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society in**

January 2008 in respect to Japanese whaling suggest that the region might well be a theatre of conflict in the future. Threats are also posed to human security within the Southern Ocean (though not yet within the region of Antarctica) by piracy and by rising numbers of asylum seekers, posing questions about the efficacy of search and rescue capacities. **It is, moreover, likely that global concerns for security from conflict will expand to wider concerns for energy, food, and the security of economic opportunities** in the Antarctic. **Tourism poses a risk to the environment and is also a human risk in the event of a serious shipping incident in which the many thousands of tourists on a single vessel are likely to strain rescue operations. Commercial risks to sustainable fishing are also likely in the future,** with unreported fishing in the Southern Ocean of Patagonian tooth fish and southern bluefin tuna. Further, largely untapped, opportunities for commercial gain lie in clean water and bioprospecting. **Resource security is thus a potential challenge to the current mining moratorium.**

US not key

US not key

Augustine et al. 12 - U.S. aerospace businessman who served as Under Secretary of the Army from 1975 to 1977, and currently serves as chairman of the Review of United States Human Space Flight Plans Committee (July 2012, Norman R., "More and Better Science in Antarctica Through Increased Logistical Effectiveness," White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, National Science Foundation, http://www.nsf.gov/geo/plr/usap_special_review/usap_brp/rpt/antarctica_07232012.pdf) mj

Many nations around the world are currently making significant investments to expand their activities in Antarctica (Figure 8). For example, **South Korea is** in the process of **establishing a new station** in the Terra Nova Bay region of the Ross Sea. **Germany replaced an existing station in 2009.** At approximately the same time, **the United Kingdom replaced its Halley Station. Russia has stated its intent to launch five new polar research ships and reconstruct five research stations and three seasonal bases. Argentina recently announced plans to construct a new scientific base** to replace one that was partially destroyed by fire. **Belgium's Princess Elizabeth Station, now in summer operation, is said to be Antarctica's first zeroemission base. Chile's plans include developing Punta Arenas as a gateway to Antarctica for research, tourism, and mineral research traffic. China is proceeding with upgrades to three existing sites as well as building the new Kunlun Station and constructing several telescopes** at Dome A, the highest site on the Antarctic Plateau (13,428 feet/4093 meters). **India is preparing to occupy its third station**, and other nations are undertaking projects to expand their presence and scientific activity in the Antarctic.

Foreign icebreakers solve

O'Rourke 6/05 – specialist in naval affairs for the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress for three decades (June 2014, Ronald, "Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress," <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf>) mj

Two years ago, acting on advice from the Coast Guard that a second icebreaker should be brought in to assist the Polar Star, NSF chartered the Russian icebreaker Krasin for the purpose. The Coast Guard's Polar Sea was undergoing repairs and no other U.S. icebreakers other than Healy were available – but Healy was needed in the Arctic. Last year the Polar Sea was undergoing extensive repair. NSF again chartered the Russian icebreaker Krasin and held Polar Star in reserve (and eventually brought her in to assist in the final stages of the break-in). The situation for the coming year is again similar. Polar Sea is ready for duty but the Coast Guard has recommended that a backup vessel be employed. NSF has therefore nearly concluded a charter for the Swedish icebreaker, Oden.

The USCG has performed its icebreaking mission in Antarctica with distinction for many decades, but with increasing difficulty in recent years. Its two Polar Class icebreakers are nearing the end of their estimated lifetime and are becoming increasingly difficult and costly to keep in service. The need to charter the Krasin and Oden has already been mentioned. Given this state of affairs, NSF has given careful consideration to how best to meet the needs of the scientific community over the long-term.

Status quo solves icebreakers – foreign arrangements increase science research

Bement 6 - American engineer and scientist, former Director of the National Science Foundation, and previous Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (September 2006, Arden L, "Testimony of Dr. Arden

L. Bement, Jr., Director National Science Foundation Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation,”
https://www.nsf.gov/geo/plr/opp_advisory/briefings/oct2006/bement_house_testimony_written_final.pdf) mj

As noted above, NSF has met the research community's need for research platforms in the Southern Ocean through long-term contracts with private firms for ice-strengthened ships and icebreakers and through partnerships that provide access to other country's research vessels. For resupply of McMurdo and South Pole Stations, NSF has depended until recently entirely on U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers secured through reimbursement arrangements, and on chartered Military Sealift Command capabilities. More recently, NSF has had to arrange for chartered vessels to complement USCG capabilities. In the Arctic, NSF has relied on the Coast Guard's Healy and on **partnerships with other countries**. Once constructed and commissioned, the Arctic Regional Research Vessel (ARRV) will significantly increase the capacity for ship-based research in the coastal Arctic regions and where ice cover is not too deep. A variety of models have and are being used by the U.S and other countries for meeting polar icebreaker needs. The U.S. Coast Guard and the Chilean and Argentinean Navies operate their icebreakers using military personnel. Some countries build their ships to meet military specifications and others do not. **The German research icebreaker, the Polarstern, is owned by the government but operated by a private contractor. The Swedish government's operational arrangements for the Oden are similar to the German model. Both the Oden and the Polarstern are able to operate more than 300 days annually** as a consequence of ship design and mode of operation. The Arctic Regional Research Vessel (ARRV) will be operated by civilian crews under contract to the University-National Oceanographic Laboratory Systems (UNOLS). As noted above, NSF employs a contractor to operate and maintain the privately-owned Laurence M. Gould and Nathaniel B. Palmer. **The ships were built under a long-term lease agreement between the ship-owners and the Federal government**, such that the construction costs are partially amortized over the duration of the lease (with the ship reverting to the owner at the government's option at the end of the lease). **These ships also operate more than 300 days annually.**

Foreign icebreakers solve – Coast Guard options are too expensive otherwise

O'Rourke 6/05 – specialist in naval affairs for the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress for three decades (June 2014, Ronald, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress,” <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf>) mj

Regarding the first factor above, the **NSF states that although Coast Guard polar icebreakers are very capable, the NSF is mandated by presidential directive to perform its research activities in the most cost-effective way possible**, and that **it can be more expensive for NSF to support its research activities with Coast Guard polar icebreakers than with charters of icebreakers crewed by contractor personnel**.

Although Coast Guard polar icebreakers in the past have performed the annual McMurdo break-in mission, **the NSF in certain recent years has chartered Russian and Swedish contractor-operated icebreakers to perform the mission** (with a Coast Guard polar icebreaker standing ready to assist if needed). **The NSF has also noted that Healy, though very capable in supporting Arctic research, operates at sea for about 200 days a year, as opposed to about 300 days a year for foreign contractor-operated polar icebreakers.** The Coast Guard states that

Beginning with Deep Freeze 2008, **NSF opted to perform the McMurdo break-in with the Swedish icebreaker ODEN** under a five-year contract **with the Swedish government**. In July 2011, the Government of Sweden cancelled the contract, forcing **NSF to contract with Murmansk Shipping Company for use of the Russian icebreaker VLADIMIR IGNATYUK**. NSF awarded a base contract of one year (for Deep Freeze 2012) and two option years, pending POLAR STAR's return to service. NSF exercised one option year for Deep Freeze 2013, and requested POLAR STAR for Deep Freeze 2014. NSF currently intends to use POLAR STAR for 2015 and for the foreseeable future.⁴⁴

Foreign icebreakers solve – US not key

NSF 12 - independent U.S. government agency responsible for promoting science and engineering through research programs and education projects (July 2012, National Science Foundation, "NSF Charters Icebreaker to Support U.S.," http://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=124738) mj

The National Science Foundation **(NSF) announced today that it will exercise an option for chartering the diesel icebreaker Vladimir Ignatyuk from Russia's Murmansk Shipping Company. The Ignatyuk will again create a channel through the sea ice of Antarctica's McMurdo Sound needed to resupply and refuel U.S. research stations** during the upcoming 2012 to 2013 season. An icebreaker is essential to create the channel and to safely escort a fuel tanker and cargo ship in and out of McMurdo Station, NSF's logistics hub on the southernmost continent. Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station at the geographic South Pole as well as other field sites are also dependent on the same annual delivery of supplies and fuel to McMurdo. **"We are very pleased to announce this continuation of our agreement with the Murmansk Shipping Company,"** said Kelly K. Falkner, who heads NSF's Office of Polar Programs, which manages the United States Antarctic Program. **"Our recent discussions with them about deploying the Ignatyuk this season have come to a successful conclusion and we are fully confident that the ship will allow us to complete this vital mission."** In August of 2011, **NSF signed a one-year fixed contract, with options for renewal, with the Murmansk Shipping Company. The contract provides for using the Canadian-built icebreaker, Vladimir Ignatyuk, to complete the channel-breaking and escort duties. The Ignatyuk successfully completed the McMurdo Sound break-in and escort in February of 2012. Officials with the Murmansk Shipping Company had subsequently expressed concerns about supporting the mission in 2013. Officials at NSF and the ship's operators are now satisfied that a series of technical discussions have addressed the company's concerns, and arrangements are in place such that the Ignatyuk should be able once again to successfully complete the icebreaking portion of resupply and refueling mission.**

Shipping

1nc FL

Arctic shipping lanes won't be used

O'Rourke '14 – naval analyst for the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, received a Distinguished Service Award from the Library of Congress (Ronald, “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress”, June 5th, *Congressional Research Service*) //J.N.E

Ice is not the sole impediment to Arctic shipping. The region frequently experiences adverse weather, including not only severe storms, but also intense cold, which can impair deck machinery. During the summer months when sea lanes are open, heavy fog is common in the Arctic.

Commercial ships would face higher operating costs on Arctic routes than elsewhere. Ship size is an important factor in reducing freight costs. Many ships currently used in other waters would require two icebreakers to break a path wide enough for them to sail through; ship owners could reduce that cost by using smaller vessels in the Arctic, but this would raise the cost per container or per ton of freight.⁷¹ Also, **icebreakers** or ice-class cargo vessels **burn more fuel than ships designed for more temperate waters and would have to sail at slower speeds. The shipping season in the Arctic only lasts for a few weeks, so icebreakers** and other special required equipment **would sit idle the remainder of the year.** None of **these impediments** by themselves may be enough to discourage Arctic passage but they do **raise costs**, perhaps **enough to negate the savings of a shorter route**. Thus, **from the perspective of a shipper** or a ship owner, **shorter via the Arctic does not necessarily mean cheaper and faster.**⁷²

No benefit to improving Arctic Infrastructure

CBC 6/27/14 – Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (“NO Benefit to developing Arctic Shipping: U.S. Report”) <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/no-benefit-to-developing-arctic-shipping-u-s-report-1.2623384>)

A new report issued by the U.S. Government Accountability Office suggests there's no benefit to developing shipping infrastructure in the Arctic. The organization serves as a watchdog for federal spending, and says deep-water ports, **mapping and other infrastructure improvements will only go so far in attracting more ships. For the container-ship companies, the report says one problem is Arctic routes would be seasonal, while that industry needs steady, year-round schedules.** The report also says mainstream cruise lines aren't drawn to the Arctic because the 10-day journey, typically in Alaska, is too long, the scenery unvarying and interesting ports too scarce. Some U.S. policy makers like Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski disagree with the report. She says Arctic maritime activity is on the rise due to the shrinking sea ice, and says now is the time to start building infrastructure.

XT – Won't use Arctic shipping

Arctic shipping lanes won't be used regularly

Brigham, 10 - Distinguished Professor of Geography & Arctic Policy at the University of Alaska Fairbanks (Lawson, "THINK AGAIN: THE ARCTIC" Foreign Policy, SEPT. / OCT. 2010,

<http://generalpaperpress.wordpress.com/2012/02/06/313/>

But **just because ships will soon be able to traverse the Arctic doesn't mean many actually will. The Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route** across the top of Russia **have** indeed **been made navigable** by climate change, but **only for a few days or weeks a year**. **Although several climate models predict an ice-free Arctic Ocean for a brief period each summer as early as 2030, they also project a mostly ice-clogged ocean in winter, spring, and fall** through at least the end of the 21st century. No one predicts an ice-free Arctic Ocean throughout the year.

This means that an Arctic Ocean crossing, while theoretically possible, might be too difficult and costly to be worth the effort. The more ice along an Arctic navigation route, the slower the ship's speed, a factor that could easily negate the shorter distance gained by sailing across the top of the world. Expensive polar-class ships — ice-breaking cargo carriers — would still be required for most operations. And many other economic details have yet to be filled in. Last year's definitive Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment found significant challenges and unanswered questions regarding the endeavor: Can it be economically viable as a global trade route if not conducted year-round? What are the risks assumed in Arctic navigation, and how will the marine insurance industry respond to them?

So, **while modest volumes of cargo might be carried during the summers ahead, a majority of the Arctic voyages in the coming decades will be destination: A ship sails north, performs an activity in the Arctic, and goes home**. In other words, **don't expect a new Panama or Suez Canal**. And even this more limited activity will require adaptation. The real challenge will be the development of rules to protect Arctic people and the environment from the new marine traffic, wherever it's going.

China Coal Link

Russian coal exports low now due to inefficient infrastructure-icebreakers create shipping routes that open up a flood of coal exports

Lo 12- NRI Digital's in-house feature writers, covering areas including infrastructure projects, design and construction, pharmaceutical development and power generation. As well as conducting interviews and writing features, he edits news and attends industry events. Prior to joining the team he worked as a commissioning editor for a London-based B2B publisher, where he took charge of the editorial content for a range of print and online magazines. (Chris, "Russia's Nuclear Icebreakers: A New Dawn for Coal Icebreakers?", Power Technology, <http://www.power-technology.com/features/featurerussia-nuclear-icebreakers-new-dawn-coal-exports/>)/WK

Russia's icebreakers are playing an important role in mapping the undersea borders of its continental shelf, which is needed to confirm its territorial claims. The LK-60 could certainly prove to be a valuable asset in an episode of bullish territorial diplomacy that has already seen Russia plant its flag in the seabed and a Moscow-based think tank suggest rechristening the Arctic Ocean as the Russian Ocean. Opening up Russia's coal export possibilities As well as potentially reinforcing Russia's territorial ambitions, **the LK-60 could carve a path for new developments in Russian coal exports and the wider energy market. As climate change continues to shrink the permanently ice-covered areas of the Northern Sea Route running along Russia's northern coast, this shipping lane is becoming increasingly attractive as a trade route. But more extensive use of this marine gateway to Europe and Asia hinges on the availability of icebreakers**, preferably the more powerful nuclear-powered models, **to ensure that it is navigable all year round**. Could the opening of a more reliable shipping route in the Arctic Ocean give a shot in the arm to Russia's export trade in coal? It should be made clear that there has been no official indication that coal export considerations have played a part in Russia's expanding fleet of icebreakers - the only confirmed fact about the LK-60's work is that it is intended for operation in the western Arctic Ocean and shallower waters such as the Yenisei River and the Gulf of Ob. Nevertheless, **the unique circumstances of the country's coal market suggest that it could be an important beneficiary of better trade links through the Northern Sea Route**. The Northern Sea Route and Russia's coal exports It's impossible to ignore the fact that **Russia is sitting on one of the largest national coal reserves in the world, but faces significant challenges in exporting it**. The country's estimated 140 billion tons of coal represents nearly a fifth of the world's total reserves, but around 90% of this coal is located in large basins in Siberia, much of it behind the Ural Mountains, where transporting it can be prohibitively troublesome. **A major source of inefficiency in the Russian coal industry is the high cost of transporting coal both to ports for international markets and to western Russia, which represents most of the country's domestic demand**. In April 2012, Reuters reported on the sorry state of the country's rail infrastructure for hauling coal freight, with major bottlenecks creating some of the highest costs for getting coal to port in the world, at \$90 FOB or more. While Russia's tracks must ultimately undergo a logistical revolution before the country can achieve its coal export potential, in the short-term it is creating a need for new ways to save costs and add value to their products, and **an increasingly viable Northern Sea Route could bring down sea freight prices and reduce reliance on rail**. It's certainly true that Russia has a long-term plan to increase coal exports, as it expects international demand to grow to 170 million tons a year by 2030. To achieve this, the country's export focus is gradually shifting

from the traditional European market, which is experiencing a slowdown in demand, as the EU continues to introduce strict environmental regulations, to east Asia, where **expanding economies such as China and South Korea make excellent markets for Siberia's low to medium-grade coal exports.** In August 2010, Moscow and Beijing signed an agreement for Russia to supply at least 15 million tons of coal to China every year for the next 25 years. "**Establishing of [favourable] conditions for exports to the Asian-Pacific region may become a major strategic project, which would strengthen our economic presence in this dynamically developing region,**" said Russia's former Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko, signalling the shift from west to east. **With Russia's land-based transport proving a major obstacle to coal export growth, the role of convenient shipping lanes like the Northern Sea Route could improve efficiency and provide a better deal to prospective customers,** such as nearby Scandinavia and Japan, and particularly the hungry, industrialising nations of the Asia-Pacific. If the LK-60 is destined to play a role in the taming of the Arctic Ocean for Russian shipping, it could potentially help pioneer a path for a resurgent Russian coal export market.

Domestic Steel Turn

Decreased shipping prices wreck US steel

Rubin 8- former Chief Economist with CIBC World Markets and author of Why Your World Is About To Get A Whole Lot Smaller (Jeff, “The New Inflation”, CIBC World Markets, http://research.cibcwm.com/economic_public/download/smay08.pdf)/WK

The cost of shipping a standard 40-foot container from East Asia to the US eastern seaboard has already tripled since 2000 and will double again as oil prices head towards \$200 per barrel (see pages 4-7). Unless that container is chock full of diamonds, shipping costs have suddenly inflated the cost of whatever is inside. And those inflated costs get passed onto the Consumer Price Index when you buy that good at your local retailer. As oil prices keep rising, pretty soon those transport costs start cancelling out the East Asian wage advantage. They already have in steel. Soaring transport costs, first on importing iron to China and then exporting finished steel overseas, have already more than eroded the wage advantage and suddenly rendered Chinese-made steel uncompetitive in the US market. That’s great news if you are the United Steelworkers of America. Long lost jobs will soon be coming home. And the more that oil prices and transport costs rise for Chinese steel exporters, the more that US steel wages can grow. But if you’re a steel buyer, your costs are going up regardless of whether you are sourcing it from China or Pittsburgh

Increase in transport costs key to steel

Rubin and Tal 8- former Chief Economist with CIBC World Markets and author of Why Your World Is About To Get A Whole Lot Smaller, Deputy Chief Economist of CIBC World Markets Inc. (Jeff and Benjamin, “Will Soaring Transportation Costs Reverse Globalization?”, CIBC World Markets, http://research.cibcwm.com/economic_public/download/smay08.pdf)/WK

To what extent will astronomical increases in transport costs alter the huge (but shrinking) wage differential between Chinese labor and North American labor remains to be seen. But we are already starting to see some change in capital-intensive manufacturing whose products carry a high ratio of freight costs to final selling prices. Take the steel sector for example. With little over an hour and a half of labor time embodied in the production of a ton of steel, and relatively high freight costs, the global cost curve of the steel sector is changing rapidly. Given that **most parts of China (and Asia in general) are short iron ore, getting the raw materials to the steel mill (mainly from Australia and Brazil) adds an additional and growing cost** **not typically incurred by US steel producers**. Add to it the \$90 freight cost of shipping a ton of hot-rolled steel sheet from China to the US, and the transport component is large enough to turn the global steel cost curve on its head. **Even at today’s oil prices, rising transport costs have already more than offset China’s otherwise slim cost advantage, giving US steel a competitive advantage in its own market for the first time in over a decade** (Chart 5). **The rapidly changing economics of steel is already reflected in the trade statistics.** China’s steel exports to the US are now falling by more than 20% on a year-over-year basis—the worst performance in almost a decade. While many might attribute this decline to the slowdown in the US economy, **it is noteworthy that US domestic steel production has risen by almost 10% during the same period** (Chart 6).

Invasive Species Turn

Double bind-either the plan doesn't create regulations and causes invasive species, or regulations stifle and economic benefit for shippers

Conley et al. 13- *director and senior fellow of the Europe Program at CSIS received her B.A. in international studies from West Virginia Wesleyan College and her M.A. in international relations from the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, **senior fellow and co-director of the CSIS Energy and National Security Program, Pumphrey received a bachelor's degree in economics from Duke University and a master's degree in economics from George Mason University, ***a fellow at The Arctic Institute - Center for a fellow at The Arctic Institute - Center for Circumpolar Security Studies,**** research associate for the Europe Program at CSIS, where he conducts research and manages program activities on Arctic and Europe an political, security, and economic issues (Heather, David L. Pumphrey, Mihaela David, Terence M. Toland, "Arctic Economics in the 21st Century: The Benefits and Costs of Cold", CSIS, http://csis.org/files/publication/130710_Conley_ArcticEconomics_WEB.pdf)/WK

With increased shipping in the Arctic, there is higher risk of pollutants, such as aquatic invasive species and pathogens, entering the pristine Arctic waters through ships' ballast water discharges. In 2004 the IMO adopted the Ballast Water Management Convention, which established ballast water management procedures and standards, to be adopted between 2009 and 2016. There are specific concerns regarding ballast water in the icy Arctic waters, particularly the risk of freezing pipes, and numerous associated construction and management guidelines that ships must adhere to in order to prevent freezing of ballast water. **This represents a significant financial cost to ships operating in the Arctic region, in addition to those posed by the Arctic's lack of maritime infrastructure such as fuel depots or maintenance facilities.**

Mexican Manufacturing

Higher transport prices boost Mexican manufacturing-directly trades-off with China

Rubin and Tal 8- former Chief Economist with CIBC World Markets and author of *Why Your World Is About To Get A Whole Lot Smaller*, Deputy Chief Economist of CIBC World Markets Inc. (Jeff and Benjamin, “Will Soaring Transportation Costs Reverse Globalization?”, CIBC World Markets, http://research.cibcwm.com/economic_public/download/smay08.pdf)/WK

Exactly how much trade, soaring transport costs divert from China (or for that matter anywhere else) **depends ultimately on how important those costs are in total costs.** Goods that have a high value to freight ratio carry implicitly small transport costs, **while goods with low value to freight ratios typically carry significant moving costs.** **A surprisingly high percentage of Chinese exports to the US fall in the later category.** Furniture apparel, footwear, metal manufacturing, and industrial machinery—**all typical Chinese exports, incur relatively high transport costs.** And **there is already evidence that Chinese exports of freight-intensive goods are already beginning to slow under the pressure of rapidly rising transport costs.** While there has been a general slowdown in export growth to the US over the past year, it is notable that the slowdown is far more pronounced in goods that carry relatively high freight costs compared to those that do not. On a year-over year basis, this category is now falling for the first time in more than 10 years (Chart 7, left). Freight-sensitive Chinese exports to the US now account for 42% of total exports—down from 52% in 2004. In fact, we estimate that if it were not for the dramatic increase in transport costs, growth in Chinese exports to the US since 2004 would have been 30% stronger than the actual tally (Chart 7, right). **How much of Chinese manufacturing production will be coming home remains to be seen.** But **there is certainly no reason why we should not expect to see at least comparable if not greater trade diversion than we saw during the OPEC oil shocks of the 1970s.** While there remains a strong imperative in the world economy to arbitrage wage costs, **the arbitrage will increasingly take place within the constraints imposed by soaring transport costs.** **Instead of finding cheap labor half-way around the world, the key will be to find the cheapest labor force within reasonable shipping distance to your market.** In that type of world, **look for Mexico’s maquiladora plants to get another chance at bat when it comes to supplying the North American market.** In a world where oil will soon cost over \$200 per barrel, **Mexico’s proximity to the rest of North America gives its costs a huge advantage.** Compare, for example, how relative transport costs have recently changed between the Pacific Rim and Mexico. If in 2000 American importers paid 90% more to ship goods from East Asia to the US east coast, today they pay 150% more, and when oil prices reach \$200 per barrel, they will pay three times the amount it costs to ship the same container from Mexico (Chart 8). **To put things in perspective, today’s extra shipping cost from East Asia is the equivalent of imposing a 9% tariff on East Asian goods entering the US.** And at oil prices of \$200, the tariff-equivalent rate will rise to 15%. It seems that American importers are starting to do the math and already shifting some business from China to Mexico. **While the pace of shipments from China to the US is slowing—mainly among freight-intensive goods, even non-energy Mexican exports to the US are still rising at a healthy annual rate of more than 7%.** And interestingly, **the goods that have seen the fastest growth are the ones that, on average, are more freight-intensive and directly compete with China, such as furniture, iron and steel, rubber and paper products** (Chart 9). In a world of triple-digit oil prices, distance costs money. And **while trade liberalization and technology may have flattened the world, rising transport prices will once again make it rounder.**

Shipbuilding

1nc - shipbuilding

Shipbuilding is high now –

A) New legislation

Wilhelm '13 (Steve, “Northwest shipbuilders expect a boost from Coast Guard bill”, December 24th, <http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/news/2012/12/24/dec-23-coast-guard-bill-signing-opens.html>)
//Laustrada

Puget Sound-area **shipyards got an early Christmas present on Dec. 23, when President Barack Obama signed into law a bill that should generate millions of dollars of work building large boats for the groundfish industry.**¶ The **boon to shipyards has been little noted in the bill, which is formally called the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2012.** The bill also saved an icebreaker and initiated a new study on oil-spill risks.¶ But **for local shipyards, the bill's most important provision prohibits the pollock fleet from catching flatfish, rockfish and atka mackerel in the so-called “Amendment 80” sector.** Amendment 80 created a quota process for catching bottomfish other than pollock.¶ With the pollock fleet restricted to catching pollock, owners of Amendment 80 vessels can now buy new boats and replace the aging fleet of 27 catcher processors in the non-pollock sector, said Lori Swanson, executive director of the Groundfish Forum. The group represents five companies chasing fish other than pollock.¶ Bryan Nichols, sales manager at Seattle’s Vigor Shipyard, said the ratification of the Coast Guard bill promises new work by removing the uncertainty that stalled investment in new ships. He expects to be bidding on jobs next year.¶ **“They can actually build them now, which is big.” he said. “Before, when they were looking at designs, they were in anticipation of this law passing.”**

New military procurements will sustain the industry

Cavas '12 – (“10 Ships for U.S. Navy in New Budget”, <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120212/DEFREG02/302120001/10-Ships-U-S-Navy-New-Budget>) //Laustrada

At least \$12.8 billion in shipbuilding funds will be part of the Obama administration’s fiscal 2013 defense budget, according to a Pentagon document prepared for Feb. 13 news briefings and obtained by Defense News.¶ **That’s enough for 10 new warships,** and includes money to start construction on a new aircraft carrier and refuel another.¶ The request includes:¶ • Funding to begin construction of the John F. Kennedy (CVN 79), the second CVN 78 Ford-class aircraft carrier.¶ • Two SSN 774 Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines.¶ • Two DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-class Flight IIA Aegis destroyers.¶ • Four Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), split evenly between both types being built.¶ • One Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV).¶ The request asks for \$781 million in carrier construction money, including \$608.2 million in procurement for CVN 79 and \$173.5 million for research and development (R&D). **The carrier will be built at**

Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Newport News Shipbuilding shipyard in Newport News, Va., the only yard capable of building full-sized aircraft carriers.¶ The Navy is asking for \$4.26 billion for submarine construction, of which \$3.2 billion is for two ships under an existing multi-year procurement contract. Another \$900 million is requested for advance procurement for one 2014 submarine and two in 2015. Another \$165 million is requested for R&D. **Submarine construction is split evenly between Newport News and the General Dynamics Electric Boat shipyard in Groton, Conn.**¶ **\$3.5 billion is requested for**

the two destroyers, the first of nine ships in a multi-year procurement plan covering the 2013 to 2017 destroyers. Destroyer construction is split between General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, Maine, and Ingalls Shipbuilding, a subsidiary of Huntington Ingalls, in Pascagoula, Miss.

EXT: Shipbuilding High

Shipbuilding industry going strong

Evans '13 (Brenda, "From Trade to National Security, Coast Guard Spending Rises", December 31st Lexis) //Laustrada

The U.S. House of Representatives approved a bill to extend spending levels for the Coast Guard and reauthorize the Maritime Administration.¶ Congressman Rick Larsen (D-Wa) led the passage of the Coast Guard bill in early December. The bill, sponsored by Rep. Frank LoBiondo (R-NJ) and Rep. John Mica (R-FL), was signed into law by President Obama on December 20.¶ "This bill gives the Guard the resources they need to provide security and safety on our coasts," Larsen said in a press release. "In a coastal state like Washington, a strong economy needs a safe and secure maritime environment. This bill will help the Coast Guard and maritime industry thrive."¶ According to the bill's fact sheet, the bill amends H.R. 2838 to authorize \$8.6 billion in 2013 and \$8.7 billion in 2014 for the activities of the Coast Guard.¶ The Coast Guard plans to purchase 180 Response Boat-Mediums with the allocated funds. According to the release, these boats are used for search and rescue, safety and security operations. Some of the fleet is being constructed by Kvichak Marine Industries in Larsen's home state of Washington.¶ "This legislation will create jobs in the vital shipbuilding industry by taking steps towards improving our icebreaker fleet and finishing the program of record for the Response Boat-Medium," Larsen said.¶ The House-Senate agreement prohibits the decommissioning of the two icebreakers that the previous House-passed bill supported.¶ "Maintaining an icebreaker fleet protects American commerce and our national security, and creates hundreds of jobs in Northwest Washington. We should not cede this important region to international competitors," he continued.¶ Larsen says that the bill will help protect the environment as well. Title VI of this legislation reauthorizes the Marine Debris Research, Reduction and Prevention Act.¶ "More and more marine debris from the 2011 Japanese tsunami continues to wash up on the shores of Pacific Coast states," Larsen said. "It is important that we reauthorize the Marine Debris Act to ensure that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has the authority it needs to work with the states to address this serious threat."¶ According to the fact sheet, the bill's reauthorization of the Maritime Administration as the U.S. Department of Transportation's arm of waterborne transportation is an important move. The Maritime Administration is charged with shipping, shipbuilding, port operations, vessel operations, national security, environment, and maintaining the health of the merchant marine. The Maritime Administration is allocated \$295.8 million in 2013 for its national security duties.¶ The bill states that the Administration shall promote the U.S. maritime industry while providing environmental and technical assistance for new marine technologies.¶ According to the release, Washington shipbuilders will benefit from the reauthorization because it works to integrate waterborne transportation with the full transportation system.

Icebreakers Add-On Defense

Asteroids

SQ Solves Detection

New asteroid observation technology solves the impact.

Dawn **Walton 08** June 27, "A Canadian gadget that may save the world" Science.

<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080627.wsatellite27/BNStory/Science/home>

The \$12-million Near Earth Object Surveillance Satellite, dubbed NEOSSat, is considered a world's first - designed specifically as an early warning system to pinpoint asteroids on a collision course with Earth. It will also detect space junk in the path of other orbiting satellites to prevent crashes that could shut down telecommunications - television, telephone, GPS and banking systems - around the globe.

"These hazards are very real and potentially devastating to life on Earth," Rose Goldstein, vice-president of research at the University of Calgary, said yesterday in announcing the project. Scientists gathered at the university's Rothney Astrophysical Observatory southwest of Calgary, where the country's only telescope to search the night sky for asteroids is based. Only a handful of other ground-based telescopes around the world are looking for potential dangers, and all are hampered by unfavourable weather conditions and the light of the sun. NEOSSat, fitted with a baffle to block the sunlight, aims to overcome such limitations by being positioned far above the Earth where its 15-centimetre diameter telescope can work around the clock beaming back images from deep space.

"This is the cutting edge of technology," said William Harvey, a project manager with the Canadian Space Agency, a partner in the mission. Mississauga, Ont.-based Dynacon Inc., which has built another "microsatellite" now in orbit studying the structure of stars, is already working on the blueprints.

When complete, NEOSSat will piggyback on a rocket to orbit about 600 to 800 kilometres above the Earth for at least five years running on less power than a 60-watt light bulb. Fittingly, the project was announced just a few days before the 100th anniversary of the Tunguska event, when a meteorite blasted into the Earth's atmosphere over a Siberian forest, scorching and knocking down millions of trees over 2,000 square kilometres. Scientists had estimated that the June 30, 1908, impact had the force equivalent to a 10-to 20-megatonne bomb, but simulations conducted last year suggested the impact was more likely one-quarter to one-third that size. Events like Tunguska are rare, but every year, about 7,000 meteorites touch the ground, many just small fragments of space rock that cause little damage. Experts have catalogued about 9,100 near-Earth asteroids floating around out there, but officials figure that 95,000 space rocks at least 140 metres in diameter - all larger than the one that hit Tunguska - are still in orbit. U.S. Congress has mandated NASA to find 90 per cent of them by 2020, and researchers said yesterday NEOSSat will be key in accomplishing that mission by spotting asteroids as far away as 150 million kilometres. At the same time, Lauchie Scott, one of the researchers on the project with Defence Research and Development Canada, said about 12,000 pieces of space junk are circling the planet, but only 4 per cent of them are active satellites, and more and more objects are sent into space every year. NEOSSat should be able to detect objects of space junk that are 15,000 to 50,000 kilometres away, predict collision paths and warn operators to move their satellites, or foresee if any will fall to Earth, he said. "Space is getting more congested," Mr. Scott added. But what happens once one of these potentially civilization-ending asteroids is spotted heading toward our atmosphere? Do we have the kind of blow-them-up and deflect-them technology that Hollywood likes to muse about? Professor Alan Hildebrand of the University of Calgary, who leads the Near Earth Space

Surveillance asteroid-search program, said asteroid hunting could give society time to plan an evacuation or allow scientists to attempt to divert the danger.

No Asteroids

No impact—chance of an asteroid hitting Earth is zero

Bee 02 [Robert Bee, Editor at Journal of Macarthur Astronomical Society, 8-27-02]

That's not to say that a large asteroid won't hit Earth one day. But the last really big one was 65 million years ago (the dinosaur killer and astronomers estimate that such an impact will occur, on average, once every 100 million years. So the next big hit could be anytime in the next 35 million years. My concern is the matter in which some news media distort facts for sensationalism. The printer banner headlines Asteroid to Hit earth in 2019, for 1.2 km wide asteroid 2002NT7, forgetting to report that astronomers said there was less than one in a million chance of that happening. This frightens people unnecessarily. The odds have since been reduced to virtually zero.

No earth-killing asteroids are on a collision course with earth – Even if they are, mortality rate is equal to flying on a plane.

Easterbrook 03 (senior fellow at The New Republic) 2003 [Gregg, "We're All Gonna Die!" Wired Magazine 11.07 July 2003//loghry]

Estimates by Alan Harris of the Space Science Institute of Boulder, Colorado, suggest that 500,000 asteroids roughly the size of the Tunguska rock wander through Earth's orbit. Much spookier are asteroids big enough to cause a Chicxulub-class strike. At least 1,100 are believed to exist in Earth's general area, some capable of plunging the planet into a years-long freeze while showering the globe with doomsday rain as corrosive as battery acid. None of these killer rocks is known to be on a collision course with Earth - but then, the courses of hundreds have yet to be charted. Can we stop an incoming asteroid? Not yet. NASA is trying to coordinate tracking of near-Earth objects but has no technology that could be used against them and no plan to build such technology. This may be unwise. As the former Microsoft technologist Nathan Myhrvold has written, "Most estimates of the mortality risk posed by asteroid impacts put it at about the same risk as flying on a commercial airliner. However, you have to remember that this is like the entire human race riding the plane."

No Impact

Zero risk of asteroid extinction – They're not big enough.

Bostrom 02 Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at Yale University (Dr. Nick, Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards, <http://www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html>)

There is a real but very small risk that we will be wiped out by the impact of an asteroid or comet [48]. In order to cause the extinction of human life, the impacting body would probably have to be greater than 1 km in diameter (and probably 3 - 10 km). There have been at least five and maybe well over a dozen mass extinctions on Earth, and at least some of these were probably caused by impacts ([9], pp. 81f.). In particular, the K/T extinction 65 million years ago, in which the dinosaurs went extinct, has been linked to the impact of an asteroid between 10 and 15 km in diameter on the Yucatan peninsula. It is estimated that a 1 km or greater body collides with Earth about once every 0.5 million years.[10] We have only catalogued a small fraction of the potentially hazardous bodies. If we were to detect an approaching body in time, we would have a good chance of diverting it by intercepting it with a rocket loaded with a nuclear bomb [49].

2. Impact winter is overstated – The world will recover quickly.

Marusek 07 Nuclear Physicist and Engineer (James A., "Comet and Asteroid Threat Impact Analysis," American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, <http://www.aero.org/conferences/planetarydefense/2007papers/P4-3--Marusek-Paper.pdf>)

I feel that the threat of a dust generated "impact winter" is vastly overstated and that any dust generated "impact winter" will not be anywhere near as severe nor last as long as some predict. • According to research from geologist, Kevin Pope, the K/T impact did not generate the quantities of fine dust needed to block the Sun completely and choke off photosynthesis. Approximately 99% of the debris produced was in the form of spherules, which are too coarse and heavy to remain suspended in the upper atmosphere for very long. Only 1% of the debris is fine dust generated from pulverized rock. If this fine dust were spread out across the entire globe, it would represent a thickness of ~ 0.001 inches (0.03 mm). Therefore the hypothesis of an "impact winter" is vastly overstated.24 • Just as dust that is kicked up into the atmosphere will block sunlight from hitting the earth, the dust will also act as an insulator trapping heat at the Earth's surface. This includes the heat from (1) the impact and fireball, (2) firestorms, (3) fuel fires – oil, natural gas, coal, timber, methane hydrate, and (4) lava flows and volcanoes. This trapping effect will slow the decent of the temperature fall, and retard the onset of the "impact winter". • Some of my reasoning comes from reverse logic. The dust cloud is a global threat. It shuts off light from the entire surface of the Earth. It brings photosynthesis to a grinding halt. Several mammals and reptiles survived the asteroid that slammed into Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula 65 million years ago. We know this because the event did not result in total and complete extinction of all complex life forms. How long could these creatures survive without food? Several years seems like a very, very long time to go without food. • The oldest tropical honeybees, Cretotrigona prisca, were studied by Jacqueline M. Kozisek. These honeybees survived the Cretaceous/Tertiary (K/T) extinction. The bees share a common ancestry tree with modern tropical honeybees making them an ideal subject

for study. These bees rely on pollen for their energy source and do not store honey. They must have a constant source of blooming angiosperms to survive. They also require a temperature of 88-93°F (31-34°C) to maintain their metabolism. These insects are very sensitive to the environment changes. Covering the outer atmosphere with a dust layer, blocking off photosynthesis, and dropping tropical temperatures by 13°F (7°C) to 22°F (12°C) would have meant certain death for this species.If a global “impact winter” occurred, these honeybees could not survive years in the dark and cold without the flowering plants which they need to survive. But they did survive! 25 I feel the entire world will be dark within one hour after a large impact. The impact debris flung high into the stratosphere will cause this darkness. It will take several days for the majority of this debris to fall back to Earth’s surface. I believe at about the third day after impact, some light will start to get through.

Proliferation

No Impact

No prolif impact – empirically denied

Colin H. **Kahl 13**, Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and an associate professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Melissa G. Dalton, Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Matthew Irvine, Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security, February, "If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia Be Next?" http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AtomicKingdom_Kahl.pdf

*cites Jacques Hymans, USC Associate Professor of IR***

111. LESSONS FROM HISTORY Concerns over "regional proliferation chains," "falling nuclear dominos" and "nuclear tipping points" are nothing new; indeed, reactive proliferation fears date back to the dawn of the nuclear age.¹⁴ Warnings of an inevitable deluge of proliferation were commonplace from the 1950s to the 1970s, resurfaced during the discussion of "rogue states" in the 1990s and became even more ominous after 9/11.¹⁵ In 2004, for example, Mitchell Reiss warned that "in ways both fast and slow, we may very soon be approaching a nuclear 'tipping point,' where many countries may decide to acquire nuclear arsenals on short notice, thereby triggering a proliferation epidemic." Given the presumed fragility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the ready supply of nuclear expertise, technology and material, Reiss argued, "a single new entrant into the nuclear club could

catalyze similar responses by others in the region, with the Middle East and Northeast Asia the most likely candidates."¹⁶ Nevertheless, **predictions of inevitable proliferation cascades have**

historically proven false (see The Proliferation Cascade Myth text box). In the six decades since atomic weapons were first developed, nuclear restraint has proven far more common than nuclear

proliferation, and cases of reactive proliferation have been exceedingly rare. Moreover, most **countries that have started down the nuclear path have found the**

road more difficult than imagined, both technologically and bureaucratically, **leading the majority** of nuclear-weapons aspirants **to reverse**

course. Thus, despite frequent warnings of an unstoppable "nuclear express,"¹⁷ William Potter and Gaukhur Mukhatzhanova astutely note that the "train to date has been slow to pick up steam, has made fewer stops

than anticipated, and usually has arrived much later than expected."¹⁸ None of this means that additional proliferation in response to Iran's nuclear ambitions is inconceivable, but the empirical record does suggest that regional chain reactions are not inevitable. Instead, only certain countries are candidates for reactive proliferation. Determining the risk that any given country in the Middle East will proliferate in response to Iranian nuclearization requires an assessment of the incentives and disincentives for acquiring a nuclear deterrent, the technical and bureaucratic constraints and the available strategic alternatives. Incentives and Disincentives to Proliferate Security

considerations, status and reputational concerns and the prospect of sanctions combine to shape the incentives and disincentives for states to pursue nuclear weapons. **Analysts predicting**

proliferation cascades tend to **emphasize the incentives for** reactive **proliferation while** ignoring or **downplaying the**

disincentives. Yet, as it turns out, **instances of nuclear proliferation** (including reactive proliferation) **have been so rare** because going down **this**

road often **risks insecurity, reputational damage and economic costs that outweigh** the **potential benefits.**¹⁹

Security and regime survival are especially important motivations driving state decisions to proliferate. All else being equal, if a state's leadership believes that a nuclear deterrent is required to address an acute security challenge, proliferation is more likely.²⁰ Countries in conflict-prone neighborhoods facing an "enduring rival"—especially countries with inferior conventional military capabilities vis-à-vis their opponents or those that face an adversary that possesses or is seeking nuclear weapons—may be particularly prone to seeking a nuclear deterrent to avert aggression.²¹ A recent quantitative study by Philipp Bleek, for example, found that security threats, as measured by the frequency and intensity of conventional militarized disputes, were highly correlated with decisions to launch nuclear weapons programs and eventually acquire the bomb.²² The Proliferation Cascade Myth Despite repeated warnings since the dawn of the nuclear age of an inevitable deluge of nuclear proliferation, such fears have thus far proven largely unfounded. Historically, nuclear restraint is the rule, not the exception—and the degree of restraint has actually increased over time. In the first two decades of the nuclear age, five nuclear-weapons states emerged: the United States (1945), the Soviet Union (1949), the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960) and China (1964). However, in the nearly 50 years since China developed nuclear weapons, only four additional countries have entered (and remained in) the nuclear club: Israel (allegedly in 1967), India ("peaceful" nuclear test in 1974, acquisition in late-1980s, test in 1998), Pakistan (acquisition in late-1980s, test in 1998) and North Korea (test in 2006).²³ This significant slowdown in the pace of proliferation occurred despite the widespread dissemination of nuclear know-how and the fact that the number of states with the technical and industrial capability to pursue nuclear weapons programs has significantly increased over time.²⁴ Moreover, in the past 20 years, several states have either given up their nuclear weapons (South Africa and the Soviet successor states Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) or ended their highly developed nuclear weapons programs (e.g., Argentina, Brazil and Libya).²⁵ Indeed, by one

estimate, 37 countries have pursued nuclear programs with possible weapons-related dimensions since 1945, yet the overwhelming number chose to abandon these activities before they produced a bomb. Over time, **the**

number of nuclear reversals has grown while the number of states initiating programs with possible military dimensions

has markedly **declined.**²⁶ Furthermore—especially since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) went into force in 1970—reactive proliferation has been exceedingly rare. The NPT has near-universal membership among the community of nations; only India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea currently stand outside the treaty. Yet the actual and suspected acquisition of nuclear weapons by these outliers has not triggered widespread reactive proliferation in their respective neighborhoods. Pakistan followed India into the nuclear club, and the two have engaged in a vigorous arms race, but Pakistani nuclearization did not spark additional South Asian states to acquire nuclear weapons. Similarly, the North Korean bomb did not lead South Korea, Japan or other regional states to follow suit.²⁷ In the Middle East, no country has successfully built a nuclear weapon in the four decades since Israel allegedly built its first nuclear weapons. Egypt took initial steps toward nuclearization in the 1950s and then expanded these efforts in the late 1960s and 1970s in response to Israel's presumed capabilities. However, Cairo then ratified the NPT in 1981 and abandoned its program.²⁸ Libya, Iraq and Iran all pursued nuclear weapons capabilities, but only Iran's program persists and none of these states initiated their efforts primarily as a defensive response to Israel's presumed arsenal.²⁹ Sometime in the 2000s, Syria also appears to have initiated nuclear activities with possible military dimensions, including construction of a covert nuclear reactor near al-Kibar, likely enabled by North Korean assistance.³⁰ (An Israeli airstrike destroyed the facility in 2007.³¹) The motivations for Syria's activities remain murky, but the nearly 40-year lag between Israel's alleged development of the bomb and Syria's actions suggests that reactive proliferation was not the most likely cause. Finally, even countries that start on the nuclear path have found it very difficult, and exceedingly time consuming, to reach the end. Of the 10 countries that launched nuclear weapons projects after 1970, only three (Pakistan, North Korea and South Africa) succeeded; one (Iran) remains in progress, and the rest failed or were reversed.³² The successful projects have also

generally needed much more time than expected to finish. According to Jacques Hymans, **the average time required to complete a nuclear weapons program has**

increased from seven years prior to 1970 **to** about **17 years** after 1970, **even as the hardware, knowledge and industrial**

base required for proliferation has expanded to more and more countries.³³ Yet throughout the nuclear age, many states with potential security incentives to develop nuclear weapons have nevertheless abstained from doing so.³⁴ Moreover, contrary to common expectations, recent statistical research shows that states with an enduring rival that possesses or is pursuing nuclear weapons are not more likely than other states to launch nuclear weapons programs or go all the way to acquiring the bomb, although they do seem more likely to explore nuclear weapons options.³⁵ This suggests that a rival's acquisition of nuclear weapons does not inevitably drive proliferation decisions. One reason that reactive proliferation is not an automatic response to a rival's acquisition of nuclear arms is the fact that security calculations can cut in both directions.

Nuclear weapons might deter outside threats, but **leaders have to weigh** these **potential gains against the possibility that seeking**

nuclear weapons would make the country or regime less secure by **triggering a regional arms race or** a preventive **attack by outside**

powers. Countries also have to consider the possibility that **pursuing nuclear weapons will** produce **strain**s in strategic **relations** with **key allies** and security patrons. If a state's leaders conclude that their overall security would decrease by building a bomb, they are not likely to do so.³⁶ Moreover, although security considerations are often central, they are rarely sufficient to motivate states to develop nuclear weapons. Scholars have noted the importance of other factors, most notably the perceived effects of nuclear weapons on a country's relative status and influence.³⁷ Empirically, the most highly motivated states seem to be those with leaders that simultaneously believe a nuclear deterrent is essential to counter an existential threat and view nuclear weapons as crucial for maintaining or enhancing their international

status and influence. Leaders that see their country as naturally at odds with, and naturally equal or superior to, a threatening external foe appear to be especially prone to pursuing nuclear weapons.³⁸ Thus, as Jacques Hymans argues, extreme levels of fear and pride often “combine to produce a very strong tendency to reach for the bomb.”³⁹ Yet here too, leaders contemplating acquiring nuclear weapons have to balance the possible increase to their prestige and influence against the normative and reputational costs associated with violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If a country’s leaders fully embrace the principles and norms embodied in the NPT, highly value positive diplomatic relations with Western countries and see membership in the “community of nations” as central to their national interests and identity, they are likely to worry that developing nuclear weapons would damage (rather than bolster) their reputation and influence, and thus they will be less likely to go for the bomb.⁴⁰ In contrast, countries with regimes or ruling coalitions that embrace an ideology that rejects the Western dominated international order and prioritizes national self-reliance and autonomy from outside interference seem more inclined toward proliferation regardless of whether they are signatories to the NPT.⁴¹ Most countries appear to fall in the former category, whereas only a small number of “rogue” states fit the latter. According to one count, before the NPT went into effect, more than 40 percent of states with the economic resources to pursue nuclear programs with potential military applications did so, and very few renounced those programs. Since the inception of the nonproliferation norm in 1970, however, only 15 percent of economically capable states have started such programs, and nearly 70 percent of all states that had engaged in such activities gave them up.⁴² The prospect of being targeted with economic sanctions by powerful states is also likely to factor into the decisions of would-be proliferators. Although sanctions alone proved insufficient to dissuade Iraq, North Korea and (thus far) Iran from violating their nonproliferation obligations under the NPT, this does not necessarily indicate that sanctions are irrelevant. A potential proliferator’s vulnerability to sanctions must be considered. All else being equal, the more vulnerable a state’s economy is to external pressure, the less likely it is to pursue nuclear weapons. A comparison of states in East Asia and the Middle East that have pursued nuclear weapons with those that have not done so suggests that countries with economies that are highly integrated into the international economic system – especially those dominated by ruling coalitions that seek further integration – have historically been less inclined to pursue nuclear weapons than those with inward-oriented economies and ruling coalitions.⁴³ A state’s vulnerability to sanctions matters, but so too does the leadership’s assessment regarding the probability that outside powers would actually be willing to impose sanctions. Some would-be proliferators can be easily sanctioned because their exclusion from international economic transactions creates few downsides for sanctioning states. In other instances, however, a state may be so vital to outside powers – economically or geopolitically – that it is unlikely to be sanctioned regardless of NPT violations. Technical and Bureaucratic Constraints In addition to motivation to pursue the bomb, a state must have the technical and bureaucratic wherewithal to do so. This capability is partly a function of wealth. Richer and more industrialized states can develop nuclear weapons more easily than poorer and less industrial ones can; although as Pakistan and North Korea demonstrate, cash-strapped states can sometimes succeed in developing nuclear weapons if they are willing to make enormous sacrifices.⁴⁴ A country’s technical know-how and the sophistication of its civilian nuclear program also help determine the ease and speed with which it can potentially pursue the bomb. The existence of uranium deposits and related mining activity, civilian nuclear power plants, nuclear research reactors and laboratories and a large cadre of scientists and engineers trained in relevant areas of chemistry and nuclear physics may give a country some “latent” capability to eventually produce nuclear weapons. Mastery of the fuel-cycle – the ability to enrich uranium or produce, separate and reprocess plutonium – is particularly important because this is the essential pathway whereby states can indigenously produce the fissile material required to make a nuclear explosive device.⁴⁵ States must also possess the bureaucratic

capacity and managerial culture to successfully complete a nuclear weapons program. Hymans convincingly argues that many recent would-be proliferators have weak state institutions that permit, or even encourage, rulers

to take a coercive, authoritarian management approach to their nuclear programs. This approach, in turn, politicizes and ultimately

undermines nuclear projects by gutting the autonomy and professionalism of the very scientists, experts and

organizations needed to successfully build the bomb.⁴⁶ Alternative Sources of Nuclear Deterrence Historically, the availability of credible security guarantees by outside nuclear powers has provided a potential alternative means for acquiring a nuclear deterrent without many of the risks and costs associated with developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. As Bruno Tertrais argues, nearly all the states that developed nuclear weapons since 1949 either lacked a strong guarantee from a superpower (India, Pakistan and South Africa) or did not consider the superpower’s protection to be credible (China, France, Israel and North Korea). Many other countries known to have pursued nuclear weapons programs also lacked security guarantees (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Switzerland and Yugoslavia) or thought they were

unreliable at the time they embarked on their programs (e.g., Taiwan). In contrast, several potential proliferation candidates appear to have abstained from

developing the bomb at least partly because of formal or informal extended deterrence guarantees from the United States

(e.g., Australia, Germany, Japan, Norway, South Korea and Sweden).⁴⁷ All told, a recent quantitative assessment by Bleek finds that security assurances have empirically significantly

reduced proliferation proclivity among recipient countries.⁴⁸ Therefore, if a country perceives that a security guarantee by the United States or another nuclear power is both available and credible, it is less likely

to pursue nuclear weapons in reaction to a rival developing them. This option is likely to be particularly attractive to states that lack the indigenous capability to develop nuclear weapons, as well as states that are primarily motivated to acquire a nuclear deterrent by security factors

Disease

No Impact

Diseases burn out – no spread

Morse, 04 (Stephen, PhD, director of the Center for Public Health Preparedness, at the Mailman School of Public Health of Columbia University, May 2004, "Emerging and Reemerging Infectious Diseases: A Global Problem," <http://www.actionbioscience.org/newfrontiers/morse.html>, Hensel)

Morse: A pandemic is a very big epidemic. It requires a number of things. There are many infections that get introduced from time to time in the human population and, like Ebola, burn themselves out because they kill too quickly or they don't have a way to get from person to person. They are a terrible tragedy, but also, in a sense, it is a lucky thing that they don't have an efficient means of transmission. In some cases, we may inadvertently create pathways to allow transmission of infections that may be poorly transmissible, for example, spreading HIV through needle sharing, the blood supply, and, of course, initially through the commercial sex trade. The disease is not easily transmitted, but we provided, without realizing it, means for it to spread. It is now pandemic in spite of its relatively inefficient transmission. We also get complacent and do not take steps to prevent its spread.

No risk of big impact – Quarantines check.

Pharma Investments, Ventures & Law Weekly 05 "SARS; Quarantine is cost saving and effective in containing emerging infections" Lexis

Quarantine is cost saving and effective in containing emerging infections. "Over time, quarantine has become a classic public health intervention and has been used repeatedly when newly emerging infectious diseases have threatened to spread throughout a population. "Here, we weigh the economic costs and benefits associated with implementing widespread quarantine in Toronto during the SARS outbreaks of 2003," scientists writing in the Journal of Infection report. "We compared the costs of two outbreak scenarios: in Scenario A, SARS is able to transmit itself throughout a population without any significant public health interventions. In Scenario B, quarantine is implemented early on in an attempt to contain the virus. "By evaluating these situations, we can investigate whether or not the use of quarantine is justified by being either cost-saving, life saving, or both," wrote A.G. Gupta and colleagues at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. "Our results indicate that quarantine is effective in containing newly emerging infectious diseases, and also cost saving when compared to not implementing a widespread containment mechanism," the authors said. Gupta concluded, "This paper illustrates that it is not only in our humanitarian interest for public health and healthcare officials to remain aggressive in their response to newly emerging infections, but also in our collective economic interest. Despite somewhat daunting initial costs, quarantine saves both lives and money." Gupta and colleagues published their study in the Journal of Infection (The economic impact of quarantine: SARS in Toronto as a case study. J Infect, 2005;50(5):386-393).

AT: Antibiotic Resistant

New antibiotics solve resistance

Michael Fumento 05, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, 2005, Scripps Howard News Service, June 23, 2005, lexis

On June 17 the FDA approved New Jersey-based Wyeth Pharmaceutical's Tygacil, primarily intended for skin infections and abdominal wounds. It's especially useful against the common and drug-resistant bacteria *Staphylococcus aureus*, better known as "staph." But it's a true broad-spectrum drug, applicable against a host of different bacteria - so much so that doctors can feel confident in administering it as a first-line treatment even if they have no idea what germ - or germs - they're up against. Tygacil is the first antibiotic approved in a new class called glycyclines, expressly developed to bypass the mechanisms that made bacteria resistant to the tetracycline family of drugs. The major drawback of Tygacil is that it must be administered intravenously, yet that's also a plus. Perhaps the main reason bugs develop resistance to antibiotics is that doctors overprescribe the drugs. They hand out pills like Pez candy because patients demand it. But patients don't demand IVs; therefore limiting usage of Tygacil and probably greatly forestalling the day when it too leads to resistant strains. But Tygacil is not alone in new and forthcoming antibiotics designed to tell germs: "Resistance is futile!" The injectable Cidecin from Cubist of Lexington, Mass., also targeted at nasty hospital infections, may soon receive FDA approval. Just four days before the approval of Tygacil, the FDA also gave the green light to Pfizer's Zmax, an important new formulation of an older antibiotic. Zmax is administered with merely one dose rather than given over a period of seven to 10 days - an all guns blazing assault on bacteria that cause sinusitis and pneumonia. "An antibiotic taken just once can address compliance issues and may minimize the emergence of antibiotic resistance," Dr. Michael Niederman, Chairman of the Department of Medicine at Winthrop University Hospital in Mineola, New York notes in a Pfizer press release. New Jersey-based Johnson & Johnson has two different broad-spectrum drugs in late-stage testing that are designed to overcome antibiotic resistance, ceftobiprole and doripenem. The Holy Grail of anti-bacterial drugs is one to which bugs cannot become resistant. One step in that direction may be further development of bacteriophages (Greek for "bacteria eaters".) These are viruses that attach to the bacterial surface and inject their DNA, which replicates until the bacterium explodes. These phages evolve just as bacteria do. The same forces that select for resistant bacteria also select for viruses that overcome that resistance.

No complete resistance is possible, and it's unlikely that antibiotics will become completely useless.

Abigail Salyers & Dixie Whitt 05, Microbiology Profs – U of Illinois, 2005, Revenge of the Microbes: how bacterial resistance is undermining the antibiotic miracle, p 38

If we lose antibiotics, will we return to a truly pre-antibiotic era? Before considering this question, let's define what we mean by lose. Although there are now some strains of bacteria that are pan-resistant or resistant to virtually all available antibiotics, these strains are still in the minority. Most disease-

causing bacteria remain susceptible to at least a few antibiotics. There even seem to be some bacteria, such as *Streptococcus pyogenes* (the cause of strep throat and a common cause of wound and bloodstream infections), *Chlamydia trachomatis* (the cause of a gonorrhea-like infection that can cause infertility and ectopic pregnancy), and *Treponema pallidum* (the cause of syphilis), that have remained steadfastly susceptible to most antibiotics. Scientists do not know why this is, and we may be in for some unpleasant surprises in cases like these if these bacterial slow learners finally catch up with the rest of the class, but for now it appears that some serious diseases would still be treatable. Even in the case of bacterial species that are noted for resistance to antibiotics, there are some strains that have remained susceptible to most antibiotics. There may be an important lesson in this. Why would the incidence of resistant strains within a species rise to, say 60% and then level off, leaving 40% of strains persistently susceptible? This is a phenomenon scientists don't understand, but such trends have been observed. Instead of focusing exclusively on strains that are becoming resistant to antibiotics, perhaps scientists ought to be paying some attention to those strains that seem not to have gotten onto the resistance bandwagon. In any event, there will probably not be a total loss of antibiotics. This is not to say that the situation will not be grim, but it may not become completely hopeless.

Bioterror

Defense

No risk of bioterror

Keller 13 (Rebecca, 7 March 2013, Analyst at Stratfor, "Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential," Stratfor, <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential>)

The risk of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and experts in the field have had a year to determine the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits. Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level three out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with national authorities. The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters **the risk is minimal**. The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the **likelihood** of a **successful attack** is **very low**. Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 -- or any influenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population. There are **severe constraints** that make **success** using either of these methods **unlikely**. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is **beyond the capability** of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as **wind patterns** and **humidity** can render an attack **ineffective**. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is **doubtful** with a **serious disease** like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact.

No impact - mitigation efforts

Enemark 11 (Christian, PhD from Australian National University and Associate Professor of National Security Policy in the Crawford School of Public Policy at ANU, "Farewell to WMD: The Language and Science of Mass Destruction," Contemporary Security Policy, 32:2, pgs. 382-400, <http://www.contemporarysecuritypolicy.org/assets/CSP-32-2-Enemark.pdf>)

The third category of non-nuclear WMD, chemical weapons, have destructive power more readily comparable to conventional weapons. **A chemical weapon is a toxic chemical compound directed against the tissue of a living target to cause injury, incapacitation or death**. The critical requirements for turning a chemical agent into an effective weapon are that it be toxic enough to produce the desired level of casualties and stable enough to survive dissemination either through explosion of the delivery munition or passage through a spray device. However, **even if delivered successfully, a number of atmospheric or ground conditions can influence the action of a chemical agent. These include air and ground temperature, exposure to sunlight, humidity, precipitation, wind speed and direction, soil conditions and terrain**.²⁶ For example, **high ground temperature could cause the agent to decompose, high wind velocity could cause its dilution, and heavy precipitation could wash the agent away**.²⁷ Towards the end of the Second World

War, British officials reportedly considered attacking Tokyo with phosgene and mustard. A government-employed academic, Professor D. Brunt, investigated the advantages and disadvantages of attacking the city in the winter or the summer, and how to maximize casualties by attacking a crowded neighbourhood rather than a more open area. In advice dated 8 May 1944, he wrote: 'The winter is on the average cold, and may be so cold that the danger from mustard gas would be negligible.'²⁸ The hot summer would have been a better time to attack, 'provided that the attack took place during a gap in the heavy rain that typically occurred'.²⁹ Brunt also noted that 'In the densely built areas of Japanese-type buildings, where the streets are narrow, the flow of a gas cloud would be hindered by the narrowness of the streets.'³⁰ **The empirical record for chemical weapons is greater than that for biological weapons, although it still suggests strongly that the former cannot plausibly be categorized as WMD. During the First World War, only two to three per cent of those soldiers gassed on the Western Front died, whereas battle wounds caused by conventional weapons were up to 12 times more likely to result in death.**³¹ On average it took over a ton of gas to produce a single fatality,³² and gas accounted for less than one per cent of battle deaths.³³ **The 1988 Iraqi attack on the Kurdish town of Halabja using a combination of chemical and conventional munitions resulted in up to 5,000 deaths,**³⁴ **and the 1995 attack on the Tokyo subway by members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult using the nerve agent sarin resulted ultimately in 13 deaths.**³⁵ **There is no empirical data on the effects of chemical weapons used in large numbers against cities, although** Thomas McNaughton **has suggested that the likely slow dissipation of chemical agents would cause greater damage when used against cities than when used tactically.**³⁶ Nevertheless, **compared to a nuclear blast, against which there can be no defence, a state could mitigate a chemical attack on a population centre by issuing protective gear, and the slow spread of chemicals would allow some time for evacuation.**³⁷ According to a 1993 report by the US Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) entitled Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, **'chemical weapons must be delivered in great quantities to approach the potential lethality of nuclear and biological weapons'**.³⁸ However, **the same can be said for conventional weapons. Two days of firebombing raids on Dresden in 1945 killed an estimated 25,000 German people,**³⁹ one week of conventional bombing in July and August 1943 killed around 50,000 German citizens in Hamburg, and a single night of firebombing killed an estimated 100,000 Japanese people in Tokyo in March 1945.⁴⁰ **The OTA assessment of chemical weapons thus hardly merited their inclusion in a report on weapons of mass destruction from which conventional weapons were deliberately excluded.**

Overfishing

No Impact

Apocalyptic claims that fisheries are collapsing from overfishing are unsupported by data and counterproductive.

Hilborn, 10 – Professor, Aquatic and Fishery Sciences, University of Washington [Ray, Apocalypse Forestalled: Why All the World's Fisheries Aren't Collapsing, The Science Chronicles, Nov 10, <http://www.atsea.org/doc/Hilborn%202010%20Science%20Chronicles%202010-11-1.pdf>, 6/26/14] CC

If you have paid any attention to the conservation literature or science journalism over the last five years, **you likely have gotten the impression that our oceans are so poorly managed that they soon will be empty of fish — unless governments order drastic curtailment of current fishing practices**, including the establishment of huge no-take zones across great swaths of the oceans. To be fair, there are some places where such severe declines may be true. **A more balanced diagnosis, however, tells a different story** — one that still requires changes in some fishing practices, but **that is far from alarmist. But this balanced diagnosis is being almost wholly ignored in favor of an apocalyptic rhetoric that obscures the true issues fisheries face as well as the correct cures for those problems.** To get the storyline correct, it is important to go back to the sources of the **apocalyptic rhetoric**. In 2006, a paper was published by Boris Worm in Science (Worm et al. 2006) that received enormous press coverage. It argued that, if current trends continued, all fish stocks would collapse by 2048. Worm and his coauthors concluded their paper with the following sentence: "Our analyses suggest that business as usual would foreshadow serious threats to global food security, coastal water quality, and ecosystem stability, affecting current and future generations." Others joined in, chief among them Daniel Pauly, who rang and continues to ring the apocalyptic note. "There are basically two alternatives for fisheries science and management: one is obviously continuing with business as usual..." wrote Pauly in 2009 (Pauly 2009a). "This would lead, in addition to further depletion of biodiversity, to intensification of 'fishing down marine food webs,' which ultimately involves the trans-formation of marine ecosystems into dead zones." It might surprise you to learn Pauly's views **are not universally held among scientists**. Indeed, these **papers exposed a deep divide in the marine science community over the state of fish stocks and the success of existing fisheries management approaches**. Numerous critiques of the apocalyptic stance were published after the 2006 paper, suggesting that Worm et al. had greatly exaggerated the failings of "business as usual." For instance, Steve Murawski, director of scientific programs and chief science advisor, defended the U.S. fisheries management system and pointed out that the proportion of stocks overfished in the U.S. was declining, not increasing (Murawski et al. 2007). No one disagrees on our goals for the world's fisheries stocks — we need higher fish abundances. The arguments are largely about where we are now and how we will get to higher fish abundance and lower fishing pressure. Are current fisheries management systems working to decimate fish stocks...or rebuild them? Do we need large areas of the oceans closed to fishing to assure sustainable seafood supply? Daniel Pauly says yes to the latter question: "This trans-formation," he writes, "would also require extensive use of ocean zoning and spatial closures, including no-take marine protected areas (MPAs). Indeed, MPAs must be at the core of any scheme intending to put fisheries on an ecologically sustainable basis" (Pauly 2009a). **In an attempt to resolve this dispute**, Boris Worm and I several years ago organized **a set of four meetings, sponsored by the National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis (NCEAS)**, in which we **assembled a database on abundance as measured by fisheries agencies and research surveys**. Participants included several of the authors of the 2006 paper as well **as several people from national fisheries management agencies. The results** were published in Science in 2009 (Worm et al. 2009), and **showed that, while the majority of stocks were still below target levels, fishing pressure had been reduced in most ecosystems** (for which we had data) **to below the point that would assure long-term maximum sustainable yield of fish from those ecosystems**. About 30 percent of the stocks would currently be classified as overfished — but, generally, **fishing pressure has been reduced enough that all but 17 per-cent of stocks would be expected to recover** to above overfished thresholds if current fishing pressure continues. **In the United States, there was clear evidence for the rebuilding of marine ecosystems and stock biomass. The idea that 70 percent of the world's fish stocks are overfished or collapsed and that the rate of overfishing is accelerating** (Pauly 2007) **was shown** by Worm et al. (2009) and FAO (2009) **to be untrue**. The Science paper coming out of the NCEAS group also showed that the success in reducing fishing pressure had been achieved by a broad range of traditional fisheries management tools — including catch-and-effort limitation, gear restrictions and temporary closed areas. Marine protected areas were an insignificant factor in the success achieved. **The database generated** by the NCEAS group and subsequent analysis **has shown that** many of the **assumptions fueling the standard apocalyptic scenarios painted by the gloom-and-doom proponents** are un-true: • For instance, **the widespread notion that fishermen generally sequentially deplete food webs** (Pauly et al. 1998) — starting with the predators and working their way down — **is simply not supported by data**. • **Declining trophic level of fishery landings is just as often a result of new**

fisheries developing rather than old ones collapsing (Essington et al. 2006). • Catch data also show that fishing patterns are driven by economics, with trophic level a poor predictor of exploitation history (Sethi et al. 2010). • Furthermore, the mean trophic level of marine ecosystems is unrelated to (or even negatively correlated with) the trophic level of fishery landings (Branch et al. 2010). • **And the oft-cited assessment that the large fish of the oceans were collapsed by 1980** (Myers and Worm 2003) **is totally inconsistent with the database** we have assembled — for instance, world tuna stocks in total are at present well above the level that would produce maximum sustained yield, except bluefin tuna and some other billfish that are depleted (Hutchings 2010). **Nevertheless, many in the marine conservation community appear unwilling to accept these results, continue to insist that all fish may be gone by 2048,** and use declining catches in fisheries where regulations have reduced catches as indications of stock collapse. No one argues that all fisheries are well-managed, and so far we do not have abundance estimates for many parts of the world, especially Asia and Africa. Using the catch-based methods of Worm et al. (2006) and Pauly, these areas appear to have fewer stock collapses and overfished stocks than in the areas for which we have abundance data. However, we do not know if these areas have been reducing exploitation rates or if they are still increasing. Finally, in places without strong central government control of fishing, there is broad agreement that community-based co-management can be effective. For these fisheries, management tools are very different than those used for industrial fishery stocks, and MPAs are here often a key ingredient. The lessons from the Worm et al. (2009) paper about what works to rebuild fish stocks are applicable to industrial fisheries, but probably not to the small-scale fisheries that support many fishing communities. There is considerable room for policy debate about where we want to be in the tradeoff between yield and environmental impact of fishing. There is no denying that sustainable fishing changes ecosystems, and that different societies will almost certainly make different choices about how much environmental change they will accept in return for sustainable food production. But science cannot provide the answers for this debate; it can only evaluate the tradeoffs. My perspective is that we need to treat fisheries like medical diagnoses. We must identify which fisheries are in trouble and find the cures for those individual fisheries. The evidence is strong that we can and are rebuilding stocks in many places. Let us accept that progress and identify the problem stocks and how to fix them. **Apocalyptic assertions that fisheries management is failing are counter-productive — not only because these assertions are untrue, but because they fail to recognize the long, hard work of fishery managers, scientists and stakeholders in the many places where management is working.** While the gloom-and-doom advocates have been attracting public attention and press coverage, thousands of people — decried by Pauly (2009b) as agents of the commercial fishing interests — have worked through years of meetings and painful catch and effort reductions to lower fishing pressure and successfully rebuild fisheries.

Alt Causes

Alt cause: fishing precedes all other factors causing ocean death.

Craig and Hughes, 12 – environmental law scholar who has written important works on water and ocean and coastal issues, Director of the Australian Research Council (ARC) Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies [Robin Kudis and Terry, Marine Protected Areas, Marine Spatial Planning, and the Resilience of Marine Ecosystems, Resilience and the Law, 8/16/12, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1917696, 6/24/14] CC

Moreover, the study emphasized that **both commercial and recreational fishing “can cause cascading trophic effects that alter the structure, function, and productivity of marine ecosystems,”** and where recreational fishing actually outstrips commercial **fishing, it “can have equally serious ecological and economic consequences on fished populations”** (Coleman et al. 11 2004: 1959). **Fishers, quite naturally, prefer to catch the largest fish of the species they are targeting, and they often prefer to target large apex predators—tuna, swordfish—to begin with** (Coleman et al. 2004). **Both preferences have consequences for marine ecosystem function.** First, by targeting large predators, **fishers can wipe out (or nearly so) an entire trophic level of the relevant ecosystem’s food web, changing the abundances of species, distorting foodwebs, and eroding the resilience of the ecosystem.** In the heavily fished main Hawaiian Islands, for example, apex predators account for about three percent of the biomass of the coral reef ecosystems, while in the more isolated Northwest Hawaiian Islands, apex predators account for 54 percent of the biomass—a significant shift in food-web structure and ecosystem function. **As apex predatory species become depleted, fishing effort typically expands or switches to large and then small herbivores, planktivores and detritivores, a phenomenon known as “fishing down the food chain.”** Second, by targeting the largest individuals of a species, **fishers can change the species’ reproduction dynamics. The biggest fish produce disproportionately more offspring—i.e., the relationship between body size and fecundity is strongly non-linear (Roberts & Hawkins 2000). Moreover, in some heavily targeted species such as parrotfishes, individual fish undergo a sex change as they mature (Roberts & Hawkins 2000). Fishing can also exert strong evolutionary pressures on fishes, selecting for individuals that reach reproductive size earlier. Thus, by targeting the largest fish, fishers may alter sex ratios, puberty size, and reproductive capacity as well as overall abundances.** Fishers invariably catch non-target species, or bycatch. Very few fishing methods, especially at the commercial scale, can limit the kinds of species caught: long lines attract seabirds, marine mammals, and sharks as well as target fish; nets and traps capture species and juveniles that are too big to slip through the mesh. Improvements to gear, such as turtle exclusion devices on shrimp nets or escape slots on traps, can help to reduce bycatch. Banning netting in habitats where vulnerable species such as dugongs are prevalent can also reduce bycatch rates. Under most fisheries regimes, fishers throw the dead and dying bycatch back into the ocean, making accurate estimates of bycatch very difficult. Moreover, “ghost fishing” by discarded or lost fishing nets and traps can continue to catch and kill fish and other marine creatures for years (UNFAO 2005). Finally, certain **fishing methods destroy the marine habitat necessary to support healthy ocean ecosystems. Blast fishing and fishing through cyanide poisoning on coral reefs are obvious examples** (McClellan 2010). More controversially, perhaps, **bottom trawling is recognized as an ecosystem-destroying fishing method.** As the United States’ National Research Council recognized in 2002, “[t]rawl gear can crush, bury, or expose marine flora and fauna and reduce structural diversity” (NRC 2002: 20). **Bottom trawling and dredging have flattened the three-dimensional habitat** formed by sponges, sea fans and deep-water corals in many of the world’s fishing grounds. **The cumulative impacts of fishing on marine ecosystem structure and function** (and hence overall resilience) **are most obvious from an historical perspective.** Many of the impacts of fishing are cumulative over long periods, making them easy to miss or ignore. In 1995, Daniel Pauly coined the phrase “shifting baseline syndrome” to describe a pervasive phenomenon in fisheries management: Essentially, this syndrome has arisen because each generation of fisheries scientists accepts as a baseline the stock size and species composition that occurred at the beginning of their careers, and uses this to evaluate changes. When the next generation starts its career, the stocks have further declined, but it is the stocks at that time that serve as a new baseline. The result obviously is a gradual shift of the baseline, a gradual accommodation of the creeping disappearance of resource species, and inappropriate reference points for evaluating economic losses resulting from overfishing, or for identifying targets for rehabilitation measures (Pauly 1995: 430). An historical perspective on the status and trajectory of marine ecosystems is thus critical in assessing their resilience. Moreover, **historical overfishing may be the key culprit in pushing these ecosystems towards a tipping point**

(Steneck et al. 2011, Hughes 1994). In 2001, after examining a variety of historical records and evidence, nineteen marine scientists jointly concluded that “[e]cological extinction caused by overfishing precedes all other pervasive human disturbance to coastal ecosystems, including pollution, degradation of water quality, and anthropogenic climate change” (Jackson et al. 2001b: 629). This study emphasized the significantly greater abundance of almost all fished marine species in historical times, and outlined the already-existing impacts of historical overfishing, theorizing that centuries of overfishing have set in motion processes that caused or contributed to current—and, the authors speculated—future collapses of marine ecosystems (Jackson et al. 2001b). For example, in the Pacific Northwest and Alaska, fur traders hunted sea otters “to the brink of extinction” by the 1800s in many kelp forest ecosystems, allowing sea urchins to multiply in the absence of their main predator; the sea urchins then ate the kelp itself, decimating the entire ecosystem (Jackson et al. 2001b: 631). This regime-shift persists today, except in areas where recovery of sea otters is underway.

Current fishing management makes eventual ocean collapse inevitable.

Wilson et al, 9 – Professor MSO in Fisheries Sociology, Sociologist, PhD. Michigan State University [Douglas Clyde Wilson, Kjellrun Hiis Hauge, Belinda Cleeland, Fisheries Depletion and Collapse, International Risk Governance Council, 9, http://irgc.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Fisheries_Depletion_full_case_study_web.pdf, 6/24/14] CC

Until the late 19th century, the fish resources of the world’s vast oceans were thought to be essentially inexhaustible, even by the most prominent biologists [Smith, 1994]. **As the fishing industry expanded and technology made larger catches possible and more areas of the ocean exploitable, the received wisdom that fisheries were inexhaustible soon became discredited**. FAO estimates that **25% of the world’s fish stocks are currently being fished at an unsustainable level [FAO, 2007:29], thus risking collapse**. **Fish are a common pool resource, meaning that it is difficult to exclude users and that exploitation by one user reduces the resource availability for others** [Ostrom et al. 1999]. Common pool resources are found when a system of individual property rights is insufficient for sustainability or too costly to implement [Bromely, 1991]. **Furthermore, in many cases, especially in long-distance fisheries and in developing countries, they are effectively an open access resource, meaning that a system of property rights is completely absent and thus the fish can be caught by anyone**. When common pool resources are valuable and open access, overexploitation is inevitable because users have no incentive to conserve when the fruits of such conservation can simply be taken by another user. **The outcome of such a situation is overfishing and eventual collapse**. This is why management is required if fish are to be harvested in a sustainable and economically efficient manner. Because fisheries are common pool resources they are often owned and managed as “common property” by governments or other collective entities. These entities seek to avoid the commons dilemma by granting conditional rights of access, for example a fishing license or a rule that only certain fishing techniques can be used. Although it is a common mistake, common property should never be confused with open access because common property regimes involve these access rights. However group-level management arrangements are challenging and costly, and often require the development of complex management systems.

Democracy

No Impact

1. No impact – Peace produces democracy, not the other way around. They also overlook aggression that isn't formal war.

Binnur Ozkececi-Taner, 02, Ph.D.Candidate, Department of Political Science at Syracuse University, Fall 2002, "The Myth of Democratic Peace"
<http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume1/number3/binnurozkececi.htm>

One can also dispute the fact that democracy produces peace by claiming that it is the peace that produces democracy.(29) This argument presents a new problem to the "democratic peace" theory, suggesting an unclear causal link. Furthermore, as Hermann and Kegley suggested, "democratic peace" theorists have overlooked instances of coercive actions short of formal war by suggesting that there were at least fifteen incidents of unequivocally democratic states intervening with military force against other democracies.(30) This is a result of "democratic peace" theorists not making any explicit claims about the sources of non-democratic war or peace, and their total negligence, if not ignorance, of constraints on the authoritarian leaders.(31)

2. Democratic peace not true – Other factors account for peace between democracies

Stephen M. Walt 99; Professor of Political Science and Master of the Social Science Collegiate Division at the U of Chicago., Foreign Affairs January, 1999 / February, 1999

Critics of the democratic-peace hypothesis make two main counterarguments. Their first line of attack holds that the apparent pacifism between democracies may be a statistical artifact: because democracies have been relatively rare throughout history, the absence of wars between them may be due largely to chance. Evidence for a democratic peace also depends on the time periods one examines and on how one interprets borderline cases like the War of 1812 or the American Civil War. Critics also note that strong statistical support for the proposition is limited to the period after World War II, when both the U.S.-led alliance system and the Soviet threat to Western Europe's democracies discouraged conflict between republics. A second challenge focuses on the causal logic of the theory itself. Democratic-peace proponents often attribute the absence of war between republics to a sense of tolerance and shared values that makes using force against fellow republics illegitimate. (As noted above, Walt's version of this argument emphasizes the tendency for republics to see similar states as part of their own "in-group.") If this theory is true, however, there should be concrete historical evidence showing that democratic leaders eschewed violence against each other primarily for this reason. But critics like Christopher Layne have shown that when democratic states have come close to war, they have held back for reasons that had more to do with strategic interests than shared political culture. These cases suggest that even if democracies have tended not to fight each other in the past, it is not because they were democracies.

3. Democracy doesn't solve peace – Lurking variables.

Waltz 2k Kenneth Waltz, Research Assoc. of the Inst. of War and Peace Studies and Adj. Prof. at Columbia U, 2000 (International Security, Spring, p. 5, Structural Realism After the Cold War) (MHARV6424)

Every student of international politics is aware of the statistical data supporting the democratic peace thesis. Everyone has also known at least since David Hume that we have no reason to believe that the association of events provides a basis for inferring the presence of a causal relation. John Mueller properly speculates that it is not democracy that causes peace but that other conditions cause both democracy and peace. Some of the major democracies--Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States in the twentieth century--have been among the most powerful states of their eras. Powerful states often gain their ends by peaceful means where weaker states either fail or have to resort to war. Thus, the American government deemed the democratically elected Juan Bosch of the Dominican Republic too weak to bring order to his country. The United States toppled his government by sending 23,000 troops within a week, troops whose mere presence made fighting a war unnecessary. Salvador Allende, democratically elected ruler of Chile, was systematically and effectively undermined by the United States, without the open use of force, because its leaders thought that his government was taking a wrong turn. As Henry Kissinger put it: "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people." That is the way it is with democracies--their people may show bad judgment. "Wayward" democracies are especially tempting objects of intervention by other democracies that wish to save them. American policy may have been wise in both cases, but its actions surely cast doubt on the democratic peace thesis. So do the instances when a democracy did fight another democracy. So do the instances in which democratically elected legislatures have clamored for war, as has happened for example in Pakistan and Jordan.